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ABSTRACT
The air transportation system in the United States is in a state of constant change and adaptation.
Greatly affected by rapid changes in the industry are the large commercial airports that handle
the greater proportion of passenger traffic. To increase capacity, maintain adequate levels of
safety and security, and provide increased convenience and comfort to passengers, these
airports need to invest heavily in capital programs, whose prices continue to escalate rapidly.
The funding of capital programs for airports in the United States is closely associated with their
operating revenue structures. Therefore, this thesis develops a framework for understanding
these operating revenue structures. The high concentration of the air traffic in the United States
suggests that a large portion of investment in airport infrastructure will be destined to few large
facilities. Hence the primary area of concern of this study is the largest commercial airports in the
United States
Part I examines the financial data of the airports at the aggregate level to create a consolidated
financial profile of these facilities. The consolidated operating revenue is analyzed to identify the
most important line items. Special consideration is given to the alternative cost recovery
methodologies - residual, compensatory and hybrid - used by airport operators to set their
aeronautical fees. The objective of this exercise is to identify the main drivers and factors that
shape the revenue structure of large commercial airports. In addition, by synthesizing scattered
operational and financial data, the research highlights the impact of airport operations and
business practices on the airports' revenues.
Part Il contains the case studies of three airports. Each case is evaluated within the basic
framework used to analyze the system at an aggregate level in Part 1. However, the evaluation of
the case studies also emphasizes the unique characteristics of each case. The case studies
include Logan International Airport in Boston (BOS), Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport
(DFW), and Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI).
Thesis Co-Supervisor: Amedeo R. Odoni
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Thesis Co-Supervisor: Jody Hoffer Gittell
Title: Assistant Professor
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PART I
OVERVIEW
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Goals of the Thesis
The air transportation system in the United States is in a state of constant change and adaptation.
Greatly affected by rapid changes in the industry are the large commercial airports that handle the
greater proportion of passenger traffic. Traffic volumes at these facilities continue to grow,
showing increasing levels of concentration. For instance, in 2000 the 31 large hub airports which
represent about one percent of the airports in the national system handled over 74% or passenger
enplanements (FAA 2001, 77, 78).
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To increase capacity, maintain adequate levels of safety and security, and provide increased
convenience and comfort to passengers, airports need to invest heavily in capital programs. Also,
as a direct consequence of the events of September 11, 2001, additional security-related
investments will also be required in the U.S. airport network. The system is undergoing a major
review of security procedures, since existing design standards of airport facilities may no longer
conform to new security requirements. These airports also face the need to invest in special
capital programs to adapt their facilities for the introduction of new large aircraft (NLA).'
Overall, airports face pressure to undertake major capital programs whose prices continue to
escalate rapidly.
It is also clear that the capacity, safety and security problems of these airports have to be faced in
a systematic and cohesive way. For example, efforts to improve capacity of the airspace, such as
the reduction of separation standards, have to be matched with corresponding increased capacity
at the individual airport facilities.
The need for investments in security, investments to prepare for the introduction of new large
aircraft, and investments in the expansion of airspace and airport capacity call for comprehensive
airport financial information and data to help managers and policymakers assess existing financial
trends and identify future sources of revenue to fund capital programs.
Today airports are capable of raising large amounts of money to fund their capital programs.
However one cannot avoid asking a few questions: Are the resources being used adequately? Is
the current model for funding capital programs appropriate? Are there better alternatives? Are the
needs of airport operators, the airlines, and the airport system in general being addressed in
coordinated fashion? Is the role of the federal government adequate? Do capital programs have a
local focus, or address issues of national concern, or both?
1 The GAO surveyed 14 airports that expect to serve NLA by 2010. These airports estimated that
collectively their cost for infrastructure changes to accommodate NLA will be approximately $2.1 billion.
The 14 airports surveyed include LAX, ORD, JFK, SFO, DFW, IAD, MEM, ATL, IAH, MCO, MIA,
DEN, Ted Stevens Anchorage International, and Indianapolis International.
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A literature review on the topic shows little academic work on the subject. Conversely, the U.S.
government, trade organizations and financial institutions, especially credit rating agencies, have
contributed and continue to be major contributors to this field. However, a comprehensive
analysis of the operating revenue structure of large hub airports is still missing. Existing work
usually focuses on specific subjects and lacks a comprehensive approach to analysis and
evaluation (e.g., the incorporation of operational issues or policy implications into the evaluation
process).
The focus and scope of existing research varies from case to case. Relevant references will be
provided in the main body of the thesis. Generally speaking, the work produced by the FAA is by
far the most comprehensive, always incorporating a systems view. Reports produced by the GAO
are, on the other hand, very focused on specific topics and lack continuity (as they respond to
specific requests from Congress). The focus of the Airports Council International-North America
(ACI-NA), the Air Transport Association (ATA), and other trade organizations is from the
perspective of their constituents, while credit rating agencies are case-specific. The linkage of
various types of information and data generated by these organizations has a great value in the
aggregate that can benefit all stakeholders in the air transportation industry.
Policy makers and most importantly the general public will benefit from increased access to
more comprehensive information. Availability and standardization of airports' financial data can
be a valuable tool in the decision-making process for future investment in the nation's air
transportation system. Lack of comprehensive information, on the other hand, can lead to
investment in capital programs that can be costly in the long-run. For example, a capital program
with local focus might be tailored to fit the needs of a specific airline, but might not necessarily
foster airline competition. Thus, this type of investment would be a disservice to the general
public.
This thesis will analyze the operating revenue framework of the universe 2 of large hub airports in
the United States. By examining first the financial data of the airports at the aggregate level, a
consolidated financial profile of these facilities will be created. Then, the study will analyze the
2 The data provided by the FAA include information on all large hub airports.
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operating revenue framework. The objective will be to identify the main drivers and factors that
shape the revenue structure of large commercial airports.
In addition, by synthesizing scattered operational and financial data, the research will attempt to
highlight the impact of airport operations and business practices on the revenue structure of large
commercial airports. It is hoped that this study will contribute to providing a national perspective
for decision-makers addressing local capital programs.
1.2 Structure and Outline of the Thesis
This study has benefited greatly from technical reports prepared by government agencies such as
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) of the
U.S. Congress, as well as documents published by the three leading credit rating agencies:
Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investor's Services, and Fitch IBCA. In addition, the study relied
heavily on reports and data from the Airports Council International - North America (ACI-NA),
American Transport Association (ATA), and the 2002 Aviation & Aerospace Almanac published
by Aviation Week.
The core financial information was provided by the FAA. The data are based on financial reports
that airport operators file with the FAA. Since 1996, the FAA requires that all airports receiving
federal assistance or charging passenger facility charges (PFCs) report their financial status at the
end of the fiscal year. Fortunately for this project, all 31 large hub airports included in this study
are required to file Form 5100-127 with the FAA. Earlier attempts by Airports Council
International North-America to consolidate financial data from the airports' annual reports were
fruitless due to major differences in reporting and accounting procedures (Plavin 2002).
The financial data from the FAA were complemented with data from the 2001 ACI-NA General
Information Survey. This comprehensive data set contains a wealth of information on many
relevant issues that include ownership, governance and management, operations, contractual
agreements, and capital programs expenditures. This information, as well as the data collected by
the FAA, has been used with caution, since the data requested was in several instances subject to
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the interpretation of the respondents. To verify the accuracy of some of the data the author relied
on telephone calls to airport, FAA, GAO, and ACI-NA officials and on confirming the
information against the airports' annual reports. An explanation is provided in every case when
adjustments were made to the original data. Given the numerous sources used and the various
time frames involved, it is important to mention that all amounts are presented in current dollars.
The study starts with a comprehensive view of issues affecting the operating revenue structure of
large commercial airports in the United States. Part I, which includes chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4,
examines large commercial airports at an aggregate level. The high concentration of the air traffic
in the U.S. suggests that a large portion of investment in airport infrastructure will be destined for
the large hub airports3. Hence the primary area of concern of this study is the largest commercial
airports in the U.S. Then Part I, links analyzed revenue line items to the drivers that influence the
airports' revenue streams. In addition, financial alternatives and funding trends are examined
against capital program needs.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the state of the airport system in the United States
emphasizing the importance of the largest hubs to the nation's airport network. The chapter then
focuses on ownership, governance and management issues. Next, the chapter elaborates on the
types of cost recovery methodologies used by the airports to set their fees. This section analyzes
the airport-airline relationship and its impact on the revenue structure. At the end, the chapter
addresses issues related to competition among airlines in an airport setting.
Chapter 3 describes the resources most commonly used by large commercial airports to fund their
capital programs. Trends in funding explaining the role of key stakeholders are identified next.
The chapter further explains the participation of the federal government in the funding process.
In addition, the chapter includes a section detailing the vital role of the credit rating agencies in
the funding process for capital programs. Finally, the chapter focuses on the funding challenges
that airports face today and on the outlook for future funding.
3 The 2001 Aviation Capacity Enhancement Plan published by the FAA uses the term hub to identify very
busy commercial airports. This use is different from that of the airline industry, where a hub is an airport
where passengers connect with other flights coming from the spokes of the system. The NPIAS does not
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Chapter 4 explains the challenges associated with the comparison of financial data. Then it
evaluates the consolidated financial data of all large hub airports. Next, it analyzes (at the
aggregate level) the operating revenues and operating expenses. The federal government
programs used to fund capital programs are also assessed. Then, the chapter gauges the
performance of the three cost recovery methodologies used by airport operators to set their fees
against operating revenues and expenses, as well as operating margins. The last section of
Chapter 4 identifies the main drivers affecting operating revenues of large commercial airports. It
shows how the relationship between the airlines and the airport influence aeronautical operating
revenues. It further identifies the business practices that shape non-aeronautical operating
revenues, and presents the policy factors that shape government funding.
Part II, which includes chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, contains the case studies of three airports. Each
case is evaluated with the basic framework used to analyze the system at an aggregate level in
Part I. However, the evaluation of the case studies emphasizes the unique characteristics of each
case. The case studies include Logan International Airport in Boston (BOS), Dallas/Fort Worth
International Airport (DFW), and Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI). Each case
includes a 10-year historical review of operating revenues and expenditures, followed by an
analysis of their revenue structure at the end of the period. Next, the case studies focus on the
participation of the federal government in the funding of capital programs. Finally, each case
includes an analysis of the corresponding airport's debt service and current financial standing. It
is important to mention that the cases were carefully chosen to ensure that they represent a broad
range of issues affecting most large hub airports in the U.S.
Chapter 5 presents an analysis of Logan International Airport operating revenue framework. The
chapter assesses the operating revenue framework. Then, the focus shifts to BOS' compensatory
method for fee-setting and how its use influences the operator's business decisions. The capital
investment program and funding sources are also examined. Special attention is given to recent
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differentiate between airports with mostly connecting traffic and those with mostly origin-destination
(O&D) traffic (FAA 2001, 76).
developments that include the slow down in the economy and the impact of Sept. 11 on the
airport's business.
Chapter 6 assesses Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. After a general description of the
airport, the chapter reviews the airport's operating revenue framework focusing on the revenue
line items setting the trends. DFW's rate-setting methodology is highlighted against its revenue
trends. At the end the capital program is assessed against DFW funding sources, as well as the
airport's debt service.
Chapter 7 features Baltimore/Washington International Airport, one of the fastest growing
facilities in the nation in terms of passenger traffic. The chapter highlights the main factors that
caused this growth and the links between traffic growth and operating revenues. Then, the chapter
focuses on the government contribution to BWI capital program. Finally, the chapter presents
recent developments and an outlook for the future.
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Chapter 2
The U.S. Airport System
From the early days of commercial aviation the U.S. airport system has played an important role
in the world's air transportation system. This is corroborated by the fact that during the last two
decades U.S. airports have continuously served about 40% of the world's air travelers. At the end
of 2000, 13 of the 20 busiest airports in the world in terms of annual passengers were located in
the United States.
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Commercial airports in the U.S. started to be built during the 1930s and 1940s. They were
mainly, small, single-runway facilities, constructed to handle propeller airplanes. In the late
1940s, air travel started to gain popularity, and by the 1950s had become a common alternative
for long trips (Champeau, Soltz and Fry 2000, 1). Today, air travel continues to grow and is
straining existing airport infrastructure as air traffic congestion is taking center stage in the
nation's largest commercial airports.
In 2000 over 669 million passengers were enplaned at U.S. airports (Figure 2.1), and latest
forecasts suggest that the number will exceed one billion by 20134 (Aviation Now 2002, 1). This
represents a 33% growth over an 11-year span. Given the present level of congestion at major
airports, government officials, the airlines, and airport operators continuously look for ways to
improve traffic flows. But the solution does not seem to be a reduction in traffic volumes or
dispersion of traffic. On the contrary, increased traffic volumes and traffic concentration is
encouraged and fostered because it represents enormous business potential for airlines and
airports alike. The dilemma of maintaining traffic growth while improving capacity in
constrained spaces is being addressed, at least in part, through direct investment in ambitious
capital programs at major U.S. airports.
After deregulation, as airlines searched for airport facilities suitable for their operations, traffic
started to concentrate on airports with advantageous geographical location. Most airline networks
began to evolve from a simple point-to-point system serving city pairs into elaborate hub-and-
spoke patterns. This configuration allows air carriers to connect to more destinations without
having to increase the number of aircraft. Hub-and-spoke networks converge on key hub airports
often located in a geographically strategic place, generally away from both the east and the west
coast, clustering around the geographical center of the U.S. territory (Figure 2.2).
4 In formulating its 27th annual commercial aviation forecast, the FAA took into consideration the negative
impact of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the air transportation system.
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Figure 2.1 Revenue Passengers Enplaned in the United States, 1980-2000
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According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) classification system in 2000 the U.S.
had 31 large hubs5 (large commercial airports). These airports represent about one percent of the
3,489 facilities of the National Airport System, yet these facilities enplaned over 74% of all
commercial passenger traffic in the country. As a result, these facilities have become the
bottleneck of the system and are under tremendous pressure to increase capacity and improve
their level of service. To cope with the problem there are many initiatives underway including
the modification of operational procedures, governance improvements and capital programs
s The 2001 Aviation Capacity Enhancement Plan published by the FAA uses the term hub to identify very
busy commercial airports. This use is different from that of the airline industry, where a hub is an airport
where passengers connect with other flights coming from the spokes of the system. The NPIAS does not
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(FAA and ARP Consulting 2000, 48). The funding of these initiatives is vital to guarantee the
safety, security and reliability of the air transportation system of the 21st century.
2.1 Composition of the U.S. Airport System
With over 19,000 airports, the US has the most extensive and complex air transport system in the
world. About 16,000 of these airports are very small facilities, most of them with fewer than 10
aircraft on site. However, the focus of this study is on the commercial passenger traffic which
takes place through the 3,489 airports that are part of the National Plan of Integrated Airport
Systems (NPIAS). All airports under the NPIAS are monitored by the FAA and are eligible to
receive federal funding as grants under the federal Airport Improvement Program (AIP) (Section
3.1.2). The FAA airport classification system is adjusted every year since the facilities are
categorized on the basis of annual traffic volumes. The following section describes the structure
of the NPIAS as of 2000.
National Airport System
The NPIAS divides airports into two main categories: general aviation airports and commercial
service airports. General aviation airports are facilities that serve small communities.
Commercial service airports are larger facilities located in more densely populated areas. During
2000, the NPIAS had 3,489 airports. Figure 2.2 displays graphically the composition of the
United States airport system highlighting the fact that airports with a high number of connecting
passengers are clustered away from both the west and east coast. By contrast, most airports along
both coasts are mainly points of origin or destination.
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differentiate between airports with mostly connecting traffic and those with mostly origin-destination
(O&D) traffic (FAA 2001, 76).
General Aviation Airports
General aviation airports are small facilities that have at least 10 based aircraft and have
fewer than 2,500 enplanements6 a year. The National Airport System had 2,943 General
Aviation Airports in 2000. The FAA has classified 260 general aviation airports as
relievers. Reliever facilities are generally located next to major metropolitan areas and
can be used as an alternative to larger, congested commercial service airports. Notable
airports in this category are: Merril Field in Anchorage, Alaska, Teterboro Airport in
New Jersey, and Van Nuys in California (FAA 2001, 27).
Commercial Service Airports
To be classified as a commercial service airport, an airport must enplane at least 2,500
passengers annually. In 2000 there were 546 airports that met this criterion. Commercial
service airports are divided into two main categories: those that enplane more than 10,000
passengers, and those that enplane less than 10,000 passengers. In 2000, 127 commercial
service airports enplaned less than 10,000 passengers. The same year a larger number of
facilities, that is 419 airports, enplaned more than 10,000 passengers. These are the
airports that serve most of the commercial air passengers, thus they are the primary
airports of the U.S. system. Primary airports are sub-classified by the FAA based on
annual enplanements as large hubs, medium hubs, small hubs, and non-hubs. Large hubs
are those that account for at least 1% of total enplanements. Medium hubs are airports
that account for between 0.25% and 1% of enplanements. Small hubs account from
0.05% to 0.25% of enplanements. Primary airports that account for more than 10,000
passengers, but for less than 0.05% of total enplanements are classified as non-hub
airports. Table 2.1 lists the classification of primary airports in the US for 2000.
6 One enplanement refers to one boarding passenger.
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Figure 2.2 Geographical Distribution Of Connecting Traffic At Large Commercial Airports In the U.S., Fiscal Year 2000
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Figure 2.3 Configuration of the U.S. Airport System, Fiscal Year 2000
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Table 2.1 Commercial Service Airports in the U.S., Fiscal Year 20007
Number Percent of Number of Enplanements
Category of Enplanements Description
Airports From To
Large hubs 31 70 6.69 million --- 1% or more
Medium hubs 35 20 1.67 million 6.69 million 0.25%- 1%
Small hubs 71 7 334,637 1.67 million 0.05 - 0.25 percent
Non-hubs 282 2.9 10,000 334,637 0.05 percent - 10,000
Other commercial service airports 127 0.1 2,500 10,000 Less than 10,000
Totals 546 100
Source: FAA's 2001 Aviation Capacity Enhancement Plan
Since the airport designation depends on traffic volumes, the hub classification can change from
year to year depending on the changes in traffic volumes. For example, from 1998 to 1999 the
number of large hubs increased from 30 to 31 with the addition of the Fort Lauderdale airport. In
this case, Fort Lauderdale's annual traffic growth outpaced the nation's traffic growth and thus
the airport captured more than one percent of the country's passenger traffic volume. By
contrast, during the same period, the number of medium hubs decreased from 42 to 37, and the
number of small hubs increased from 70 to 74. In 2000, the number of large hubs did not change,
but the number of medium hubs decreased to 35, and the number of small hubs decreased to 71
(FAA 2001, 76).
2.2 Ownership, Governance, and Management
The operators of modem airports must deal in one way or another with legal, financial, planning,
public affairs and government relations, administration, human resource, environmental,
engineering, technical, commercial, and operational issues (De Neufville and Odoni 2002). The
ownership structure, governance and management practices of these facilities largely determine
7 According to the FFA 669.2 million revenue passengers were enplaned in the U.S. airport system in 2000.
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the interaction of all these elements. The dynamics of these interactions ultimately determine the
revenue structure of an airport facility, as well.
In the United States large and medium-sized airports are mostly public entities under the
jurisdiction and control of local governments. Most facilities are owned and operated by cities
and counties and very few are under state or federal ownership. There are also a few airports
which fall under the jurisdiction of public entities specially created to manage airports, in some
cases in conjunction with other transportation-related facilities such as seaports, bridges, and
tunnels (e.g., Massachusetts Port Authority in New England and The Port Authority of New York
& New Jersey).
Figure 2.4 Ownership of Large Hub Airports in The United States, Fiscal Year 2000
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Table 2.2 Ownership And Management of Large Hub Airports in the U.S.,
Fiscal Year 2000
Ranking Airport Name Ownership Manageent &
Minneapolis/St Paul International Airport (a)
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport
O'Hare International Airport
Los Angeles International Airport
Denver International Airport
Sky Harbor International Airport
G Bush Intercontinental Airport
Lambert-St Louis International Airport
Orlando International Airport
Philadelphia International Airport
Charlotte/Douglas International Airport
Salt Lake City International Airport
Newark International Airport
JF Kennedy International Airport
La Guardia Airport
McCarran International Airport
Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport
Miami International Airport
Ft Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport
Pittsburgh International Airport
PHX
IAH
STL
MCO
PHL
CLT
SLC
EWR
JFK
LGA
LAS
DTW
MIA
FLL
PIT
TPA
IAD
DCA
DFW
SFO
SEA
BOS
SAN
CVG
HNL
BWI
11 MSP
1 ATL
2 ORD
3 LAX
6 DEN
(a) Modified. New information from interview with Patrick Hogan, Public Affairs Official at MSP.
(b) Modified. New information from Annual Report.
(c) Modified. New information from Annual Report.
(d) Modified information.
(e) Modified information.
(f) Modified. New information from website.
Source: 2001 ACl-NA General Information Survey
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Tampa International Airport (b)
Dulles International Airport (d)
R Reagan Washington National Airport (e)
Dallas/Ft Worth International Airport (c)
San Francisco Airport (f)
Seattle Tacoma International Airport
Logan International Airport
San Diego International Lindbergh Field Airport
Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport
Honolulu International Airport
Baltimore/Washington International Airport
Airports Commission
City
City
City
City
City
City
City
City
City
City
City
City
City
City
County
County
County
County
County
County
Federal Government
Federal Government
Multi-jurisditional
Multi-jurisditional
Port Authority
Port Authority
Port Authority
Regional
State
State
Airports Commission
City
City
City
City
City
City
City
Aviation Authority
City
City
City
Port Authority
Port Authority
Port Authority
County
County
County
County
Airport Authority
Aviation Authority
Airport Authority
Airport Authority
Airport Board
Airport Commission
Port Authority
Port Authority
Port Authority
Airport Authority
State
State
Figure 2.5 Management and Operation of Large Hub Airports in the United States,
Fiscal Year 2000
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Ownership
As Table 2.2 and Figure 2.4 show, the ownership and management structure of large commercial
airports in the U.S. is quite diverse. Fourteen airports or 46% are owned by local municipalities.
Six airports or about 20% are controlled by local counties, and two airports or 6% are state
owned. Another two facilities are owned by specially created airport authorities. Similarly, two
8
are owned by port authorities. Two facilities are owned by the federal government. Another
8 Through the Metropolitan Washington Act of 1986 Dulles (IAD) and National airports (DCA) were
leased and the operating responsibility was transferred from the federal government to the Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority (MWAA). MWAA started operating both airports, which are located in
Virginia just outside Washington D.C. on June 7, 1987, under a 50-year lease from the U.S. Department of
Transportation (GAO 2000, 1).
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two airports belong to multi-jurisdictional bodies,9 and one airport is part of a regional
government.
Management and Operation
As Table 2.2 indicates, most large commercial airports in the United States are managed and
operated by the owner. However, there a few cases where this does not apply. Eleven airports or
36% are managed by the municipality that owns the facility. Four airports are managed by the
county which owns the facility. Two are managed by the Department of Transportation of the
state that owns the airport. Seven facilities or 23% are managed by public entities created for the
purpose of operating the airport (i.e., airport authorities). Five airports or 16% are controlled by
public entities known as Port Authorities. In addition to airport facilities, Port Authorities may
control other transportation facilities such as seaports, tunnels and bridges (e.g., Massachusetts
Port Authority in New England and The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey). Finally,
there are two airports, or 6% of the total, which are managed by an airport commission or board
(Figure 2.5).
2.3 Cost Recovery Methodologies
The airlines, the main tenants of an airport facility, are also the main contributors to the airports
coffers. Therefore, the relationship between the airport operator and the airlines plays a crucial
role in determining the management, operational, and financial structure of airport facilities. The
nature of this relationship varies widely from case to case and depends on many factors such as
passenger demand, geographical location of the airport, level of revenues from non-aeronautical
sources, financial strength of the air carriers, etc. The method for calculating rates (cost recovery
methodology) airlines must pay for use of airport facilities and services is generally determined
through negotiated use and lease agreements or is set by local ordinances or resolutions (GAO
1998, 4).
9 The ownership of the Dallas/Fort Worth airport is shared by two cities. The San Francisco airport
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The use and lease agreements establish the terms and conditions governing the airlines' use of the
airport.' 0 These legally binding documents specify how the risks and responsibilities of running
the airport are to be shared. Sometimes use and lease agreements include majority-in-interest
clauses, which give the signatory airlines the right to review and to oppose capital programs
(Section 2.4.1) (US Congress 1984, 125). In many cases these agreements serve as the
foundation for the financing of airport facilities.
As indicated previously, there are some airports that operate without airline-operating
agreements, setting their fees by ordinance. This type of arrangement is used by airports whose
air traffic demand is based on the strength of the local market. These airports are in an
advantageous bargaining position that allows them to set rates unilaterally (e.g., JFK or BOS).
This, in addition, gives the airport a great deal of flexibility as the ultimate decision-maker on
sharing revenues with the airlines. It is likely under this scenario that the airport will retain
control over decisions on investments into capital programs (Whiteman, Hu and Cahill 2000, 12).
To understand the intricacies and differences among the cost recovery methodologies used by
airport administrators it is necessary to reflect upon the "cost center" concept. This is a concept
that has evolved over time as the nature of the business increased its level of sophistication.
During the early years of commercial aviation airports were viewed as public facilities whose
main objective was to serve the general public. In the U.S. the overwhelming majority of these
facilities were under the jurisdiction and control of local governments who were expected to
provide the infrastructure and services needed to allow airlines to operate. The role of the airport
administrators at the time was that of a facility manager. As traffic increased and converged at
key "hub airports," the sophistication of management practices at these facilities increased as
well. Airports that used to place all revenues and costs into a single account learned about the
advantages of dividing their operational or business units into "cost centers." The use of this
scheme allows airport administrators to assess the operational and financial efficiency of their
business units. The definition of cost centers is not standardized and can vary greatly from case
ownership is shared by the city and the county.
10 "Airport agreement" is used generically here to include both legal contracts for the airlines' use of
airfield facilities and leases for the use of terminal facilities. At many airports, both are combined in a
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to case (De Neufville and Odoni 2002). However, they are generally defined with reference to
their operating function (i.e., terminal buildings, airfields, roads and grounds, and cargo or
airfreight areas).
Large commercial airports in the U.S. use one of three cost recovery methodologies: residual,
compensatory or hybrid (Table 2.4). It is important to point out that the use and lease agreements
can vary dramatically from case to case since they are tailored by attorneys to fit the needs and
characteristics of specific facilities. As a result, no two agreements of the same type are exactly
the same.
2.3.1 Residual Approach
Under the residual scheme, cost centers are combined into a single system. The expenses of
operating the cost centers including administration, maintenance, operations, and debt service"
(including coverage) are put together into a single account (US Congress 1984, 126). Under this
type of agreement the airlines assume the financial risk for the operation of the airport and agree
to cover any deficit that the airport might have at the end of the fiscal year. Any surplus revenues
or deficit from the previous year is credited or charged to the airlines when calculating airline
landing fees or other rates for the following year. When the non-aeronautical cost centers
generate substantial profits, the airlines can benefit by having their costs reduced. In short, under
this type of agreement the air carriers pay landing fees sufficient to ensure a minimum of break-
even operations for the entire facility. Thus, the airlines assume the total financial risk and ensure
that the airport is kept whole. (Whiteman, Hu and Cahill 2000, 11)
Figure 2.6 shows the way the residual agreement is set up. Each column in the drawing
represents a cost center (in this case the airside and lanside have three cost centers each). The
residual methodology implies transfer of funds from one side to the other. For example, a
parking revenue surplus can be transferred to the airside causing a reduction to the landing fees
the airlines have to pay. Conversely, losses at the landside cost centers would need to be
single document. A few commercial airports do not negotiate airport use agreements with the airlines, but
instead charge rates and fees set by local ordinance.
" Debt service coverage is the requirement that the airport's revenues, net of operating and maintenance
expenses, be equal to a specified percentage in excess of the annual debt service (principal and interest
Page 38
balanced by money from the airside. In this case, the airlines will have their fees increased to
cover the losses of the cost centers on the landside. Chapter 6 analyzes the operating revenue
structure of Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) highlighting its residual agreement
with the airlines.
Figure 2.6 Residual Scheme
Airside Landside
2.3.2 Compensatory Approach
The compensatory approach requires cost centers to be operated as financially independent units,
eliminating the transfer of surpluses and deficits among them. Under this type of arrangement,
the airport assumes the financial risk associated with the operation of the facility. This of
arrangement does not guarantee that the costs associated with running the facility will be covered
by the airlines. Therefore, if there are deficits they will be the airport's responsibility. Under
compensatory agreements the airlines will pay only for the cost of using a facility, and contrary to
the residual approach will not have to cover shortfalls from the centers that they are not using
(i.e., retail space, access roads, parking facilities, etc.), neither will they benefit from reductions in
payments) for revenue bond issues. The coverage required is generally form 1.25 to 1.40 times debt
service, thereby providing a substantial cushion that enhances the security of the bonds.
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aeronautical expenses due to surpluses from non-aeronautical cost centers. Figure 2.7 shows that
each cost center operates as an independent unit. Chapter 5 highlights the compensatory
arrangement used by Logan International Airport (BOS).
Figure 2.7 Compensatory Scheme
Airside Landside
2.3.3 Hybrid Approach
In recent years airports started combining elements of the residual and compensatory cost
recovery methodologies. Under this scheme, an airport applies a compensatory scheme to most
cost centers, except for one or two cost centers that could help reduce the size of landing or rental
fees. Figure 2.8 shows how individual cost centers can be "linked" with each other. For
example, in a hybrid arrangement the surplus from parking revenues can be used to lower the
passenger building rentals or landing fees. In 1998 the General Accounting Office (GAO) of the
U.S. Congress released a study entitled: "Airport Financing: Information on Airport Fees Paid
by Airlines." This report highlights Miami airport's (MIA) hybrid arrangement. MIA has used a
combination of the compensatory and residual approaches since 1990. The airport has set fees for
the use of terminal space used exclusively by the airlines, such as counters, on the basis of square
footage. On the other hand, the fees for shared use areas such as baggage claim, and concourse
areas are set on the basis of the share of the number of aircraft seats carried by each airline.
These fees reflect such costs as direct and indirect operating expenses and debt service, and are
not adjusted to reflect revenues derived from concessions, parking or other non-aeronautical
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sources. In the tradition of the compensatory type of agreement, the costs of vacant rentable
space are not recovered and represent a "loss" for the airport. By contrast, "landing fees are
calculated annually on the basis of budget estimates for the upcoming year and are revised
midyear on the basis of updated estimates." Then, in a residual fashion, ". . . a portion of the
concession revenues is used to offset cost in the computation of these fees" (GAO 1998, 7).
Chapter 7 describes the operating revenue structure of Baltimore/Washington International
Airport (BWI) highlighting the hybrid arrangement with the airlines.
Figure 2.8 Hybrid Scheme
Airside Landside
2.4 Cost Recover Methodology Related Issues
2.4.1 Majority-In-Interest (MII) Clauses
Majority-in-interest (MII) clauses allows signatory airlines to review, approve or veto capital
projects. These clauses limit the ability of the airport owner to proceed with a capital program if
opposed by the signatory airlines. This type of arrangement is far more common in residual
agreements where airlines are willing to assume responsibility for part of the financial risks. In
exchange for higher risk airlines get the inclusion of MII clauses in the use and lease agreements.
As a matter of fact, 90% of large commercial airports with residual agreements had MII clauses
in place in 2000. Airports with compensatory arrangements, where airlines are spared the
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financial risks are less likely to have MII clauses in place. In fact, in 2000 only 33% of large
commercial airports with compensatory arrangements have included MIT clauses (Table 2.4). It
is important to note that, regardless of the type of agreement in place, most airports have at least a
small discretionary fund for capital improvements that is not subject to majority-in-interest
clauses (US Congress 1984, 129).
2.4.2 Residual Versus Compensatory
Provided that the expenses of the cost centers on the airside are always covered by the users (i.e.,
the airlines), the profits or losses of the cost centers on the landside will define whether the
contractual arrangement in place is advantageous for the airport operator or the airlines. Residual
agreements can be considered a conservative methodology to cost recovery from the airport
perspective. The reason is that no matter what happens to the revenues, the airport operator will
be covered from any losses. On the other hand, compensatory agreements, can be considered
riskier from the airport perspective, because deficits will have to be covered by the airport
operator.
Table 2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Cost Recovery Methodologies
Profitable landside Landside cost centers
cost centers at a loss
Residual Compensatory Residual Compensatory
Negative (-) Positive (+) Positive (+) Negative (-)
The airport uses the The airport can use The airlines offset The airport has to
Airport surplus from surplus towards losses on the absorb the losses of
landside cost capital programs or landside the landside cost
centers to reduce keep it for any other centers
airline fees use
Positive (+) Negative (-) Negative (-) Positive (+)
Surpluses from Airline will not have The airline will pay Airlines will not have
Airline landside cost its fees reduced when excess fees to to cover any losses
centers will help the airport is offset losses from sustained by
reduce the airline profiting from the lanside cost landside cost
fees landside centers centers.
Source: Author
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According to credit rating agency Standard & Poor's "Airports with more compensatory elements
to their business profile are expected to achieve average higher debt service coverage (1.75 to 2.5
times or higher) to compensate for the highly elastic association between passenger levels and
concession revenues as compared to residual airports. Simply put: Because moderate decline in
passengers could likely result in a larger decline in concession revenues, the effect on
compensatory airports might be more dramatic than at a purely residual airport that simply raises
airline charges" when needed (Forsgren, Wilkins and Greer 1999, 21). Table 2.3 shows two
scenarios: one when the landside cost centers are profitable and the other when they are at loss.
The table describes the advantages and disadvantages to airports and airlines under two scenarios
and under both types of agreements.
2.4.3 Trends In Fee-Setting
In recent years, as airports became increasingly aware of their potential for generating profits, a
trend towards a compensatory approach in setting fees has emerged. This trend includes a switch
away from the residual cost approach and a "bluffing of the traditional distinction between
residual and compensatory rate-setting methodologies." This translates into a large percentage of
airports using hybrid approaches (GAO 1998, 8).
Figure 2.9 shows graphically how airports are turning slowly away from purely residual cost
recovery methodology into compensatory and hybrid type of arrangements:
e A 1983 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) survey of the nation's large commercial
airports reported that 14 airports (58%) used a residual approach, while the remaining 10
(42%) percent used the compensatory approach.
* A 1995-1996 survey conducted by the American Association of Airports Executives among
200 U.S. airports showed that 34% of the respondents used a residual approach. Another 30%
used compensatory arrangements, while 36% used a hybrid scheme (GAO 1998, 8).
" Figure 2.9 shows that, in 2000, 11 airports or 35% of the 31 large commercial airports in the
U.S. used residual agreements, 7 airports or 23% had compensatory arrangements, while 13
airports or 42% combined elements of both methodologies with a hybrid approach.
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The duration of airport-airline agreements has started to decline. In the past long-term
agreements used to be considered a symbol of stability by investors. Today, investors are
inclined to value more the flexibility to adjust to changes in the business environment. This
means that today short-term agreements can be seen as advantageous. The Airport Business, a
1992 book by Rigas Doganis states that in the U.S. agreements between airports and airlines
traditionally have been long term contracts ranging between 20-50 years! This perception about
the duration of agreements has changed considerably in recent years. For instance, Fitch IBCA in
a 2000 report noted: "Historically, airports (in the U.S.) used long-term agreements (10-20
years)." The same report states that today, a large percentage of airports in the U.S. have
medium-term agreements (5-7 years) with the airlines. (Champeau, Soltz, and Fry 2000, 4).
Figure 2.9 Cost
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Note: Data for 1983 are from 24 larger commercial airports. Data for 1995 are from a survey of
200 airports (including large, medium and small airports). Data for 2000 include the 31
largest commercial airports.
Sources: Congressional Budget Office, American Association of Airport Executives, ACI-NA and author
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Table 2.4 Cost Recovery Methodology Used by Large Hub Airports
(as of 2000)
Percent Expiration EffectiveCost Recovery Ml w Date for O&D O&D Eometive ECI
Ranking Airport Methodology Clause with u Airline (%) Average Index (ECI) Average
Agreement (
1 1 ATL Compensatory yes 1-Sep-00 37 1.8
2 3 LAX Compensatory no 30-Jun-01 75 7
3 7 PHX Compensatory no 61 3.9
4 9 DTW Compensatory yes 33.3 1-Jan-09 46 61.7 2 4.5
5 13 IAH Compensatory no 30-Jun-05 40 1.5
6 18 BOS Compensatory no 86 7.9
7 28 TPA Compensatory yes 30-Sep-06 87 7.7
1 6 DEN Hybrid (a) 47 2.5
2 8 LAS Hybrid yes 30-Jun-02 79 6.2
3 10 EWR Hybrid no 31-Jan-18 78 2.7
4 11 MSP Hybrid yes 45 1.9
5 14 JFK Hybrid (a) no 31-Dec-01 86 5.3
6 15 STL Hybrid yes 31-Dec-05 35 1.8
7 19 LGA Hybrid (a) no 72.7 91 64.6 6.8 4.0
8 21 CLT Hybrid (a) yes 30-Jun-16 26 1.5
9 25 BWI Hybrid yes 1-Jan-03 82 5
10 26 lAD Hybrid yes 1-Jan-14 65 4
11 27 SLC Hybrid (a) yes 30-Jun-03 45 2.1
12 29 SAN Hybrid no 1-Jan-02 86 5.9
13 31 DCA Hybrid yes 1-Jan-14 75 6
1 2 ORD Residual yes 11-May-18 47 3.4
2 4 DFW Residual yes 1-Jan-09 39 2.4
3 5 SFO Residual yes 30-Jun-11 72 3.9
4 12 MIA Residual (b) yes 66 3.3
5 16 MCO Residual yes 30-Sep-08 84 7.2
6 17 SEA Residual yes 90.9 1-Jan-02 72 61.6 6.8 4.3
7 20 PHL Residual yes 30-Jun-06 60 2.7
8 22 CVG Residual yes 1-Jan-15 25 2.3
9 23 HNL Residual no 83 6
10 24 PIT Residual yes 1-Jan-18 35 1.7
11 30 FLL Residual yes 30-Sep-1 1 95 7.1
(a) Modified by author
(b) In the survey MIA is listed as using a residual methodology. In
residual approach with compensatory approach resulting in a hybrid
2.3.3)
practice MIA combines elements of a
cost recover methodology (see Section
Source: ACI-NA, author
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Table 2.5 illustrates the application of the two methodologies for an airport facility under a
scenario in which non-aeronautical cost centers are profitable. As seen on the top section of the
table the facility has been divided into two areas: the terminal and the airfield. They both have
expenses of $100,000. If the facility uses the residual type of agreement the surplus of the non-
aeronautical cost centers can be credited towards the reduction of cost for terminal and airfield as
shown in row C. In this case the contribution of the non-aeronautical cost centers reduces the
cost of operating the terminal and the airfield to $80,000 each. Under the compensatory type of
agreement there is no reduction of cost. The airlines will pay for what they use regardless of
profits generated on other cost centers. In addition, under the compensatory scenario the airport
will be able to keep the surplus money.
Table 2.5 Comparison of Residual and Compensatory Fee-Setting Methodology with
Profitable Non-Aeronautical Cost Centers
Residual Compensatory
Requirement Terminal Airfield Terminal Airfield
Maintenance, operations and administration 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
Debt service 40,000 20,000 40,000 20,000
Debt service coverage 10,000 5,000 10,000 5,000
Deposits to special funds 5,000 20,000 5,000 20,000
Other 5,000 15,000 5,000 15,000
A Total Requirements 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000
B Cost center revenues from non-aero sources 20,000 20,000 N/A N/A
Airline share (percent) N/A N/A 65 75
C Residual cost (A-B) 80,000 80,000 N/A N/A
D 1 00,0001b 100,0001b
Activity level 6,500 sq. ft. gross 6,500 sq. ft. gross landinglanding weight
weight
Rental rate (per square foot) 12.31 N/A 10 N/A
Landing fee rate (per 1,0001b gross landing weight) N/A 0.80 N/A 0.75
Source: Adaptation by author of a table produced by the Congressional Budget Office (1984)
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Table 2.6 illustrates the application of the two methodologies for the same facility under a
scenario in which non-aeronautical cost centers lose money. The top section of the table shows
that the facility has been divided into two areas: the terminal and the airfield. They have
expenses of $100,000 each. If the facility uses the residual type of agreement the losses of the
non-aeronautical cost centers are "charged" to the airlines to assure that the airport breaks even at
the end of the fiscal year. In this case the non-aeronautical cost centers need $20,000 from the
terminal and $20,000 from the airfield to cover expenditures. Under the compensatory type of
agreement there is no increase of cost to other airport users. A compensatory type of agreement
is such that the airport carries the risk. The airlines will pay only for what they use regardless of
losses at other cost centers.
Table 2.6 Comparison of Residual and Compensatory Fee-Setting Methodology with
Non-aeronautical Cost Centers At A Loss
Residual Compensatory
Requirement Terminal Airfield Terminal Airfield
Maintenance, operations and administration 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
Debt service 40,000 20,000 40,000 20,000
Debt service coverage 10,000 5,000 10,000 5,000
Deposits to special funds 5,000 20,000 5,000 20,000
Other 5,000 15,000 5,000 15,000
A Total Requirements 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000
B Cost center revenues from non-aero sources -20,000 -20,000 N/A N/A
Airline share (percent) N/A N/A 65 75
C Residual cost (A-B) 120,000 120,000 N/A N/A
D Activity level 6,500 sq. ft. 100,0001b 6,500 sq. ft. 100,0001b
gross landing gross
weight landing
weight
Rental rate (per square foot) 18.46 N/A 10 N/A
Landing fee rate (per 1,0001b gross landing weight) N/A 1.20 N/A 0.75
Source: Adaptation by author of a table produced by the Congressional Budget Office (1984)
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2.4.4 Legal Challenges to Airport Fee-Setting
The process of setting airport fees can be highly controversial and contentious. As profitable
airports move in the direction of compensatory and/or hybrid cost recovery methodologies,
airlines fear increases in their costs for the use of airports. Airlines also dislike the fact that they
can no longer benefit from cross subsidies from surpluses of non-aeronautical cost centers.
Therefore, the switch from residual to compensatory approaches by some airport authorities is
vehemently opposed by many airlines. Between 1984 and 1998 there have been 14 disputes over
fees that airlines pay to airports. A 1998 study by the GAO describes the administrative
procedures used to resolve differences. The Department of Transportation (DOT) encourages
airports and airlines to resolve differences through direct negotiations. If this does not work, then
there are two administrative alternatives: an investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), or an expedited review by the Office of the Secretary.
Eight complaints regarding airport fees were filed between the passage of the Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act of 1994 and 1998. The Office of the Secretary handled seven
of the eight complaints under the expedited procedures with the following results:
e Three cases were dismissed
* A decision was issued in other three cases
* One complaint was settled prior to a decision
For their intervention in disputes, the FAA and the Office of the Secretary rely on the following
federal statutes:
The Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 requires that airports that accept federal grants
under the Airport Improvement Program must be available for public use on "reasonable"
conditions without unjust discrimination (GAO 1998, 8). Likewise, the Anti Head Tax Act
requires that the rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges set by publicly owned
airports be reasonable.
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The nature of the complaints in these disputes has been mixed. Among the factors that gave rise
to these differences are a change in the type of agreement from residual to compensatory,
increased fees to pay for the construction of new terminals, as well as landing fee differentials for
large versus small aircraft. The following two cases have become landmarks and are now used as
guidelines for issues affecting fee-setting disputes between airport operators and the airlines.
Table 2. 7 Airports Involved in Fee-Setting Disputes Between 1984 and 1998
Year Airport Description
1984 Indianapolis International Airport Airport set new fees by ordinance using a
compensatory approach
1985 Miami International Airport Dispute over property rents and fee increases
1987 Aspen/Pitkin County Airport Dispute over fee structure differential between
general aviation and commercial airlines
1989 Stapleton International Airport Airlines complained that concessions and airline fees
were being used to finance a new airport facility
1989 Logan Airport Complaint over the increase of landing fees for
smaller aircraft while the fees for larger aircraft were
decreased
1994 Kent County International Airport Airlines complained new compensatory fee-setting
methodology
1995 Los Angeles International Airport Change from residual to compensatory fee-setting(First case) methodology
1995 Micronesia/Northern Mariana Island Airports One airline complaint over "excessive, unreasonable
and discriminatory" fees
1995 Lehigh Valley International Airport Complaint by signatory airlines about subsidies and
special landing fees and terminal rental charges to
airlines serving specific markets
1995 Denver International Airport Increased terminal fees to one airline that included
amounts needed to pay for unused gates
1997 Los Angeles International Airport Challenge on the compensatory fee structure using(Second case) fair market values and including police and fire
protection in the fee calculation.
1997 Miami International Airport Controversy on the distribution of the cost of
construction of new facilities among airlines
1998 Puerto Rico's Airports Change by the airport authority to a compensatory
rate-setting methodology
1998 Greater Rochester International Airport Complaint over a $4 per passenger fee charged only
to regional carriers
Source: GAO (1998)
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Kent County International Airport (Michigan) Case
Even though this case does not involve one of the large commercial airports, its implications are
profound and affect all cases in which airport operators contemplate changes to their fee-setting
methodology. The airlines serving this Michigan airport complained that the airport's
compensatory approach imposed excessive fees because it did not use concession revenues to
offset the fees paid by the airlines. In this case the Supreme Court ruled in 1994 that
compensatory agreements were legally permissible and that the fees were not excessive because
the airlines were charged only break-even costs. In upholding the airport's use of the
compensatory approach, the Court resolved the conflict presented by similar airport decisions at
Indianapolis International and Stapleton International (Denver) airports (Table 2.7).
Los Angeles International Airport Cases
The operator of LAX has been involved in two separate disputes. The first case originated when
the LAX residual agreement expired in 1993. The airport unilaterally adopted a compensatory
approach at that point. Under the new agreement, the landing fees increased by 300% from $0.51
per 1,000 pounds to $1.56. The operator used the fair market value for the airfield and land to
calculate the new fees. The airport threatened to deny use of the airport to the airlines that did not
pay the new fees. In mid 1995, the DOT ruled that LAX was entitled to use a compensatory
arrangements, however, the airport's use of fair market value in calculating the fees was not
reasonable. The DOT's final decision stated:
"The Department of Transportation, under 49 U.S.C. 47129(c), has
determined after a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) that the
increased landing fees charged at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX)
are unreasonable insofar as those fees include a rental cost for the airfield land
based on the land's estimated fair market value. We otherwise find that the
airlines have failed to show that the fees are unreasonable. Since the landing
fees paid by the airlines have been higher than justified by the airport's costs,
we have determined further that the City of Los Angeles must make refunds
of the excess amount to the airlines that filed the complaint that began this
proceeding. Many of the other airline parties will obtain refunds under an
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interim settlement agreement between the City of Los Angeles and the
airlines." (USDOT, Office of the Secretary, Order 95-6-36, Served June 30,
1995)
Again during the 1995-96 fiscal year LAX increased its fees. This time the airlines complained
because, among other things, the airport included expenses for a portion of police and fire
services in the fee calculation. The DOT concluded that these charges were in part unreasonable
and reaffirmed its prior ruling that fair market value should not be used in calculating landing
fees. On most other issues, the DOT concluded that the fees computed by using a compensatory
fee-setting methodology were reasonable. The DOT's decisions on the valuation of airfield land
in both cases were taken to the Court of Appeals for the District Of Columbia Circuit. The case
was argued before the Court of Appeals on January 7, 1999. The case was decided on February
5, 1999. The petition was denied. Judge Silberman summarized the case as follows:
"The City of Los Angeles increased the landing fees at Los Angeles
International Airport, and the airlines challenged those fees as unreasonable
before the Department of Transportation. The DOT set aside the increased
fees, reasoning that the City's attempt to recoup its "opportunity costs"
through the fees was impermissible as a matter of statute. In City of Los
Angeles v. DOT, 103 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we rejected that statutory
interpretation and remanded for the DOT to consider the opportunity cost
issue as a matter of policy. The DOT did so, concluding that the City's
claimed entitlement to recover its opportunity costs was unreasonable, and
rejected the fees. The City petitions for review. We deny the petition." (US
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia District, No. 98-1071)
The preceding cases have contributed to define the position of the government and the legal
system with regards to aeronautical rate-setting disputes. Today, the FAA continues to work with
airport operators and airlines to sort out rate-setting differences. The emphasis is in bringing all
parties to the table to discuss their differences and solve their problems before going into aformal
complaint process. This seems to be working quite well as most cases are solved without
reaching the judicial system (Heibeck 2002).
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2.5 Competition at Airport Facilities
The FAA states that since the beginning of the deregulation era the number of cities serviced by
large U.S. carriers has decreased. On the other hand, the number of air carriers has increased. For
instance, in 1998 there were 42 scheduled large U.S. carriers, that is 12 more that in 1978. This
has resulted in increased frequencies and services, but to fewer cities (FAA 1999, 2). Most of the
increase in activity has occurred at the nation's top 50 airports and this is generally attributed to
the increasing hub-and-spoke 2 operations by the air carriers. This suggests increased traffic
concentration.
2.5.1 Traffic Concentration
The complexity of hub operations obligates air carriers to look for airport facilities where they
can connect their flights without having to bump into other carriers' operations. For a hub to be
functional air carriers require at least the following minimum requirements: sufficient terminal
space that allows passengers to move freely from gate to gate without having to walk long
distances; adequate baggage handling infrastructure; and the airside capacity and capability to
handle the banks required by the airline to operate as a hub. Airports hosting hub operations for
more than one carrier are an exception. These airports have to have extremely large airside and
landside capacity in order to accommodate very large numbers of aircraft and passengers during
peak hours. One notorious case is Chicago's O'Hare,13 where United and American have side by
side hub operations.
"[Air] traffic in the United States is heavily concentrated at the largest
airports. In 2000 the 31 large hub airports handled over 74% of passenger
enplanements, the 35 medium hub airports served another 20 percent, and the
small hubs accounted for another 7 percent. Collectively, the 137 hub airports
served about 97 percent of passenger enplanements. The remaining 282
primary airports served only 2.9 percent of enplanements, while the other 128
non-primary commercial service airports had only 0.1 percent of
enplanements." (FAA 2001, 77,78)
12 To increase coverage with fewer aircraft the airlines utilize the hub-and-spoke model, according to which
aircraft converge on a single facility to connect flights.
13 Chicago's O'Hare has 6 operational runways and is planning to build another two.
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An airline's share of boarding passengers at a given airport determines its bargaining position
when it comes to negotiating the terms of use and lease agreements. For example, an airline
capable of handling over 40-50% of total departures at a given airport presumably will be able to
negotiate more favorable contractual terms than smaller carriers with a 5-7% market share. But
market concentration with little or no competition allows the airlines to operate as monopolies
charging monopolistic fares. This makes the role of the federal government vital to combat
monopolistic practices. Since the air transportation system is under a deregulated environment
with the absence of price controls, the federal government can address competition issues by
tying new federally sponsored funding schemes to anti-monopolistic practices. For example,
under AIR 2114 no large or medium airport at which one or two air carriers account for more than
50% of the passenger boardings may impose a Passenger Facility Charge (PFCs) (Section 3.1.3)
unless the airport authorities submit a competition plan (U.S. Department of Transportation 2000, 1).
The most common methods to quantify market concentration and level of competitiveness that
can be applied to airport sites are the Concentration Ratio (CR), the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) and the Efficient Competition Index (ECI).
2.5.2 Concentration Ratio (CR)
The Concentration Ratio (CR) measures the market share of the main participants in a given
market. The CR methodology focuses only on the firms with larger market shares. For example,
an airport whose main carriers have 40, 25, 10 and 5 percent market share will have the following
concentration ratios:
CR 2 = 40% + 25% = 65%
CR 4 = 40% + 25% + 10% + 5% = 80%
14 Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 2 1s' Century signed into law by President
Clinton in 2000.
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2.5.3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The Justice Department uses extensively the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a tool to
determine the level of market concentration. The index is calculated by squaring the market share
of each firm competing in the market and then adding the resulting numbers.
HHI = s 2 + S22 + s32 + ... s2
Where si is the market share of firm i, and n is the number of firms in the market. In the airline
industry an airport facility can be considered a "market" and the airlines that serve that particular
facility are the firms competing in it. If an airport hosts 5 airlines each with 20% of market share,
the HHI is calculated as follows:
202+ 202+ 202+ 202+ 202 = 2,000
HHI can range from 10,000, which represents a pure monopoly with one firm in total control of
the market (i.e., 1002 = 10,000), to values closer to zero with a very competitive environment
representing a large number of participating firms in the market. As Table 2.8 shows the Justice
Department considers HHI values under 1,000 to be "unconcentrated" markets. Markets with
HHI values between 1,000 and 1,800 are considered moderately concentrated; and markets with
HHI values above 1,800 are considered highly concentrated and negative for competition.
"Transactions that increase the HHI by more than 100 points in highly concentrated markets (with
HHI values above 1800) presumptively raise significant antitrust concerns under the Department
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines" (US District Court
District of Columbia 1997, 7).
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Table 2.8 U.S. Department of Justice Classification
of Market Concentration
HHI Values Level of Concentration
< 1000 Unconcentrated
1000 - 1800 Moderately concentrated
1800 + Highly concentrated
2.5.4 Effective Competition Index (ECI)
The Effective Competition Index is a variation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. This index
assigns values close to 1 to markets with a monopoly and little or no competition, and values
closer to 10 or higher to very competitive environments. In other words, the higher the number
the "better" for consumers who can benefit from competition. The Effective Competition Index
is computed as follows:
Effective Competition Index = 10,000/HHI
When comparing the various methods for measuring market concentration it is evident that the
concentration ratio (CR) does not account for the competitive situation of the entire system. It
provides a good idea of who dominates the market, but it only focuses on a specified number of
players. Financial researchers and the U.S. Department of Justice favor the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) perhaps due to fact that it better captures the state of competitiveness by
incorporating all participants into the calculation of market concentration.
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Table 2.9 Competition Index Comparison, Large Hub Airports, Fiscal Year 2000
CR* CR* Herfindahl- Effective .n Dominant
Airports 2-firm 4-firm Hirschman Competition Domiant Airline
% % Index Index Airline MarketShare
1 Atlanta ATL 82 90 5,471 1.8 Delta 73.0
2 Chicago O'Hare* ORD 75 85 2,949 3.4 United 43.4
3 Los Angeles LAX 42 66 1,419 7.0 United 24.2
4 Dallas-Ft. Worth DFW 79 89 4,219 2.4 American 62.1
5 San Francisco SFO 57 72 2,564 3.9 United 47.1
6 Denver DEN 69 82 3,998 2.5 United 61.7
7 Phoenix PHX 68 79 2,533 3.9 America West 41.1
8 Las Vegas LAS 48 67 1,620 6.2 Southwest 31.2
9 Detroit DTW 78 83 4,947 2.0 Northwest 69.4
10 Newark EWR 68 81 3,736 2.7 Continental 53.7
11 Minneapolis/St. Paul MSP 80 87 5,332 1.9 Northwest 72.2
12 Miami MIA 70 81 2,992 3.3 American 49.6
13 Houston IAH 86 91 6,869 1.5 Continental 82.7
14 New York JFK 52 78 1,874 5.3 American 19.8
15 St Louis STL 85 91 5,557 1.8 TWA 73.4
16 Orlando MCO 41 57 1,389 7.2 Delta 27.1
17 Seattle SEA 42 64 1,474 6.8 Alaska 28.5
18 Boston BOS 38 62 1,270 7.9 Delta 20.6
19 La Guardia LGA 43 67 1,461 6.8 Delta 24.7
20 Philadelphia PHL 67 79 3,733 2.7 US Airways 59.4
21 Charlotte CLT 91 95 6,763 1.5 US Airways 81.7
22 Cincinnati CVG 83 96 4,372 2.3 Delta 61.4
23 Honolulu HNL 47 74 1,660 6.0 Hawaiian 25.5
24 Pittsburgh PIT 88 92 5,885 1.7 US Airways 75.6
25 Baltimore/Washington BWi 60 72 2,020 5.0 Southwest 34.8
26 Washington Dulles IAD 60 79 2,499 4.0 United 44.5
27 Salt Lake City SLC 78 91 4,699 2.1 Delta 66.9
28 Tampa/St. Petersburg TPA 39 63 1,292 7.7 Delta 20.5
29 San Diego SAT 48 68 1,694 5.9 Southwest 33.4
30 Fort Lauderdale FLL 40 63 1,414 7.1 Delta 25.4
31 Washington D.C. (National) DCA 49 70 1,654 6.0 US Airways 30.4
* Concentration Ratio
Sources: 2002 Aviation & Aerospace Almanac Data, calculations performed by author
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Table 2.9 displays the market concentration of the 31 largest commercial airports in the United
States. It is evident from the various measuring methodologies that most of these facilities have a
very high market concentration. Figure 2.10 displays graphically the level of airline concentration
at large commercial airports. Values above the horizontal line (1800) are considered highly
concentrated (less competitive). According to the concentration guidelines established by the
Justice Department (measured by the HHI) 12 airports or about 39% of the nation's large
commercial airports are considered moderately concentrated (values between 1000 and 1800),
while the majority, that is 19 airports or 61% are considered highly concentrated (values above
1800). Figure 2.10 highlights IAH and CLT as airports with highest HHI values, thus the lowest
level of competition. By contrast, BOS, TPA and MCO offer the most competitive environment.
Figure 2.10 Traffic Concentration at 31 Largest Commercial Airports in the U.S.
According to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Fiscal Year 2000
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Sources: 2002 Aviation & Aerospace Almanac Data, calculations performed by author
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Figure 2.11 shows a clear relationship between the level of competition and connecting traffic.
The graph indicates that as connecting traffic increases the level of competition 5 decreases. This
is explained by the fact that airlines tend to concentrate their operations at airports located in
strategic geographical locations (see Figure 2.2), avoiding (in most cases) facilities used by
competitors as a hub for operations. As a result, airlines increase considerably their market share
at key airports making them dominant carriers and causing a decrease in competition.
Figure 2.11 Effective Competition Versus Connecting Traffic at 31 Largest
Commercial Airports in the U.S., Fiscal Year 2000
TPA **BOS
+ MCO ,LAX
GA +A SEA
SAN + L *DCA
#JFK
+BWI
SFO, IAD,
+ MIA
+EWR
y = -0.0898x + 7.5387
R = 0.7768
PHX
*ORD
* PHL
DTW
10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0
Connecting Traffic (percent)
DFW
+ ATL
60.0
CVG
+
PT + CLT
70.0 80.0
15 The Efficient Competition Index is used in Figure 2.12 to measure the level of competitiveness at U.S.
large commercial airports. According to ECI 10 is the value given to an airport with perfect competition
(infinite number of airlines), and 1 is the least competitive environment with one airline in control of 100%
of the airport facility.
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Chapter 3
Funding for Capital Programs
All airlines in the United States are privately owned, in contrast to what has been the case in most
of the rest of the world until the 1990s. Likewise, most airport facilities in the United States have
been designed, built and operated with ample participation from the private sector. Even more
important, most of the infrastructure of large commercial airports has been financed by private
sources, primarily through the bond markets (De Neufville and Odoni 2002). This has made the
financial performance of commercial airports a focus of scrutiny from the credit rating agencies,
which provide risk analysis to investors.
Large commercial airports in the U.S. are run through a form of partnership between the federal
government, the airport owner and operator, which is usually a local government entity or a
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specially created airport authority, and private companies (airlines, concessionaires, car rental
companies, and other service providers). Increasing traffic volumes and the urgent need for
capital programs, as well as the operational complexity of large commercial airports, makes
imperative a high level of coordination and cooperation between the airport operator and all other
stakeholders. But the cooperation and coordination goes beyond the technical and operational
aspects of airport management; it goes into the very heart of the financial structure of capital
programs.
Aeronautical and non-aeronautical elements of airports are funded differently. The planning
process and major elements of-aeronautical projects related to air traffic control and runway
systems are funded in large part by public money from the FAA (De Neufville 1999, 8). By
contrast, the local authority in control of the airport leads the development on the landside. The
airlines are very active participants in the process, both because their operations are directly
affected by capital programs, and because the fees the airlines pay for the use of the facilities are
often used as the primary financing vehicle for the issuance of bonds. The level of cooperation,
consultation and mutual participation in the United States is such that can be considered a model
of extensive public-private collaboration (De Neufville 1999, 9). A recent example of this level
of cooperation is the new $1.2 billion Northwest Airlines terminal inaugurated in February 2002
at Detroit Metro (DTW). The airport and the new facility is owned by Wayne county. The
project was financed with airport revenue bonds, however Northwest Airlines, which has a 30-
year lease at DTW, had control over essentially the entire project from start to finish (Flint 2002,
67).
3.1 Funding Sources
To provide service and keep up with increasing air traffic demand large commercial airports
spend billions of dollars in capital programs every year. To fund these projects airports rely on a
variety of funding sources. In 1998 the General Accounting Office (GAO) of the U.S. Congress
released a study that highlighted sources of capital programs for the 71 largest commercial
airports in the United States. The study showed that in 1996 these airports raised about $7 billion
for capital programs. Tax-exempt bonds generated over $4 billion or 58% of the cash needed for
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capital programs. By contrast with models outside the United States, where government
participation is often dominant, the direct contribution by the federal government through Airport
Improvement Program (AIP) grants was only $1.3 billion or 20%. Revenues from the Passenger
Facilities Charges (PFCs), an user-fee scheme, contributed 16%. The study showed a relatively
small participation of state and local funding (4%) and airport revenues (2%).
Table 3.1. Capital Programs Funding Sources for 71
Larger U.S. Airports, Fiscal Year 1996
(in Billions of Dollars)
Funding Source Amount Percent
Tax-exempt Bonds 4.104a 58
Airport Improvement Program (AIP) Grants 1.372 20
Passenger Facility Charges (PFC) 1.114 16
State and Local Contributions 0.285b 4
Airport Revenues 0.153c 2
Total 7.028 100
Source: GAO 1998
As Figure 3.1 shows, the funding pattern of airport capital programs varies dramatically from
year to year. For instance, funding between 1989 and 1990 more than doubled, contrasting with a
sharp reduction of about 45% between 1992 and 1993. Capital programs are usually very large
and expensive and can be initiated at any given year. For example an airport16 might not have a
major capital program in place for years, but then propose a new plan whose total cost could
range between $2 to $4 billion. According to a 1998 GAO study, other factors that contribute to
this variability includes the year-to-year changes in the amount of funding available from bonds,
which in turn is affected by changing interest rates, the demand for air travel, and airline
agreements with airports (GAO 1998, 6).
a Net of refinancing. Of this total, a little over $400 million is special facility bonds issued on the behalf of
nonairport beneficiaries, such as airlines.b State grants only. Amounts for local capital subsidies are unknown. GAO believes these amounts are
minimal.
c Net operating revenue in excess of a minimum coverage ratio of 125 percent of the debt service (principal
and interest payments).
16 This applies to large commercial airports.
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Figure 3.1 Airport Funding: Primary Sources, 1982-1996
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Source: GAO 1998
There are five main sources of funding for capital programs of commercial airports in the United
States: revenue and special facility bonds, the federal Airport Improvement Program (AIP),
passenger facility charges (PFCs), state and local grants, and airport revenues.
3.1.1 Bonds
For a long time the largest source of financing airport development in the United States has been
the issuance of bonds. This scheme continues to be the primary source of funding for capital
programs. A 1998 GAO report entitled "Airport Financing: Funding Sources for Airport
Development" highlights the importance of airport revenues that allow large commercial airports
to raise bond money: "More than 95% of all airport debt issued [between 1982 and 1996] has
been in the form of general airport revenue bonds (GARB), which are secured by the airport's
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future revenue. Thirty years ago, general obligations bonds, which are backed by the taxing
power of a governmental unit, were far more common because of their stronger credit standing
and therefore lower financing costs" (GAO 1998, 38).
An important feature of airport bonds is that not all money is destined to capital programs. A
good portion of bond revenues is used to refinance previous debt. As Figure 3.2 shows, from
1982 through 1996, airports in the United States issued $53 billion worth of bonds. Of this
amount about one third or $17.3 billion was used to refinance previous debt and $36.3 billion was
destined to new capital programs. The total amount of money raised through bond issuance as
well as the split between refinancing and new financing varies dramatically from year to year,
depending on the state of the economy and the specific needs of the issuer. For example, when
the interest rates were very low in 1992 and 1993, airports used a larger portion of their debt to
refinance previous obligations (GAO 1998, 36). Data collected by the FAA and displayed in
Table 3.2 indicates that between 1996 and 2000, large commercial airports in the U.S. raised over
$18 billion, a yearly average of over $3.5 billion.
Credit rating agencies, specifically Standard & Poor's and Moody's, expect an increase in the use
of alternative financing mechanisms such as special facility bonds, which are secured by
contractual lease payments of the airline or airlines for which the facility is constructed, rather
than the airports' general revenue. Some large airports favor special facility bonds in order to
obtain tax-exempt status. According to Moody's, this financing alternative can result in project
design, construction and completion earlier, and possibly at lower cost that would have been
possible through the issuance of airport revenue bonds (Hu, Whiteman and Francoeur 1997, 1).
The introduction of PFCs as a new revenue source in 1992 has also led to the creation of a new
financing vehicle: PFCs backed bonds. Because of the conservatism of the tax-exempt bond
market, this type of bonds requires special commitments from the FAA 7 to assure the stability of
the revenue stream (FAA and ARP Consulting 2001, 35).
" The FAA holds the right to discontinue the PFC program at a particular airport if the established
guidelines for its implementation are not followed.
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Figure 3.2 Airport Bonding, Total and New Finance for U.S. Airports,
1982-1996
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3.1.2 Airport Improvement Program (AIP)
Since the mid 1940s the federal government has played a vital role in the process of planning and
developing airport facilities. The role has not been one of direct involvement with local
processes, but of providing financial support through grant programs, especially the Airport
Improvement Program (AIP). The funding has supported and continues to support programs that
allow the U.S. airport system to expand while meeting high standards of safety and security and
promoting competition at airport facilities (DOT/FAA 1999, 47). The Office of the Associate
Administrator for Airports of the FAA administers both the AIP and PFC programs.
At the end of World War II the federal government initiated a grants-in-aid program to promote
the development of a system of civil airports to meet the needs of the increasingly important air
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transportation system. The Federal-Aid Airport Program (FAAP) was instituted through the
passage of the Federal Airport Act of 1946. Program funding was obtained through general funds
of the Treasury. The grants of this program could be used for airfield construction, passenger
terminals, access roads, and the acquisition of land for the airport (DOT/FAA 1999, 47).
By 1970 the needs of the airport network had increased substantially and the federal government
started to devise a plan to expand its support for civil aviation. The Airport and Airway
Development Act of 1970 established a more elaborate program to support commercial aviation.
This grant program was divided into two main categories, the Planning Grant Program and the
Airport Development Aid Program. This time the source of funding shifted from the Treasury to
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which derived its revenues from aviation related activities
such as airline fares, air freight, and charges on aviation fuels (DOT/FAA 1999, 47). The grants
from this program could be used to finance investments in the airport and airway system and
could also be used to cover operating costs, whenever possible. It is important to note that the
funding structure of this program has been modified many times through the years.
The Airport and Airways Improvement (AAI) Act of 1982 established the successor program.
This time the planning and airport development programs of the 1970s were combined into one
cohesive program: the Airport Improvement Program (AIP). AIP took into consideration issues
related to the environment and included noise compatibility programs. The AAI Act has been
amended to allow the conversion of unused apportioned funds for use in the form of discretionary
grants (DOT/FAA 1999, 48).
The Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987 extended the AIP grant
authority until 1992. This time the law authorized $1.7 billion each fiscal year through 1990 and
$1.8 billion for 1991 and 1992. In the meantime, the Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion
Act of 1990 authorized the FAA to initiate the PFC program as a complement to the AIP program
(see Section 3.1.3). The Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity, and Noise Improvement, and
Intermodal Transportation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-581, October 31 1992) authorized the
extension of the AIP program at a funding level of $2.05 billion through the end of 1993. Almost
two years later, the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-
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305, August 23, 1994) extended AIP until the end of September, 1996. The Federal Aviation
Authorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-264, October 9, 1996) extended AIP for two more
years until September 1998 (DOT/FAA 1999, 48). The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Public Law
105-34) enacted on October 1, 1997 extended the AIP program for ten years through September
30, 2007. The bill retains the existing freight waybill and general aviation fuel/gas taxes. It also
converts the 10 percent ad valorem tax on domestic passenger tickets to a combination ad
valorem/flight segment'8 tax. Between January 1, 2002, and December 31, 2002, the tax is to be
applied at 7.5% plus $3 per segment. After 2002, the $3 segment rate will be indexed to the
Consumer Price Index. While held by the Treasury, the AIP funds are invested in government
securities. Any interest earned is deposited into the Trust Fund and amounts are withdrawn from
the Trust Fund as they are needed and transferred into each FAA appropriation to cover necessary
outlays. At the end of 2000 the uncommitted balance of the Trust Fund was approximately $7.6
billion (FAA 2000, 21).
AIP funds are apportioned by formula each year. Each primary airport's apportionment is based
on the number of passengers boarding at the airport. In 1997 the minimum amount apportioned
to the sponsor of a primary airport was $500,000, and the maximum was $22 million. Obligated
funds in 1997 were $1.46 billion. The apportionment was calculated as follows:
e $7.80 for each of the first 50,000 passenger boardings
e $5.20 for each of the next 50,000 passenger boardings
* $2.60 for each of the next 400,000 passenger boardings
e $0.65 for each of the next 500,000 passenger boardings
e $0.50 for each passenger boarding in excess of 1 million (FAA 1999, 12)
Table 3.3 shows the application of the 1997 AIP apportionment formula to six airports with
different traffic volumes. The airports' traffic volumes range from 50,000 to 30 million
boardings (LAX enplaned about 32 million passengers in 2000). Figure 3.3 highlights the
average AIP amount per passenger received by each airport that is depicted in Table 3.3. The
18 A domestic flight segment is a flight involving a single takeoff and a single landing at two domestic
airports.
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scale set by the FAA determines that the larger the number of passengers served, the lower
average per passenger amount the airport receives. The AIP apportionment formula clearly
favors smaller airports with lower traffic volumes.
Figure 3.3 Application of 1997 AIP Apportionment Formula to Airports with
Different Passenger Traffic Volumes
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Source: Author calculations
3.1.3 Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs)
The Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-508, November 8,
1990) authorized the FAA to approve the collection and use of Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs)
by public agencies owning or operating commercial service airports. The PFC program was
created to complement the AIP program. The revenues from PFCs can be used to fund airport-
related projects that meet the following objectives: preserve or enhance safety, capacity, or
security; reduce airport noise; or serve as a catalyst to further competition among the airlines
(DOT/FAA 1999, 48).
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Table 3.2 Airport Bonding for U.S. Large Hubs, Fiscal Years 1996-2000
(Figures in Dollars)
Ranking Airport Airport Name 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ATL
ORD
LAX
DFW
SFO
DEN
PHX
LAS
DTW
EWR
MSP
MIA
IAH
JFK
STL
MCO
SEA
BOS
LGA
PHL
CLT
CVG
HNL
PIT
BWI
William B Hartsfield
Chicago O'Hare International
Los Angeles International
Dallas/Fort Worth International
San Francisco International
Denver International
Phoenix Sky Harbor International
Mc Carran International
Detroit Metro Wayne
Newark International
Minneapolis-St Paul International
Miami International
George Bush Intercontinental
John F Kennedy International
Lambert-St Louis International
Orlando International
Seattle-Tacoma International
General Edward Lawrence Logan
La Guardia
Philadelphia International
Charlotte/Douglas International
Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky
Honolulu International
Pittsburgh International
Baltimore-Washington International
286,185,506
454,333,675
205,875,000
0
615,841,772
525,801,152
0
402,750,000
0
63,921,000
5,505,000
351,010,000
21,200,000
80,408,000
0
7,200,000
103,530,435
51,000,000
19,793,000
138,534,931
0
58,090,000
0
0
0
0
560,205,610
0
0
516,214,087
702,636,124
0
0
0
58,154,000
0
130,385,000
3,100,000
98,566,000
0
0
140,360,000
0
29,672,000
0
0
29,872,000
0
450,590,000
0
0
0
0
0
683,655,121
293,027,020
0
40,000,000
0
99,893,000
383,875,000
433,085,000
17,000,000
105,960,000
164,149,608
772,290,000
363,610,000
159,795,000
31,886,000
77,608,001
0
56,368,000
0
0
0
0
409,553,367
0
0
1,082,998,088
0
163,045,638
0
0
68,474,000
262,597,000
0
627,960,000
80,189,000
0
202,990,000
243,983,729
402,345,000
56,443,000
0
0
0
0
63,130,000
0
546,871,945
70,460,000
0
335,000,000
367,738,425
735,390,356
0
208,142,000
0
101,988,000
277,997,000
220,156,000
0
33,825,000
0
0
372,220,350
192,840,000
25,257,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
Five-year
Totals
833,057,451
1,494,552,652
205,875,000
335,000,000
3,266,447,493
2,256,854,652
163,045,638
650,892,000
0
392,430,000
929,974,000
1,134,636,000
669,260,000
398,948,000
164,149,608
982,480,000
1,223,704,514
805,980,000
163,051,000
216,142,932
0
144,330,000
0
513,720,000
0
26 IAD Washington Dulles International 130,949,805 130,949,805 7,863,180 269,762,790
27 SLC Salt Lake City International 82,932,773 0 42,757,656 15,618,301 1,153,477 142,462,207
28 TPA Tampa International 78,685,487 0 0 0 0 78,685,487
29 SAN San Diego International 67,554,559 0 0 0 0 67,554,559
30 FLL Ft. Lauderdale International Airport 190,185,000 0 190,185,000
31 DCA Ronald Reagan Washington National 180,448,197 128,428,804 29,295,324 29,295,324 5,242,120 372,709,769
Totals 3,800,600,487 2,848,183,625 3,885,204,535 4,029,757,252 3,502,144,853 18,065,890,752
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Table 3.3 Application of 1997 AIP Apportionment Formula
to Airports with Different Passenger Traffic Volumes
Totals 50,000 390,000(a) 500,000 2,600,000 1,000,000 3,802,500 5,000,000 5,945,000 10,000,000 8,445,000 30,000,000 18,445,000
Average per PAX $7.80 $5.20 $3.80 $1.19 $0.84 $0.61
(a) Airport will receive the minimum $500,000
Source: Author calculations
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Airports wishing to impose a PFC must apply to the FAA for such authority. When first
implemented, approved airports could charge enplaning passengers a $1, $2, or $3 passenger
facility charge (PFC). Since the PFC Program is complementary to the AIP program, large and
most medium hub airports authorized to charge PFCs are assessed up to a 50% apportionment
reduction in AIP. The reduction becomes effective the year following the approval of authority
for PFC collection. The apportionment money withheld as a result of PFC collections is
redistributed within the AIP program as follows:
* 25% to the AIP discretionary fund; and
* 75% to the "small airport fund."
Of the 25% distributed to the discretionary fund, half of the amount must be spent at primary,
small-hub facilities. Of the 75% distributed to the "small airport fund," one-third is distributed
among general aviation facilities (including reliever airports). The remaining two-thirds are
distributed to nonhub commercial service airports (DOT/FAA 1999, 18). Since 1997 the
authority to approve many of the PFC applications has been delegated to the FAA's regional
offices.
In 2000 President Clinton signed into law the "Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform
Act for the 21" Century" (AIR 21). This legislation allowed for the PFCs to be increased to $4
and to a maximum of $4.50. It is important to note that airports whose PFCs are to be kept at $3
or less will continue to have a 50% reduction in their AIP apportionment. However, those
airports requesting PFCs above $3 will have a 75% reduction in their AIP apportionment. Under
AIR 21 no large or medium airport at which one or two air carriers account for more than 50
percent of passenger enplanements may impose a PFC, unless the airport authorities submit a
competition plan (U.S. Department of Transportation 2000, 1).
3.1.4 State and Local Grants
State and local governments provide some financial support for capital programs. The funds are
derived from a variety of sources that include matching funds to secure federal funding, aviation
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fuel and aircraft sales taxes, highway taxes, bonds, as well as general fund appropriations.
Considering the large amounts of money needed, local governments in the United States do not
provide substantial support to capital programs of large commercial airports. For instance, 1996
the revenues from state grants for large commercial airports accounted for only 4% of capital
programs funding (Table 3.1) (GAO 1998, 40,41).
Figure 3.4 Use of Capital Program Funds, Fiscal Year 2000
Lanside
14%
Other
7%
Airside
22%
Source: ACI-NA
3.1.5 Airport Revenues
Large commercial airports generate most of their revenues from landing fees, terminal rentals,
and commercial activities that include retail activities, rental car and parking services. Operating
revenues of large commercial airports are usually sufficient to cover the facility's operating
expenses, debt service, and to the extent available, other non-operating expenditures including
some capital development funding. The use of airport revenues to pay directly for development
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Terminal
57%
programs is known as "pay-as-you-go" financing. However, this is not the preferred method for
funding capital programs. As Table 3.1 shows only 2% of capital programs are funded directly
from airport revenues (GAO 1998, 41).
3.2 Capital Programs
The 2000 General Information Survey conducted by Airports Council International - North
America (ACI-NA) gathered information on airports capital programs planned or underway for
the period 2001-2006 (Table 3.7). The combined cost of capital programs for the U.S. large hubs
for that 5-year span was estimated to be about $24 billion, averaging just over $4 billion annually
(Table 3.4). This not only shows tremendous construction activity at large airport facilities in the
United States. It also demonstrates the capacity of airport operators to find the means to fund
such capital projects.
The ACI-NA survey also shows how the money for large commercial airports capital programs
was being used (Figure 3.4). Clearly most of capital investment goes to terminal buildings
(57%). Investment on airside projects (i.e., runways, aprons, taxiing areas, etc.) took 22%.
Another 14% was spent in landside related projects (e.g., parking structures, access roads, etc.)
and 7% was allocated to remaining projects.
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Table 3.4. Projected Capital Expenditures at Large Hub Airports,
Fiscal Years 2001-2006
Ranking Airport Airport Name Amount
William B Hartsfield
Chicago O'hare International
Los Angeles International
Dallas/Fort Worth International
San Francisco International
Denver International
Phoenix Sky Harbor International
Mc Carran International
Detroit Metro Wayne
Newark International
Minneapolis-St Paul International
Miami International
George Bush Intercontinental
John F Kennedy International
Lambert-St Louis International
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Total
ATL
ORD
LAX
DFW
SFO
DEN
PHX
LAS
DTW
EWR
MSP
MIA
IAH
JFK
STL
MCO
SEA
BOS
LGA
PHL
CLT
CVG
HNL
PIT
BWI
lAD
SLC
TPA
SAN
FLL
DCA
Source: ACI-NA
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Orlando International
Seattle-Tacoma International
General Edward Lawrence Logan
La Guardia
Philadelphia International
Charlotte/Douglas International
Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky
Honolulu International
Pittsburgh International
Baltimore-Washington International
Washington Dulles International
Salt Lake City International
Tampa International
San Diego International
Ft. Lauderdale International Airport
Ronald Reagan Washington National
2,345,713,000
1,300,000,000
856,000,000
2,030,900,000
533,500,000
774,021,560
1,350,500,000
1,245,000,000
1,529,000,000
284,000,000
1,303,640,000
3,088,000,000
887,000,000
917,000,000
1,100,000,000
820,000,000
0
673,000,000
239,000,000
640,000,000
235,000,000
57,300,000
197,000,000
130,256,000
593,000,000
0
33,229,840
327,217,000
126,200,000
419,000,000
40,000,000
24,074,477,400
3.3 Credit Rating Agencies
To cope with the high cost of capital programs airport operators have to borrow large amounts of
money using the bond market. Investors interested in airport bonds turn to the credit rating
agencies for financial advice. The credit rating agencies provide independent insight analysis
about the creditworthiness of a bond issuance. The leading rating agencies in the U.S. are
Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's Investors Services and Fitch IBCA.'9 Credit rating agencies
are very influential and their opinion has a major bearing on the final cost of a capital program.
Table 3.5 Credit Rating Definitions
MOODY'S S & P FITCH Definitions Type of Investment
Aaa AAA AAA Highest quality
Aa AA AA High quality
A A A Upper medium quality Investment grade
Baa BBB BBB Medium grade
Ba BB BB Somewhat speculative
B B B Low grade, speculative
Caa CCC CCC Low grade, default possible Junk bonds
Ca CC CC Low grade, partial recovery possible
C C C Default, recovery unlikely
The credit rating agencies have developed a set of rating criteria that reflects the financial
strength of the evaluated investment vehicle. Table 3.5 synthesize the rating range for airport
bonds. Since bond ratings reflect the probability of default, the higher a bond is on the rating
scale the lower the probability of default. The highest quality bonds are rated triple-A by all
credit rating agencies. Conversely, the C type category reflects high risk and is the least desirable
type of investment. In the credit rating process airport operators benefit from highly-rated bonds
since the yields on these bonds will be set lower, resulting in a lower cost of debt.
19 In March 2001 Fitch IBCA, a subsidiary of FIMALAC, SA, a diversified French company acquired Duff
& Phelps Credit Rating Co. (D&P). Stephen W. Joynt, Fitch IBCA's president and COO stated in early
2001: " This merger enable us to offer a full service alternative to S&P and Moody's and allows us to be a
strong competitor to the industry giants."
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In general, airport revenue bonds are highly regarded and considered a safe type of investment. It
is very unusual to find an airport revenue bond in the junk bond category. Historically, airport
operators have demonstrated financial stability even when the airline industry has performed
poorly (Forsgren, MacDonald, and Whithestone 2002, 1). In fact, no large commercial airport
has defaulted on its financial obligations in the last 50 years (Whiteman, Hu and Cahill 2000, 17).
Although airport revenue bonds will continue to be the primary funding source for airport capital
projects, passenger facility charge (PFCs) bonds, special facility bonds, project finance debt, and
double-barrel letter of intent bonds (LOIs) are expected to play a larger role in airport financing in
the future (Gilliland, Champeau and Soltz 2001, 1).
It is important to point out that credit rating agencies focus their analyses on specific deals or
projects (i.e., bond series for fuel complexes, cargo facilities, or a new international terminal)
assessing the ability of the sponsoring entity to honor the acquired obligation. For this reason it is
easy to find multiples ratings (for different projects) in the same airport (see Tables 3.6 and 3.7).
It is a mistake to assume that all airports operate in the same way and can be evaluated with a
"cookie cutter" formula. Moody's emphasize that each airport is a unique operating entity that
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis (Whiteman, Hu and Cahill 2000, 18). When measuring
the creditworthiness of a bond issue, the credit rating agencies basically assess the capacity of the
sponsoring entity to serve its debt. To establish the financial viability of the bond issuance, the
rating agencies look at different factors that could impact (positively or negatively) revenues.
Credit rating agencies evaluate factors such as the local market strength, management practices,
and the cost recovery methodology used; as well as external factors such as environmental issues
and the political climate.
The next section displays a basic outline of key factors that credit rating agencies look at to set
their credit ratings. It is important to emphasize, however, that the following section provides
only an overview of "key factors." Credit rating agencies make in-depth analyses that also
capture the unique characteristics of each financing arrangement. The rating methodology
synopsis was compiled from the following publications:
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Fitch IBCA. Airport Revenue Bonds Flying High. April 28, 2000.
Moody's Investor Services: Municipal Credit Research. Worldwide Airport Industry:
Rating Methodology. May 2000.
Standard and Poor's. Standard & Poor's Public Finance Criteria: Transportation Bonds
(Airports). 2000.
3.3.1 Fitch IBCA
To assess airport revenue bonds credit strength Fitch IBCA makes an evaluation of key factors
that include the service area, traffic composition and trends, as well as airline performance and
management team track record. Fitch also looks at the legal framework and physical
characteristics of the facility.
In the process of making a service area analysis Fitch IBCA makes a careful evaluation of the
balance in air traffic. That is, the balance between origination and destination (O&D) traffic in
contrast to connecting traffic. According to Fitch IBCA, the "most highly rated airports have a
substantial foundation of O&D traffic." In addition, the traffic composition and enplanement
trends are analyzed in relationship to local economic conditions and the overall national
economy. Airport characteristics such as size and airline competition are also evaluated, as well
as the financial strength of the dominant carriers.
When evaluating the use and lease agreements between airports and airlines Fitch IBCA does not
prefer one cost recovery methodology to another. The rating agency evaluates the type of
agreement in relationship to market demands and the airport credit fundamentals. The credit
evaluation includes an airport management analysis and an assessment of the financial
performance of the sponsoring entity. The rating agency also looks into the airport's history of
capital planning and execution.
The final component of the evaluation menu includes the legal structure of the deal. "Fitch IBCA
focuses on the pledge security, flow of funds, various covenants and restrictions, reserve funds,
events of default and provisions for subordinate and variable-rate debt."
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3.3.2 Moody's Investors Services
Moody's rating process includes an assessment of the performance of the issuer against the
backdrop of major industry trends. The evaluation of an airport's position involves a
fundamental analysis of its business, competitive position and operations. According to Moody's
the airport's financial and debt positions are essentially derivatives of these structural and
operational factors, while the airport's legal framework defines its obligations to the debt holders.
Figure 3.5 synthesize the key factors that determine Moody's airport credit evaluation.
In the evaluation process, Moody's examines the competition from other airports in the area, the
airline diversity, as well as the control that the operator has over the facility (i.e., gates,
holdrooms, concession and passenger buildings space). Environmental issues such as pollution
and noise control are a major concern for Moody's. These issues have the potential to become
problematic and costly for the sponsoring agency. For example, communities opposed to an
airport expansion project due to noise, pollution and/or traffic concerns can resort to the use of
environmental legislation to derail or slow down an expansion program.
Probably the most subjective part of Moody's evaluation is the analysis of the management and
ownership structure. For example, relationships among stakeholders - government, airport
tenants, debt holders and the like-are not always explicit and easy to quantify. Yet, in many
ways, a good or bad relationship can help accelerate or slow down the negotiation process thus
affecting the overall outcome and cost of a project.
Airport finances are not totally comparable and usually reflect the cost recovery methodology that
is used as well as the corporate structure. There are, however, a number of common themes that
are true for most airports irrespective of type. Foremost among these is the diversification of the
revenue base away from airlines, something which Moody's feels is a positive credit attribute.
Moody's focuses specially on the way the financial arrangement fits the particular cost recovery
methodology used by the airport. Moody's also makes an assessment of the type of debt used and
sees how this fits the specific needs of the project. This analysis is complemented with an
assessment of the legal framework used in the deal.
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Figure 3.5 Moody's Airport Rating Factors
Ownership Environmental
Issues
Management
Source: Moody's Investors Services 2000
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3.3.3 Standard & Poor's
In the rating process Standard & Poor's (S&P) makes an in-depth analysis of the service area
characteristics. According to S&P, the strength of the local economy help determine air
passenger demand. The rating agency states that "high per capita income is an important
indicator of discretionary air travel." S&P further evaluates air traffic demand by examining the
airport utilization trends versus those of the nation. Then the types of traffic are carefully
weighted against the local economy. If most passengers are those of the O&D variety, the local
economy dictates the level of service demands. Conversely, airports used heavily for connecting
traffic depend less on service area economics. S&P clearly states that substantial transfer traffic
is usually a vulnerability "because the choice of connecting facility is not made by the passengers,
but dictated by the airline and thus related to a carrier's viability and route decisions." However,
airports that handle mostly connecting traffic have mitigating factors that can effectively offset
this concern. The mitigating factors include the importance of the facility to the overall U.S.
airport network, a favorable geographical location, manageable debt burden and carrying costs,
strong air carriers accounting for the greatest amount of connecting traffic, and legal provisions
that allow for maximum flexibility in charging rates.
The use and lease agreements used by the airport determine, not only the allocation of risk, but
also the use of surplus money from landside. If lanside businesses do not do well, then depending
on the type of cost recovery methodology, losses will be the responsibility of either the airport or
the airlines. The rate-setting methodology is carefully examined by S&P to determine how the
new debt fits into the existing legal and financial framework.
According to S&P, analysis of other financial conditions is similar regardless of cost recovery
methodology used. Important financial factors considered by S&P are historical revenue
diversity, debt burden, and airline cost per enplanement. Analyzed on a pro forma basis, this last
measure is particularly useful because it incorporates future debt service costs and indicates the
degree to which concessions can offset airline costs.
In addition, S&P analyzes the size and purpose of the financing program as well as the need of
additional debt financing. S&P also evaluates other important factors that have a major impact on
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the outcome the project such as the influence of local politics and experience of the management
team with large construction projects.
Figure 3.6 is an attempt to summarize the common factors that rating agencies analyze when
performing a credit evaluation. The market analysis focuses on external factors that have an
impact on the competitiveness of the airport. The air traffic analysis assess the forecast of air
traffic volumes and airline competition environment. Next is the analysis of the existing physical
infrastructure and an assessment for the need for a capital program. The management and
operations analysis evaluates how the management and operation of the airport fits the legal and
financial framework. The financing factor focuses on the existing debt, and an evaluation of a
scenario in which additional debt is accrued to the airport. Other relevant issues cover the
political climate and environmental concerns.
Figure 3.6 Relevant Factors for Rating Airport Revenue Bonds
Market Analysis
" Geographical location
* Regional economics (demographics, disposable income, etc.)
" O&D versus hub operations (Does the airport fit and match local needs?)
* Domestic versus international traffic
Air Traffic Analysis
" Air traffic forecast
e Airline market share at the facility
" Strength/commitment of airlines
" The role of nearby airports
Physical Infrastructure
e Use of existing facilities
e Need of new facilities
" Control of the gates (increasing gate control by airports is a plus)
Management & Operations
" Cost recovery method (Does it fit the needs and characteristics of the airport?)
e Contractual issues (Agreements with airlines, concessions, etc.)
Financing
" Existing debt burden
" Debt secured by corporate pledge general revenues PFCs > Other
e Reserves
Other relevant issues
" Political climate
e Environmental concerns
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3.4 Capital Programs after September 11, 2001
As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, in Washington and New York the North
American air transportation system was disrupted resulting in a two-day closure of the entire air
network in the United States. Since then, major carriers have announced more than 100,000
layoffs in the airline industry, have begun retiring older planes, and have reduced service in
approximately 20% (Gilliland, Champeau, Soltz, and Warlick 2001, 2). It is important to point
out, though, that prior to September 11, major carriers were already facing a noticeable decrease
in revenues due to a slow down in the economy. The terrorist attacks and the consequent
disruption to the air transportation system accentuated and magnified the problem resulting in
unprecedented declines in air traffic.
The initial impact suffered by the airlines after September 11 was followed by other sectors of the
industry including the airport system. The unprecedented nature of the events created a high
degree of uncertainty. An initial assessment on the industry by S&P indicated that the effects on
the airport industry would generate lower financial margins, higher operating costs, that naturally
would produce lower credit ratings (Forsgren, Macdonald and Whitestone 2002 -1).
"Airport industry estimates the combined financial effects on airport budgets
for the year through September 2002 to be a $3.8 billion, all relating to lower
operating and passenger facility charge revenues, higher expenses, and
insurance. Not included in that total are estimates of $750 million in capital
costs to improve airport access as reported by Airport Council International-
North America and what Standard & Poor's expects to be significant
infrastructure cost to accommodate baggage screening and explosive detective
systems." (Forsgren, Macdonald and Whitestone 2002 -1)
In early 2000 the credit rating agencies started to re-evaluate the status of the airport credit
ratings. The kind of factors they focused on highlights the issues that are most relevant to the
credit rating process under the present circumstances.
Immediately after September 11, Standard & Poor's began to monitor closely the airport sector.
On February 7, 2002 S&P released a report entitled "Operational and Financial Difficulties
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Confront North American Airport Sector." The report indicates that S&P concentrated its
attention on airports showing the following credit risks:
e Airports with airline concentration issues and a hub status that leave them exposed to a
large-scale reduction in scheduled flights greater than industry peers;
* Airport sponsors that, due to their airline rate-making methodology, are more exposed to
the implications of significantly reduced non-aeronautical revenues and negatively
affected by revised security procedures;
e Passenger facility charges (PFC) backed facilities and other narrowly secured airport
special facilities that lack sufficient financial cushions;
* Airports with already high costs and debt levels and particularly those with large non-
deferrable capital expenditure programs or anticipated capital requirements;
* Airports with a high share of discretionary or international passengers; and
" Management teams that have not devised a strategy for addressing potential cost
increases and revenue declines.
In May 2002, Moody's released the "Why the Airport Downgrades?" report citing a few cases
that warranted a credit rating downgrade. In analyzing the factors that led to downgrade some
airport credit ratings Moody's highlighted a number of key issues that include:
e Aggressive ramp-up growth assumptions that have not stood up severe stresses;
* Projects that lack sufficient liquidity to cushion financing during downturns;
e Insufficient interest contingency to cover delays in construction; and
* Ambiguities in the legal contracts and documents underlying the concessions are being
tested and not performing well
There is concensus among credit rating agencies that hub airports (i.e. those facilities with a high
level of connecting traffic) are more vulnerable under the present circumstances. This situation is
closely linked to the dominant carriers at the facilities. In recent months it has become evident
that airports with a large percentage of connecting traffic tend to mirror the standing of their
dominant carrier. For example, airport hubs dominated by American Airlines and United Airlines
have experienced the largest service reductions based on schedule daily seats in February 2002
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versus February 2001. By contrast, markets dominated by Southwest Airlines continued to be
spared much of the negative effects associated with traffic declines (Forsgren, Macdonald and
Whitestone 2002 -1). In some cases, the rating agencies have taken action against airports
dominated by troubled airlines. For instance, the troubled financial status of US Airways led to
Fitch to place the ratings for Pittsburgh International Airport and Charlotte/Douglas International
Airport, NC, the airline's largest and third hubs, respectively, on Rating Watch Negative. Fitch
also changed the outlook of Philadelphia International Airport, US Airways' second largest hub,
to negative from stable (Stettler and others 2002, 5).
Revenues generated by parking, rental car, duty free, and other concessions, have experienced
large decreases and still lag behind previous years. In addition, there is significant uncertainty
regarding both the scope and cost associated with increased security measures. This also relates
to the possibility of costly design reconfiguration of buildings in some airports due to changes in
security procedures.
As expected, many airports halted nonessential operating expenditures and implemented better
cash-management techniques by reviewing accounts receivable and shortening maturities on
reserves where possible. The monitoring of S&P shows that the approach of most management
teams has been to cut expenditures, and assuming lower traffic levels, scale back budgets.
However, Fitch expects airports to resume spending in their capital programs as passenger traffic
returns to its historical growth pattern.
In the end is important to emphasize that the rating agencies have a somewhat optimistic outlook
for the future of the airport sector. This is strengthened by the fact that as a whole the airport
sector has been able to cope relatively well with probably the worst crisis in aviation history. In
S&P's view most airport sponsors have financial flexibility, demonstrated strategy, and sufficient
liquidity to address lower traffic levels during the intermediate term. "Barring further exogenous
shocks to demand or prolonged economic recession that retards recovery, Standard & Poor's
expects most ratings in the sector to maintain their current credit profiles and eventually return to
a stable outlook."
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In Fitch's view, the risk of widespread airport revenue bond defaults remains extremely low.
Fitch highlights the fact that most airport operators have been able to adjust both capital and
operating budgets to preserve cash and maintain sound levels of debt service coverage. The rating
agency further states that "the relative stable performance of the nation's airports during one of
the most tumultuous periods of the industry's history demonstrates the inherent credit strengths of
their financial structure" (Stettler and others 2002, 5).
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Chapter 4
Operating Revenue Structure
4.1 Background
Large commercial airports are increasingly viewed as cash-generating economic engines, less in
need of direct and indirect support from local government and congressional appropriation
committees (Forsgren, Wilkins, and Greer 1999, 18). In fact, most U.S. airport debt for capital
programs sold since the 1950s has been secured solely by revenues generated at the airport
facilities. U.S. airports have participated actively in the U.S. tax-exempt market for over 50
years. Historically, this is a market that has demonstrated aversion to risk and has achieved full
and timely payment of debt. Indeed, no U.S. airport has defaulted on its debt during the past 50
years (Whiteman and He 2000, 8). The backbone of such a formidable performance is the
airports' operating revenue structure.
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The operating revenue of large commercial airports is fairly simple and can be divided into two
main categories: aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues. Aeronautical revenues are
generated mainly by fees paid by the airlines for the use of runways, terminal space, apron areas,
and cargo facilities. Non-aeronautical revenues are generated by activities not directly associated
with the actual air transport of passengers, but by supporting activities such as concessions,
parking, rental cars, and other activities as diverse as the leasing of properties, gaming, or
consulting fees.
Airports receive additional revenues from federal grants and government controlled/monitored
programs such as the passenger facilities charge (PFC) program. These revenues are not part of
the operating revenue structure. However, they, just as operating revenues, contribute
substantially to the viability of the airports' capital programs. Commercial airports in the U.S.
that benefit from federal funding programs are required by law to submit at the end of their fiscal
year a detailed financial report to the FAA. This information can be used to assess the cost of
running an airport facility. Additionally, the data can be used as a benchmarking tool to compare
financial performance among airport operators.
4.2 FAA Form 5100-127
In compliance with section 47107 of the Title 49 United States Code and section 111 (b) of the
Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 airports that receive federal funding
(AIP grants) or have received authorization from the FAA to impose PFCs must file FAA Form
5100-127 at the end of their fiscal year. Congress enacted this reporting requirement to inform
the public about how airports collect and disburse their funds and to provide the FAA with a
means for evaluating whether airports comply with policy directions on revenue use. Form 5100-
127 is a simplified financial statement that displays airport revenues and expenses in a given year.
Form 5100-127 is fairly simple and resembles an income statement. However, the version used
by the FAA prior to 2001 poses some problems when used for analysis and comparison purposes.
For example, in the old Form 5100-127 under expenses the amount allocated to depreciation was
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combined into a single line item with interest, PFCs costs, grant expenses, etc. Depreciation is a
very important line item that should be itemized separately since it profoundly affects the overall
operating cost structure. The depreciation of airport facilities can represent as much as 30% of
operating expenses (Tables 5.4 and 6.4). Another major problem was the listing of bond proceeds
as revenues, whereas this is in reality acquisition of debt. These and other similar problems will
be corrected in the future. since the FAA hay updated and improved Form 5100-127 addressing
the above mentioned and other relevant issues. Figure 4.2 shows the April 2001 updated version
of Form 5100-127. The April 2001 version lists depreciation separately. In addition, it has
moved bond proceeds and sale of property to another category that reports the facility's yearly
proceeds. Other useful new features are a special category with information about the airport's
indebtedness at the end of the fiscal year, as well as a separate listing of restricted financial assets.
Adjustments to Form 5100-127
The financial information for this study was based on Form 5100-127 as reported by the airport
operators to the FAA. The data were collected in the original Form 5100-127 format as it stood
prior to the 2001 version. This format presented a few difficulties for the evaluation and
comparison of airports' financial performance. The objective of this study was to identify the
main sources of operating revenues of large commercial airports in the United States and the
factors that affect them the most, as well as the creation of a framework that allows a fair
comparison between airport facilities. To analyze and compare the financial data a few
adjustments were made to the original version of Form 5100-127. The various changes made to
this form were not aimed at improving its accuracy or to make it compatible to standard
accounting procedures. They were made just to better resemble an income statement (this allows
one to single out operating revenues and expenses), to simplify the format and to provide a
framework for fair analysis and comparison.
The modifications made to Form 5100-127 resemble the new format put forward by the FAA in
April 2001 (Figure 4.2). Figure 4.1 displays the changes made to Form 5100-127. The left
column shows the format of Form 5100-127 prior to April 2001. The right column shows the
modified format used for this study. The following is a detailed description of the changes made
to the original Form 5100-127.
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Structural Changes
Originally Form 5100-127 was divided into two main sections: revenues and expenses. The
revenues section was further divided into three main subsections: aeronautical operating
revenues, non-aeronautical operating revenues and non-operating revenues. The expenses section
was divided into operating and non-operating expenses subsections. The modified version
separates the operating revenues and expenses from other revenues and expenses. Operating
revenues are subdivided into two subsections aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues. The
"Non-Operating Revenues" and "Non-Operating Expenses" sections were combined into a new
section named "Non-Operating Revenues (Expenses)." In addition, a new "Government-
Sponsored Revenues" section was created (Figure 4.1).
Line Item Changes
Form 5100-127 as it stood prior to April 2001 underwent several modifications that included
moving six line items and eliminating another six line items. The original format of Form 5100-
127 had 37 line items (see left column of Figure 4.1). The modified version ended up with 31
line items (see right column of Figure 4.1).
New Non-Operating Revenues (Expenses) Section
Revenues and expenses not directly related to the operation of airport facilities were moved and
consolidated into a new "Non-Operating Revenue (Expenses)" section.
" Interest income (line item B 16) under non-aeronautical revenues was moved to become new
line item D1.
" Other non-operating revenue that includes interest income from restricted cash/capital (line
item C25) was moved to become new line item D2.
e Other non-operating expenses and fund uses (which combines interest, depreciation, and loss
on retirement/disposal of property, plant & equipment) (line item E12) was moved to become
new line item D3.
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The revenues generated by governmental programs were consolidated under the new
"Government-Sponsored Revenues" section.
e Revenue from AIP and other grants (line item C23) was removed
Revenues to become new line item El.
* Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) (line item C24) was removed
Revenues to become new line item E2.
from Non-Operating
from Non-Operating
Eliminated Line Items
" Bond proceeds (line item C20) are not revenues, instead they represent the acquisition of new
debt (this is money that airport operators will eventually have to pay back), therefore this line
item was eliminated.
* Property sold--not subject to federal obligations (line item C21), and Property sold--subject to
SPA/grant obligations (line item C22) are one-time events that depend on specific
circumstances and decisions of the airport operator. The inclusion of sale of properties
figures can affect negatively the comparability of fixed and steady operating revenue streams;
these figures were therefore eliminated.
" Finally, to help simplify the format three other line items, namely Debt Service (line item
E9), Transfer to Reserves (line item E10), and Capital Expenditures (line item E 11), were
also eliminated.
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Figure 4.1 Changes to FAA's Form 5100-127
FAA FORM 5100-127 (as of 2000)
A) Aeronautical Operating Revenue
1 Landing fees
2 Terminal
3 Apron charges and tiedowns
4 Fuel flowage fees
5 Utilities
6 FBO revenue: contract or sponsored
7 Cargo and hangar rentals
8 Security reimbursement
9 Miscellaneous
10 Other(s)
B) Non-aeronautical Operating Revenue
11 Rent
12 Concessions
13 Parking
14 Rental Cars
15 In-flight catering
16 Interest income Moved to Row D1
17 Royalties
18 Miscellaneous
19 Other(s)
C) Non-operating Revenues
20 Bond Proceeds Eliminated
21 Property sold (a) Eliminated
22 Property sold (b) Eliminated
23 AIP and other grants Moved to Row El
24 PFCs Moved to Row E2
25 Other(s)--Interest income from restricted Moved to Row D2
D) Operating Expenses
1 Personnel Compensation and Benefits
2 Communications and Utilities
3 Supplies, Materials Repairs, Maintenance
4 Services (c)
5 Insurance and Claims
6 Government in lieu (e)
7 Miscellaneous
8 Other(s)
E) Non-operating Expenses
9 Debt Service Payments (f) Eliminated
10 Transfers to Reserves Eliminated
11 Capital Expenditures Eliminated| 12 Other non-operatinq expenses and fund Moved to Row D3|
MODIFIED VERSION OF FAA FORM 5100-127
A) Aeronautical Operating Revenue
1 Landing fees
2 Terminal
3 Apron charges and tiedowns
4 Fuel flowage fees
5 Utilities
6 FBO revenue: contract or sponsored operated
7 Cargo and hangar rentals
8 Security reimbursement
9 Miscellaneous
10 Other(s)
B) Non-aeronautical Operating Revenue
11 Rent
12 Concessions
13 Parking
14 Rental Cars
15 In-flight catering
16 Royalties
17 Miscellaneous
18 Other(s)
C) Operating Expenses
1 Personnel Compensation and Benefits
2 Communications and Utilities
3 Supplies, Materials Repairs, Maintenance
4 Services (c)
5 Insurance and Claims
6 Government in lieu, permit, impact fees, etc
7 Miscellaneous
8 Other(s)
D) Non-Operating Revenues (Expenses)
1 Interest income
2 Other(s)--Interest income from restricted cash/capital funds
3 Other non-operating expenses and fund uses (d)
E) Government Sponsored Revenues
1 AIP and other grants
2 PFCs
(a) Not subject to federal obligations
(b) Subject to SPA/grant obligations
(c) Includes fees for other governmental services not included in other categories
(d) Includes interest, depreciation, and loss on retirement/disposal of property, plant & equipment
(e) Includes permits, impact fees, etc.
(f) Net of Capitalized Interest
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
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Figure 4.2 FAA Form 5100-127 (April 2001 version)
Operating and Financial Summary
Summary of Revenues and Expenses
A. Aeronautical Operating Revenue
1. Landing fees
2. Terminal/international arrival area rental or other charge
3. Apron charges/tiedowns
4. FBO revenue: contract or sponsor-operated
5. Cargo and hangar rentals
6. Aviation fuel tax retained for airport use
7. Fuel sales net profit/loss or fuel flowage fees
8. Miscellaneous (not to exceed 5% of Aeronautical)
9. Other (enter total here and add attachment)
Total
B. Nonaeronautical Operating Revenue
1. Land and non-terminal facilities
2. Terminal - food and beverage
3. Terminal - retail stores
4. Terminal - other
5. Rental cars
6. Parking
7. Misc. (Should not exceed 5% of total non-aeronautical)
8. Other (Enter total here and add attachment)
Total
C. Nonoperating Revenues
1, Interest income - restricted and non-restricted
2. Grant receipts
3. Passenger Facility Charges
4. Other
Total
D. Operating Expenses
1. Personnel compensation and benefits
2. Communications and utilities
3. Supplies and materials.
4. Repairs and maintenance
5. Contractual services
6. Insurance, claims and settlements
7. Misc (should not exceed 5% of total op expenses)
8. Other
Total
$
E. Non-Operating Expenses
1. Interest expense
2. Other
Total
F. Depreciation
Net (Total A+B+C Less D, E and F)
Other Financial Information
G. Reporting Year Proceeds
1. Bond proceeds
2. Proceeds from sale of property
3. Grants and other contributed capital
4. Other
Total
H. Reporting Year Expenditures for Projects
1. Airfield
2. Terminal
3. Parking
4. Roadways, rail and transit
5. Other
Total
I. Reporting Year Debt Payments Incl. Interest
J. Indebtedness at End of Year
1. Bonds
2. Loans
3. Other
Total
K. Net Assets
L. Restricted Financial Assets
1. Restricted debt service reserve
2. Restrictions for renewals and replacements
3. Other restricted financial assets
Total
M. Unrestricted Financial Assets Including cash
$
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4.3 Operating Revenues and Expenses
The financial data from Form 5100-127 provided by the FAA were used to look into the airports'
operating revenue and cost structure. Figure 4.3 displays the consolidated operating financial
information for large commercial airports in the United States. Between 1996 and 2000
operating revenues increased from $5.56 billion to $7.23 billion. Operating expenses did not
increase at the same pace. As a result, operating income (differential between operating revenues
and expenses) increased from $2.28 billion in 1996 to $3.10 billion in 2000. The consolidated
operating margin of all large hubs in the U.S. was 41% in 1996 and 1997, 44% in 1998, and 40 %
in 1999 and 2000. These operating margins provide the means to pay for the airports' expensive
capital programs.
Figure 4.3 Consolidated Operating Revenues and Expenses for U.S. Large Hubs,*
Fiscal Years 1996-2000
8.00 - - -- ---- -- -- --
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Z 3.00
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1.00 -
0.00 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
-4-Operating Revenues 5.56 5.84 6.37 6.70 7.23
-- Operating Expenses 3.28 3.43 3.57 4.05 4.22
-r-Operating income 2.28 2.42 2.81 2.65 3.01
* According to the FAA classification system large hubs are airport facilities that serve at least 1% of revenue
enplanements in the U.S. in a given year. After 1999 the FAA incorporated Fort Lauderdale Airport (FLL) to
the list of large hubs.
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
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4.3.1 Operating Revenues
The FAA financial data have been used to create Table 4.1, which consolidated operating
revenues for all large commercial airports in the United States for the period 1996-2000. Table
4.1 divides operating revenues into two categories: aeronautical revenues, and non-aeronautical
revenues. In 2000 the operating revenue of large hubs was $7.22 billion. The same year
aeronautical revenues accounted for 54% of operating revenues, while non-aeronautical operating
revenues contributed 46%. A few large line items stood out under each category. For example,
under aeronautical revenues landing fees and terminal building revenues accounted for 44% of
operating revenues. Also, four non-aeronautical line items including concessions, parking, rental
cars, and rent contributed 42% of operating revenues. In summary, six line items generated
approximately 86% of operating revenues.
Aeronautical Operating Revenues
Table 4.1 shows that the aeronautical operating revenues have increased steadily from $3.1
billion in 1996 to $3.8 billion in 2000. As a proportion of the overall operating revenue structure
these revenues have declined slightly over the 5-year span from 56% in 1996 to 54% in 2000.
Terminal Revenues
Terminal rental revenues are generated from the use of terminal facilities and ground space used
for moving passengers and their baggage. It includes charges for the use of office space, check-in
and ticket counters, hold rooms, passenger baggage claim and staging areas, and the use of other
operational and maintenance facilities directly related to the air transport of passengers. Table 4.1
shows that, at 24%, the revenues from the fees paid by the airlines for the use of the terminal
space was in 2000 the most important operating revenue source of large commercial airports in
the U.S.
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Table 4.1 Consolidated Operating Revenues for 31 Large Hub Airports, Fiscal Years 1996-2000
(in Current Dollars)
1996 % 1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Aeronautical Operating Revenue
Terminal 1,362,804,101 25 1,370,378,831 23 1,437,709,193 23 1,506,983,069 23 1,756,864,782 24
Landing fees 1,252,133,599 23 1,246,875,894 21 1,279,028,572 20 1,374,639,822 21 1,474,620,729 20
Cargo/hangar rentals 210,392,138 4 200,643,048 3 198,190,270 3 217,638,145 3 223,385,174 3
Utilities 119,710,625 2 129,926,184 2 143,867,236 2 134,704,467 2 160,856,832 2
Others 178,088,872 3 192,775,549 3 320,251,544 5 309,949,814 5 256,860,374 4
Subtotal 3,123,129,335 56 3,140,599,506 54 3,379,046,815 53 3,543,915,317 53 3,872,587,891 54
Non-aeronautical Operating Revenue
Parking 810,818,319 15 883,270,064 15 1,000,554,666 16 1,108,377,315 17 1,209,236,545 17
Concessions 739,216,300 13 779,968,741 13 796,209,531 12 837,100,670 13 913,722,543 13
Rental Cars 396,433,543 7 438,636,809 8 490,135,352 8 528,260,268 8 586,982,222 8
Rent 234,577,324 4 267,886,334 5 330,322,321 5 290,752,842 4 271,831,199 4
Others 255,168,076 5 331,026,901 6 377,016,756 6 387,489,575 6 373,891,972 5
Subtotal 2,436,213,562 44 2,700,788,849 46 2,994,238,626 47 3,151,980,670 47 3,355,664,481 46
Total Operating Expenses 5,559,342,897 100 5,841,388,355 100 6,373,285,441 100 6,695,895,987 100 7,228,252,372 100
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
Page 94
Landing Fees
Landing fees are paid by the air carriers for the use of runways, taxiways, landing strips, runway
protection zones and clearways. Form 5100-127 does not account for charges for aircraft parking
under this category. Landing fees are a vital component of the operational revenue structure of
large commercial airports. In 2000 landing fees accounted for 20% of all operating revenues
(Table 4.1). By contrast, the fees that the airlines pay for utilizing airport facilities are a relatively
minor portion of the airlines' cost of operations, typically 3 to 6% (Fitch IBCA 2000, 1). As
Figure 4.4 shows, in 2000 landing fees constituted only 2.3% of the cost of operations for U.S.
major carriers. 20 By contrasting the importance of landing fees to airport revenues with their cost
to the airlines it is easier to understand where these two parties start off when negotiating airport
use and lease agreements.
Figure 4.4 U.S. Major Carriers Expense Indicators,* Fiscal Year 2000
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Cargo and Hangar Rentals
This line item includes revenues received from cargo operations and for the "hangaring" of
aircraft. Between 1996 and 2000 this line item accounted for about 3-4% of operating revenues.
Some airports known for their passenger traffic volumes have also developed quite profitable
cargo operations. For example, JFK generated over $100 million from cargo operations in 2000.
Other airports with considerable revenues from cargo operations are EWR with $23 million, SFO
with $20 million, and BOS with $13 million.
Other Revenues
Other revenues on the aeronautical side account for about 6-7% of the total. They include income
from utilities, fuel flowage fees, apron charges, Fixed-Base Operators (FBOs),2' security
reimbursements, etc. Under fuel flowage fees airports record all revenues (or losses if applicable)
derived from the business of selling aviation fuel. This should include all fees charged to aircraft
owners, operators and fuel providers (e.g., fuel flowage fees charged to FOBs for fueling aircraft
on airport property). Other revenues are derived from the parking of aircraft on airport property
and the fees paid by FBOs for the use of land and airport facilities. In addition, there is a variety
of smaller sources of operating revenues that include revenues derived from security charges, tax
retained for airport use, and revenues from tax collections from the sale of aviation fuel.
20 Under the FAA classification system airlines with annual revenues over $1 billion are considered major
carriers.
21 "Fixed-Base Operators (FBOs) are privately owned businesses that provide flight and aircraft support
services to aeronautical users of the airports, such as the sale of aircraft fuel, aircraft maintenance, and
hangar facilities. FBOs may need to lease airport facilities and land or enter into operating agreements with
the airports sponsor in order to provide such services." (US Department of Transportation 2001, A1-1)
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Non-Aeronautical Operating Revenues
As indicated previously, non-aeronautical operating activities are not essential to air
transportation. However, they play a key supporting role, adding convenience to the traveler, and
are becoming an increasingly vital component to the overall revenue structure of large
commercial airports. The main non-aeronautical operating revenues are generated from
concessions, parking and rental car companies. Table 4.1 lists the consolidated non-aeronautical
operating revenues for the large commercial airports in the US during the period 1996-2000. The
table shows that non-aeronautical operating revenues have increased steadily from $2.4 billion in
1996 to $3.3 billion in 2000. As a percent of the overall operating revenue structure, non-
aeronautical operating had a minor increase from 44% in 1996 to 46% in 2000.
Parking and Car Rentals
Given the great dependence on the use of the automobile in the United States it is not surprising
that, at 17% in 2000, parking revenues represent the most important non-aeronautical source of
operating revenue, and the third major contributor to the overall operating revenue structure.
Parking facilities are very profitable since the cost of operating them is very low compared to the
revenue they generate. Airports with large O&D traffic volumes show higher reliance on
revenues related to automobile usage. Indeed, Table 4.1 shows that in 2000 large commercial
airports in the U.S. derived about 25% of their operating revenues from automobile-related
businesses (i.e., parking 17% and car rentals 8%).
Figure 4.5 shows a fairly good correlation between the revenues from parking and O&D traffic
volumes. The graph shows that as O&D traffic increases, the revenue from parking increases as
well. In 2000 ORD was the leading parking revenue collector with over $90 million. Other
airports with large O&D traffic such as DEN, DFW, SFO, EWR, ATL and BOS, had parking
revenues ranging between $60 and $80 million.
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Figure 4.5 Correlation Between O&D Traffic and Parking Revenues
at Large Hub Airports, Fiscal Year 2000
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Concessions
Airports are increasingly taking advantage of business opportunities in passenger buildings by
offering specially designed space for concessions. The concessions category includes a) revenues
from food and beverages, and b) revenues from retail activities (news stands, bookstores, gift
shops, clothing stores, banks, currency exchanges, postal facilities, hotel reservation desks,
business centers, barbershops, shoeshine stands, computer games, gambling machines, pay
telephones, advertising space, specialty stores, duty-free and tax-free shops, and other retail
operations).
Between 1996 and 2000 concession revenues for all large commercial airports have increased by
23% from $739 million to $913 million (Table 4.1). Concessions generated about 13% of
operating revenues in 2000. Revenues from concessions are also tied to traffic volumes. As new
terminal facilities are built, newer airport designs focus on the latest retail techniques aimed at
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improving the revenues from concessions. Figure 4.6 shows that as traffic volume increases,
concession revenues increase as well. HNL and MIA stand out with concession revenues much
higher than other airports with larger traffic volumes. Figure 4.7 compares average concession
revenues per enplaned passenger. Again HNL and MIA stand out.
Figure 4.6 Correlation Between Concession Revenues and
Traffic Volumes, Fiscal Year 2000
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Other non-aeronautical operating revenues
A variety of other non-aeronautical activities produce between 7% and 8% of total revenues.
Activities at airport sites and surrounding areas can vary greatly depending on the economic
character of the area where the facilities are located. The FAA notes that airport owners and
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operators sometimes set up other revenue-producing activities that include manufacturing,
warehousing, and farming. In addition, there are charges to companies that operate on the airport
premises such as catering firms that provide services for the airlines. As well, there are other
revenue-generating activities such as leases, or contracts with hotels, car valet services, etc.
4.3.2 Operating Expenses
Table 4.2 lists the consolidated operating expenses for large commercial airports in the U.S.
during the period 1996-2000. The table shows that operating expenses grew steadily from $3.2
billion in 1996 to $4.2 billion in 2000. Labor costs stand out as the most significant operating
expense. In 2000 this line item accounted for 37% of operating expenses. Another 22% was
destined to outsourcing of services, while supplies, repairs and maintenance accounted for
approximately 18%. Communications and utilities expenditures were approximately 10%. The
combination of all the remaining expenses accounted for about 14%.
Personnel Compensation and Benefits
Salaries and other compensation and benefits accounted for 37% of operating expenses in 2000.
However, it is important to point out that operators of large commercial airports in the United
States often employ between 10 to 20% of the total number of workers on the airport. Typically,
private companies handle most of the everyday activities needed to keep American airports
running (de Neufville 1999, 9). For example, the Port of Seattle employs about 800 people to run
the local airport (SEA). But the total number of employees working at the airport including
airlines, food & beverage services, rental car operations, etc., is estimated to be close to 22,000"
(Parker 2002). A similar case is that of the Minneapolis Airports Commission (MSP): the airport
operator has about 500 employees on its payroll, but 30,000 people are estimated to work at the
facility as whole.
22 This number is based on the number of security badges issued by the Port of Seattle.
23 Information provided in a telephone interview by Patrick Hogan, MSP Public Affairs official (April 16,
2002).
Page 100
Figure 4.7 Concessions Revenues Per Enplanment, Fiscal Year 2000
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Table 4.3 lists employment figures for large commercial airport operators in the United States.
The employment figures at those facilities range from 148 employees at SAN to 2,400 at LAX.
Figure 4.8 shows the number of enplanements per airport operator employee. Most airports show
15,000 to 25,000 enplanements per employee. With over 98,000 enplanements per employee
ATL stands out as a facility with a ratio 5 times higher than the average US airport!
Facilities that show large numbers of enplanements per employee, such as ATL, SAN, CLT,
PHX, EWR and MSP are airports with high concentration ratios and are hubs of major airlines.
The low number of airport employees per enplanement may be explainable by the possibility that
the dominant airline provides or outsources most services to handle traffic operations.
Figure 4.8 Enplanements Per Employee at Large Hub Airports, Fiscal Year 2000
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Table 4.2 Consolidated Operating Expenses for 31 Large Hubs, Fiscal Years 1996-2000
(in Current Dollars)
1996 % 1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Operating Expenses
Personnel Compensation and Benefits 1,200,316,710 37 1,233,517,356 36 1,337,706,170 37 1,458,492,466 36 1,549,396,497 37
Services (a) 554,863,363 17 606,628,456 18 594,418,298 17 780,819,597 19 908,127,673 22
Supplies, Materials Repairs, 522,212,710 16 516,048,370 15 623,388,966 17 746,350,367 18 744,834,202 18Maintenance
Communications and Utilities 342,107,521 10 348,985,244 10 352,192,537 10 357,105,962 9 419,072,558 10
Others 655,600,315 20 720,648,738 21 659,533,956 18 706,750,710 17 598,106,618 14
Total Operating Expenses 3,275,100,619 100 3,425,828,164 100 3,567,239,927 100 4,049,519,102 100 4,219,537,548 100
(a) This line item is for outsourcing services such as legal advise, engineering, maintenance and janitorial services, etc.
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
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Services
The FAA states that under this category the airport management should record the outsourcing of
services from commercial enterprises and governmental agencies. Such costs include, but are not
limited, to consulting, legal, accounting, auditing, security, fire-fighting, advertising, engineering,
training, lobbying, maintenance, and janitorial services, architectural fees, and financial services.
The cost of outsourcing services has increased by 64% from $554 million in 1996 to $908 million
in 2000.
Supply, materials, repairs and maintenance
The costs of supplies, materials, repairs and maintenance have increased from $522 million in
1996 to $744 million in 2000. This represents an increase of 42% in five years. However in the
overall operating cost structure this line item has only grown from 16% in 1996 to 18% in 2000
Communications and utilities
Expenditures on communications and utilities have increased from $342 million in 1996 to $419
million in 2000 remaining at 10% in the overall operating expenses framework. This is a line item
that includes, but is not limited to, the cost of telephone usage, electricity and water services.
Others
The combination of the remaining operating expenses accounted for approximately 14% of all
expenses in 2000. These include insurance, claims and settlements, and special contractual
agreements with governmental agencies.
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Table 4.3 Employment at Large Hub Airports, Fiscal Year 2000
Labor
Ranking Airport Employees Enplanements Enplanements Labor expenditureper employee expenses per
employee
1 ATL 400 39,375,330 98,438 33,950,000 84,875
2 ORD 1,645 34,153,190 20,762 156,247,993 94,984
3 LAX 2,400 32,332,452 13,472 106,131,571 44,221
4 DFW 1,745 28,066,194 16,084 89,556,704 51,322
5 SFO 1,786 18,498,749 10,358 111,910,110 62,660
6 DEN 900 18,883,765 20,982 72,378,486 80,421
7 PHX 540 18,652,345 34,541 34,552,399 63,986
8 LAS 941 17,530,409 18,630 48,709,000 51,763
9 DTW 700 17,873,801 25,534 49,214,547 70,306
10 EWR 497 17,144,940 34,497 63,439,000 127,644
11 MSP 543 17,203,373 31,682 39,814,000 73,322
12 MIA 1,626 16,716,291 10,281 143,627,000 88,331
13 IAH 687 16,564,385 24,111 30,789,000 44,817
14 JFK 591 16,080,974 27,210 77,955,000 131,904
15 STL 644 14,552,733 22,597 30,590,979 47,502
MCO
SEA
BOS
LGA
PHL
CLT
CVG
HNL
PIT
BWI
IAD
SLC
TPA
SAN
FLL
DCA
645
800
729
480
641
225
370
600
475
424
545
512
371
148
380
436
15,136,268
14,225,451
13,816,195
12,567,451
13,022,732
11,936,722
9,185,962
10,511,446
10,520,627
10,617,714
8,501,994
9,297,702
8,200,264
7,953,273
8,541,532
7,959,838
23,467
17,782
18,952
26,182
20,316
53,052
24,827
17,519
22,149
25,042
15,600
18,160
22,103
53,738
22,478
18,257
31,963,000
57,940,651
60,581,834
44,376,000
31,584,183
9,471,008
19,503,111
25,622,180
19,039,642
20,569,358
45,516,045
23,783,305
18,667,687
3,272,211
15,186,000
33,454,493
49,555
72,426
83,103
92,450
49,273
42,093
52,711
42,704
40,083
48,513
83,516
46,452
50,317
22,110
39,963
76,730
Totals 23,426 495,624,102 21,157 1,549,396,497 66,140
Sources: ACI-NA, FAA & author
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4.4 Government-Sponsored Revenues
Since the mid 1940s the federal government has played a vital role in the process of planning and
developing airport facilities. The role has not been one of direct involvement with local
processes, but of providing financial support through grant programs, especially the Airport
Improvement Program (AIP). The funding has supported and continues to support programs that
follow the general guidelines that allow the US airport system to expand while meeting high
standards of safety and security while promoting competition at airport facilities (DOT/FAA
1999, 47). In the administration of the AIP, the FAA gives highest priority to projects that
enhance the safety and security of the airport system (FAA 1999, 2). The Office of the Associate
Administrator for Airports of the FAA administers both the AIP and PFC programs.
As explained in Chapter 3, most large commercial airports are operated by independent divisions
within city government or by stand-alone public entities (e.g., airport authorities or port
authorities). Both types of ownership are subject to federal regulations (with the exception of a
few grandfathered entities) that restrict airports from diverting revenues to non-airport funds or
activities (Champeau, Soltz, and Fry 2000, 6).
The fact that most large commercial airports receive AIP funding and/or have a PFC program in
place makes them subject to federal monitoring and regulation. Table 4.4 shows the government-
sponsored revenues received by large commercial airports in fiscal year 2000 as reported by the
airport operators in Form 5100-127. These revenues are likely to increase in the next few years
as airports continue to embrace more PFC-backed capital programs. Figure 4.9 depicts the
consolidated revenues of government-sponsored programs for large commercial airports in the
U.S. for the five-year period ended in 2000. These airports have had an increase in government-
sponsored revenues from $1.2 billion in 1996 to $1.4 billion in 2000.
Airport Improvement Program (AIP)
As explained in Chapter 3, in recent years the AIP program has evolved, focusing primarily on
funding medium and smaller airports. In 1996 federal grants for large commercial airports
provided about $498 million. By 2000 the number had been reduced to $376 million. This
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corroborates the fact that large commercial airports are reducing their dependence on AIP
funding.
Figure 4.9
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Consolidated Government-Sponsored Revenues for Large Hub Airports,
Fiscal Years 1996-2000
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498 337 410 426 376
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
Passenger Facilities Charges (PFCs)
Since PFCs and federal grant assistance are complementary, the AIP is likely to continue to
decline in importance for large commercial airports, as these airports increase their reliance on
PFC revenues. This is a choice that appeals to airports with large traffic volumes. As seen in
Chapter 3, the FAA set a cap to the apportionment formula for AIP money at $22 million per
airport. By using PFC funding airports with large traffic volumes give up a portion of their AIP
funding, but obtain a much larger PFC revenue in return. Figure 4.9 clearly shows that while
AIP funding has remained under $500 million between 1996 and 2000, PFC funding has
increased from $713 in 1996 to $1.1 billion in 2000. The gap between these two funding sources
is expected to widen at a higher rate after 2000 as airports authorized to charge PFCs above $3
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will give up 75% (instead of the original 50%) of their AIP funding. However, this might be an
area of concern for air carriers, since the PFC money is charged directly to the air fare. PFCs of
$1, $2, or $3 do not seem to add substantially to the overall cost of a ticket. However, as the
PFCs are increased to $4 and $4.50, they become a larger percentage of the total cost of the ticket
and could become a potential problem for low-fare carriers.
Table 4.4 Government-Sponsored Funding of Large Commercial Airports,
Fiscal Year 2000
Airport
Atlanta
Chicago O'Hare
Los Angeles
Dallas-Ft. Worth
San Francisco
Denver
Phoenix
Las Vegas
Detroit
ATL
ORD
LAX
DFW
SFO
DEN
PHX
LAS
DTW
EWR
MSP
MIA
IAH
JFK
STL
MCO
SEA
BOS
LGA
PHL
CLT
CVG
HNL
PIT
BWI
IAD
SLC
TPA
SAN
FLL
DCA
Newark
Minneapolis/St. Paul
Miami
Houston
New York
St Louis
Orlando
Seattle
Boston
La Guardia
Philadelphia
Charlotte
Cincinnati
Honolulu
Pittsburgh
Baltimore/Washington
Washington Dulles
Salt Lake City
Tampa/St. Petersburg
San Diego
Fort Lauderdale
Washington D.C. (National)
AIP and other
grants
13,794,834
15,062,579
9,121,875
19,696,484
10,072,353
4,218,143
43,826,777
10,004,000
1,206,925
2,218,000
35,177,000
16,439,000
0
8,758,000
22,894,846
17,550,000
14,043,015
8,883,000
20,524,000
2,831,167
0
10,608,852
2,747,866
12,805,514
12,027,089
6,395,406
11,768,875
4,864,003
8,243,341
22,309,000
7,956,049
376,047,993
PFC
105,108,240
90,394,695
76,054,287
73,300,686
0
51,482,169
47,514,946
45,159,000
45,996,580
45,117,000
43,567,000
43,090,000
0
39,960,000
43,819,193
44,200,000
37,438,916
41,296,309
35,326,000
33,602,771
0
18,117,705
0
0
25,611,879
26,562,989
25,661,204
20,966,416
21,061,420
20,399,000
21,798,105
1,122,606,510
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
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Ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Totals
4.5 Cost Recovery Methodology Comparison
4.5.1 Background
As seen in Chapter 2, the cost recovery methodologies used by airport operators have a major
impact on their revenue flows and consequently on the funding of capital programs. To determine
whether specific patterns exist within the revenue framework of airports with different cost
recovery methodologies a comparative analysis was performed. Keeping in mind that cost
recovery methodologies may vary widely from case to case, this section will focus on certain
general principles that apply to most cases.
A departure from a residual arrangement can be seen as a bold and aggressive business decision.
Airport operators that consider themselves in a stronger bargaining position with regards to the
airlines might feel motivated to move away from a residual rate-setting methodology into a
hybrid or compensatory arrangement. Airports switching from residual into compensatory
agreements are willing to take the risk associated with the operation of their facilities since they
can no longer rely on the airlines to cover for losses from non-aeronautical cost centers. The
motivation to increase their risk is to maximize profits and maintain control of the decision-
making process in the implementation of capital programs. The nature of the compensatory
arrangements enables airport operators to charge the airlines for the full cost of using the airports'
aeronautical installations while keeping surplus money from non-aeronautical cost centers. The
magnitude of the aeronautical charges increase can be very dramatic. For example, in 1993 when
LAX decided to switch from a residual to a compensatory methodology landing fees were
increased by 300%! (Section 2.4.4)
Residual arrangements are perceived as a more conservative approach to airport management.
However, this does not mean that operators with a residual arrangement are not motivated to
maximize profits. The difference is that the motivation might not be as strong as for airport
operators with compensatory arrangements, since the advantage of increased revenues benefits
mainly the signatory airlines. The motivation for airports with residual arrangements can be the
ability to lower the cost of aeronautical fees to maintain competitive prices and to keep the
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signatory airlines satisfied. Hybrid arrangements use components of both cost recovery
methodologies. Therefore it is expected that they should perform somewhere between residual
and compensatory arrangements.
In addition to increasing the revenue potential, airports can resort to minimizing expenses. Labor
cost represents the most significant operating expense for large commercial airports in the United
States (Table 4.2). Operators looking for ways to minimize costs may consider outsourcing as an
alternative to reduce labor costs. Advocates of outsourcing see it as an opportunity to reduce
administrative burdens, stabilize financial swings, and improve service by placing key tasks in the
hands of professionals that will provide services only when needed. Considering the willingness
of some airport operators to increase their risk level by using compensatory arrangements, one
can expect that these same operators are also the most likely to use outsourcing as an alternative
to high labor costs.
The previous general concepts regarding the alternative cost recovery methodologies established
the parameters for the formulation of three hypothesis. The common denominator for all of them
is the principle that airport operators opting for a compensatory rate-setting methodology are
more motivated to maximize revenues and minimize expenses, which should result in larger
operating margins.
Hypothesis 1
The percentage of total operating revenue generated from aeronautical sources should be highest
for compensatory airports, second highest for hybrids and lowest for residual arrangements. The
converse applies to non-aeronautical revenues.
Hypothesis 2
Services expenses should be highest for compensatory, second highest for hybrid and lowest for
residual. Conversely, labor costs should be the highest for residual, second highest for hybrid and
lowest for compensatory.
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Hypothesis 3
Operating margin should be highest for compensatory airports, second highest for hybrid and
lowest for residual arrangements.
4.5.2 Findings
For the analysis, all large commercial airports were separated into three groups by type of cost
recovery methodology (i.e., residual, compensatory or hybrid) --for a listing of airports in each
category see Table 2.4. The evaluation for each group was based on the modified version of
Form 5100-127 (right column of Figure 4.1). It is important to point out that between 1996 and
1998 there were 30 airports in the FAA list of large hubs. After 1999 the list increased to 31 as
the FAA added FLL to the list of large hubs. Table 4.5 has the consolidated operating revenues
for 11 airports listed as having residual arrangements. Table 4.6 presents the consolidated
operating revenues for the 7 airports with compensatory rate-setting methodology, while Table
4.7 shows operating revenues of the 13 airports with hybrid arrangements. It is important to
emphasize that of primary interest in these tables is the percentage value of each line item, not the
absolute dollar figures.
The following issues are important to keep in mind when interpreting the results:
" This analysis represents only a "short-term picture" of operating revenues and expenses over
a 5-year span. A long-term analysis would be needed to see how certain patterns hold over
longer periods of time.
e This type of analysis is not valid for evaluation of incidents that have a major impact at
specific points in time such as the drastic downturn in airport revenues after Sept. 11, 2001.
The reason is that not all airports end their fiscal year at the same time. For example,
financial reports of airports that ended their fiscal year at the end of September or December
of 2001 will partially reflect the impact of Sept. 11, unlike those facilities that closed their
books at the end of June, 2001.
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* Airports were classified according to cost recovery methodology on the basis of data obtained
from the 2001 General Information Survey conducted by Airports Council International.
There is no information regarding the length of time for which these airports have been using
their current cost recovery methodology. Facilities that just "switched" to a new cost recovery
methodology might be adjusting to recent changes and might not have fully developed their
revenue strategy.
Table 4.5 Consolidated Operating Revenues for Large Hub Airports with Residual
Arrangements, Fiscal Years 1996-2000 (in Current Dollars)
1996 % 1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Aeronautical Operating Revenue
Terminal 480,304,171 23 472,939,685 21 528,306,965 23 494,173,684 21 616,267,539 23
Landing fees 401,545,599 19 402,652,472 18 419,688,544 18 451,634,862 19 499,773,001 19
Cargo/hangar rentals 38,660,356 2 42,526,836 2 41,189,574 2 48,802,884 2 50,361,218 2
Utilities 35,857,404 2 36,651,644 2 39,232,884 2 30,107,620 1 35,806,810 1
Other(s) 57,160,213 3 68,485,719 3 77,359,503 3 87,366,103 4 102,389,516 4
Subtotal 1,013,527,743 48 1,023,256,356 46 1,105,777,470 48 1,112,085,153 47 1,304,598,084 49
Nonaeronautical Operating Revenue
Parking 303,852,721 14 328,339,939 15 355,225,676 15 389,872,812 16 435,779,735 16
Concessions 434,318,026 21 444,899,341 20 450,291,834 20 441,546,453 19 472,935,990 18
Rent 130,661,949 6 136,952,985 6 143,966,253 6 154,732,423 7 136,106,338 5
Rental Cars 146,113,414 7 166,971,266 8 181,385,497 8 205,922,402 9 233,293,563 9
Other(s) 86,896,561 4 100,255,329 5 67,330,129 3 70,922,905 3 84,312,713 3
Subtotal 1,101,842,671 52 1,177,418,860 54 1,198,199,389 52 1,262,996,995 53 1,362,428,339 51
Total Operating Revenues 2,115,370,414 100 2,200,675,216 100 2,303,976,859 100 2,375,082,148 100 2,667,026,423 100
Source: FAA 5100-127
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Table 4.6 Consolidated Operating Revenues, Large Hub Airports with Compensatory
Arrangements, Fiscal Years 1996-2000 (in Current Dollars)
1996 % 1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Aeronautical Operating Revenue
Terminal 207,484,448 17 217,822,018 17 231,468,007 17 255,752,023 18 288,562,030 19
Landing fees 294,836,694 24 299,604,754 23 279,812,569 20 289,030,983 20 284,664,712 19
Cargo/hangar rentals 39,835,716 3 28,002,927 2 27,146,386 2 27,184,032 2 26,469,649 2
Utilities 17,728,072 1 17,743,824 1 17,155,996 1 21,023,224 1 21,844,772 1
Other(s) 33,605,555 3 35,107,660 3 34,149,054 2 37,964,297 3 34,272,938 2
Subtotal 593,490,485 48 598,281,183 46 589,732,012 42 630,954,559 44 655,814,101 44
Nonaeronautical Operating Revenue
Parking 254,203,038 21 274,416,779 21 296,110,718 21 325,928,914 23 338,818,528 23
Concessions 152,222,925 12 164,611,963 13 182,735,157 13 206,362,759 14 205,031,950 14
Rent 72,470,107 6 89,621,679 7 140,271,264 10 83,301,569 6 94,449,861 6
Rental Cars 130,461,601 11 137,610,653 11 150,930,160 11 158,214,621 11 173,003,131 11
Other(s) 34,563,220 3 35,327,602 3 40,046,058 3 38,523,754 3 37,554,725 2
Subtotal 643,920,891 52 701,588,676 54 810,093,357 58 812,331,617 56 848,858,195 56
Total Operating Revenues 1,237,411,376 100 1,299,869,859 100 1,399,825,369 100 1,443,286,176 100 1,504,672,296 100
Source: FAA 5100-127
Table 4.7 Consolidated Operating Revenues, Large Hub Airports with Hybrid
Arrangements, Fiscal Years 1996-2000 (in Current Dollars)
1996 % 1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Aeronautical Operating Revenue
Terminal 675,015,482 31 679,617,128 29 677,934,221 25 757,057,362 26 852,035,213 28
Landing fees 555,751,306 25 544,618,668 23 579,527,459 22 633,973,977 22 690,183,016 23
Cargo/hangar rentals 131,896,066 6 130,113,285 6 129,854,310 5 141,651,229 5 146,554,307 5
Utilities 66,125,149 3 75,530,716 3 87,478,356 3 83,573,623 3 103,205,250 3
Other(s) 87,323,104 4 89,182,170 4 208,742,987 8 184,619,414 6 120,197,920 4
Subtotal 1,516,111,107 69 1,519,061,967 65 1,683,537,333 63 1,800,875,605 63 1,912,175,706 63
Nonaeronautical Operating Revenue
Parking 252,762,560 11 280,513,346 12 349,218,272 13 392,575,589 14 434,638,282 14
Concessions 152,675,349 7 170,457,437 7 163,182,540 6 189,191,458 7 235,754,603 8
Rent 31,445,268 1 41,311,670 2 46,084,804 2 52,718,850 2 41,275,000 1
Rental Cars 119,858,528 5 134,054,890 6 157,819,695 6 164,123,245 6 180,685,528 6
Other(s) 133,708,295 6 195,443,970 8 269,640,569 10 278,042,916 10 252,024,534 8
Subtotal 690,450,000 31 821,781,313 35 985,945,880 37 1,076,652,058 37 1,144,377,947 37
Total Operating Revenues 2,206,561,107 100 2,340,843,280 100 2,669,483,213 100 2,877,527,663 100 3,056,553,653 100
Source: FAA 5100-127
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Hypothesis 1
Figure 4.10 summarizes the data on aeronautical revenues contained in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7.
Airports with compensatory and residual arrangements obtain slightly less than half of their
operating revenues from aeronautical sources. Contrary to what was expected, airports with
compensatory arrangements depend the least on aeronautical revenues. Prior to 1997 residual and
compensatory airports had almost the same percentage of revenues derived from aeronautical
sources. After 1997 residual airports increased their dependence on this source. Compensatory
airports, by contrast, decreased their dependence on aeronautical sources. Hybrid airports, on the
other hand, depend heavily on aeronautical revenues. In 1996 airports with hybrid arrangements
received about 69% of their operating revenues from aeronautical sources. By 2000 this figure
had decreased to 63%.
Figure 4.10 Percent of Aeronautical Operating Revenues By
Type of Cost Recovery Methodology, Fiscal Years 1996-2000
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Figure 4.11 illustrates graphically part of the data contained in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. The graph
shows the importance of landing fees to airports with different rate-setting methodologies.
Airports with hybrid arrangements are the most dependent on landing fees. Interestingly landing
fees revenues for airports with compensatory arrangements have declined steadily since 1996 to
become almost as low as those of airports with residual agreements, which are the least dependent
on landing fees.
Figure 4.12 shows that airports with hybrid arrangements rely more that the other two types on
the rents collected from the airlines for the use of terminal buildings. Airports using residual
agreements are less dependent on terminal revenues than hybrid airports. Airports using
compensatory are the least likely to depend on terminal rental revenues.
A potential explanation for the patterns observed might be based on the following argument. An
airport using a compensatory methodology can charge fees only to cover the cost of operating the
facilities being used by the airline (i.e. runways or passenger buildings). For example, an airport
that under a residual agreement was able to reduce the landing fees with surplus money from non-
aeronautical cost centers could eliminate those subsidies under a new compensatory agreement.
If the aeronautical fee reductions were substantial, a new compensatory arrangement will
introduce a major increase in aeronautical fees. However, after the landing fees have been
adjusted then they cannot increase at a high rate because the airport will be obligated to charge
only for the cost of using the facility (the airport cannot make a profit on these charges). The
only way to increase landing fee revenues substantially will be through major increases in traffic
volumes. Therefore, the major motivation for airports to switch from residual to compensatory
agreements does not have to be increased aeronautical revenues, but rather the benefits accruing
from increased non-aeronautical revenues.
Figure 4.13 shows that airports with compensatory and residual agreements derive over 50% of
their revenues from non-aeronautical sources. Airports with hybrid arrangements receive
substantially less from non-aeronautical revenues. Figure 4.14. displays the parking revenues.
Airports with compensatory agreements have a higher reliance on parking revenues. Next are
airports with residual agreements, while airports using hybrid arrangements depend the least on
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parking revenues. This graph also highlights a clear trend with an increasing reliance on parking
revenues by all airport facilities.
Figure 4.11 Percent of Landing Fees Revenues By Type of
Cost Recovery Methodology, Fiscal Years 1996-2000
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Figure 4.12 Percent of Terminal Revenues By Type of
Cost Recovery Methodology, Fiscal Years 1996-2000
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Figure 4.13 Percent of Non-Aeronautical Operating Revenues By Type of Cost
Recovery Methodology, Fiscal Years 1996-2000
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Figure 4.15 shows that airports with residual agreements rely the most on concession revenues.
However their dependence on this line item is decreasing steadily as a percent of total operating
income. Facilities with compensatory arrangements are less dependent on concession than
airports with residual agreements. Airports with hybrid arrangements are the least dependent on
concession revenues.
In summary, airports with compensatory arrangements seem to be reducing their dependence on
aeronautical revenues and are clearly trying to increase their non-aeronautical revenues (i.e.,
parking and concessions). Airports with residual arrangements have a slightly higher dependence
on non-aeronautical revenues. However they do not show a clear trend toward either increasing or
decreasing their dependence on this revenue source. Airports with hybrid arrangements show a
much higher dependence on aeronautical revenues than airports using other cost recovery
methodologies (63% in 2000).
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Figure 4.14 Percent of Parking Revenues By Type of Cost Recovery
Methodology, Fiscal Years 1996-2000
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Hypothesis 2
Tables 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 summarize the operating expenses for each cost recovery category. In
the quest for improving profit margins airport operators can resort to outsourcing services. Figure
4.16 shows the expenditures for outsourcing of services, which includes legal advice,
engineering, maintenance and janitorial services, etc. As expected, the figures indicate that
airports with compensatory arrangements outsource substantially more services than other
airports. In fact, in 1996 airports with compensatory arrangements spent twice as much on
outsourcing services than their counterparts with hybrid and residual arrangements. In recent
years, airports with residual and hybrid arrangements have also steadily increased their
expenditures on outsourced services.
As figure 4.17 shows, airports with residual agreements spend more of their budget on labor. In
2000 about 42% of operating expenditures were devoted to labor. Despite having large service
expenditures, airports with compensatory arrangements also have high labor expenditures.
Airports with hybrid arrangements have relatively low expenditures on labor. It is important to
exercise caution when interpreting these data. The reason is that operational differences can
affect the labor requirements of airports that, in theory, might seem very similar. For example,
two airports serving roughly the same number of passengers and having similar O&D markets
can have very different labor needs. One airport could be served by an airline with 70-80%
market share which provides most of the labor force needed to operate the facility. The other
airport could have a less concentrated environment with a large number of airlines using the
facility. This could result in the need of additional manpower to better coordinate the operation of
the facility.
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Table 4.8 Consolidated Operating Expenses, Large Hub Airports with Residual
Arrangements, Fiscal Years 1996-2000 (in Current Dollars)
1996 % 1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Operating Expenses
Copenstion/Benefits 553,606,415 39 575,393,518 40 606,691,361 43 650,596,186 42 702,180,574 42
Services (a) 181,781,417 13 200,679,648 14 213,588,326 15 294,114,992 19 366,848,415 22
Supplies, Repairs, 214,804,131 15 215,136,960 15 261,103,582 19 297,278,122 19 296,678,968 18Maintenance
Communications and 145,165,187 10 146,678,864 10 146,568,435 11 144,709,906 9 166,336,633 10Utilities
Insurance and Claims 19,109,532 1 18,411,779 1 20,696,782 1 22,472,132 1 23,021,377 1
oements 19,604,027 1 13,396,234 1 6,447,310 0 7,782,629 1 10,441,186 1
Miscellaneous 51,306,981 4 39,066,288 3 29,142,985 2 24,924,628 2 29,861,542 2
Other(s) 227,078,270 16 240,186,403 17 110,986,066 8 94,613,454 6 82,292,108 5
Total Operating Expenses 1,412,455,960 100 1,448,949,694 100 1,395,224,847 100 1,536,492,049 100 1,677,660,803 100
Table 4.9 Consolidated Operating Expenses, Large Hub Airports with Compensatory
Arrangements, Fiscal Years 1996-2000 (in Current Dollars)
1996 % 1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Operating Expenses
Compenstion/Benefits 262,581,232 39 274,230,005 40 288,565,803 41 326,620,146 39 333,887,038 40
Services (a) 203,634,891 30 209,900,785 30 214,055,857 30 235,607,000 28 248,238,368 30
Supplies, Repairs, 68,740,648 10 69,666,623 10 74,386,318 10 97,874,886 12 102,004,787 12Maintenance
Communications and 63,531,808 9 65,338,690 9 67,377,824 9 68,639,848 8 75,799,013 9Utilities
Insurance and Claims 11,929,584 2 12,640,929 2 10,417,063 1 10,314,259 1 11,291,874 1
Gexments 8,244,665 1 8,817,611 1 10,398,159 1 10,543,883 1 9,715,420 1
Miscellaneous 11,931,806 2 13,305,175 2 16,862,431 2 19,636,807 2 29,401,931 4
Other(s) 39,636,532 6 39,421,823 6 29,717,798 4 62,886,496 8 24,375,894 3
Total Operating Expenses 670,231,166 100 693,321,641 100 711,781,253 100 832,123,325 100 834,714,325 100
Table 4.10 Consolidated Operating Expenses, Large Hub Airports with Hybrid
Arrangements, Fiscal Years 1996-2000 (in Current Dollars)
1996 % 1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 %
Operating Expenses
Compenstion/Benefits 384,129,063 32 383,893,833 30 442,449,006 30 481,276,134 29 513,328,885 30
Services (a) 169,447,055 14 196,048,023 15 166,774,115 11 251,097,605 15 293,040,890 17
Supplies, Repairs, 238,667,931 20 231,244,787 18 287,899,066 20 351,197,359 21 346,150,447 20Maintenance
Communications and 133,410,526 11 136,967,690 11 138,246,278 9 143,756,208 9 176,936,912 10Utilities
Insurance and Claims 21,778,714 2 20,971,198 2 20,964,059 1 24,580,251 1 22,303,729 1
expernt 2,864,000 0 5,179,000 0 0 0 2,000 0 4,058,360 0
Miscellaneous 22,677,359 2 32,787,201 3 31,441,895 2 31,826,595 2 36,564,701 2
Other(s) 219,438,845 18 276,465,097 22 372,459,408 26 397,167,576 24 314,778,496 18
Total Operating Expenses 1,192,413,493 100 1,283,556,829 100 1,460,233,827 100 1,680,903,728 100 1,707,162,420 100
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Figure 4.16 Percent of Services Expenses By Type of Cost Recovery
Methodology, Fiscal Years 1996-2000
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Table 4.11 Consolidated Operating Margins, Large Hub Airports with Residual
Arrangements, Fiscal Years 1996-2000 (in Current Dollars)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Revenue 2,115,370,414 2,200,675,216 2,303,976,859 2,375,082,148 2,667,026,423
Expenditure 1,412,455,960 1,448,949,694 1,395,224,847 1,536,492,049 1,677,660,803
Operating Income 702,914,454 751,725,522 908,752,012 838,590,099 989,365,620
Operating Margin 33.2 34.2 39.4 35.3 37.1
Table 4.12 Consolidated Operating
Arrangements, Fiscal
Margins, Large Hub Airports with Compensatory
Years 1996-2000 (in Current Dollars)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Revenue 1,237,411,376 1,299,869,859 1,399,825,369 1,443,286,176 1,504,672,296
Expenditure 670,231,166 693,321,641 711,781,253 832,123,325 834,714,325
Operating Income 567,180,210 606,548,218 688,044,116 611,162,851 669,957,971
Operating Margin 45.8 46.7 49.2 42.3 44.5
Table 4.13 Consolidated Operating Margins, Large Hub Airports with Hybrid
Arrangements, Fiscal Years 1996-2000 (in Current Dollars)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Revenue 2,206,561,107 2,340,843,280 2,669,483,213 2,877,527,663 3,056,553,653
Expenditure 1,192,413,493 1,283,556,829 1,460,233,827 1,680,903,728 1,707,162,420
Operating Income 1,014,147,614 1,057,286,451 1,209,249,386 1,196,623,935 1,349,391,233
Operating Margin 46 45.2 45.3 41.6 44.1
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Figure 4.18 Operating Margins (%) By Type of Cost Recovery Methodology
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Hypothesis 3
Tables 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 summarize operating margins by type of cost recovery methodology
for the period 1996-2000. Figure 4.18 illustrates graphically the operating margins of all three
cost recovery methodologies. The results support Hypothesis 3. Airports with compensatory
arrangements achieved the highest operating margins. Hybrid facilities had the second highest
operating margins. Facilities with residual arrangements achieved the lowest operating margins.
This is consistent with the very nature of residual agreements, which limits the risk of the airports
by shifting it to the airlines, but at the same time limits the potential of the airport for increased
operating margins.
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Despite the fact that compensatory arrangements achieve the highest operating margin, it is
airports with hybrid rate-setting methodologies that, in absolute terms, achieve the highest
operating surplus on a per-passenger basis. Figure 4.19 shows the operating revenue and cost per
enplaned passenger for airports with different cost recovery methodologies. Airports with hybrid
arrangements generate the largest operating revenues 24 per enplanement ($18.00), followed by
facilities with residual ($14.90) and compensatory ($ 10.20) arrangements. The operating
expenses follow the same order as airports with hybrid arrangements have higher expenses
($10.00), followed by facilities with residual ($9.40) and compensatory ($5.70) arrangements.
Airports with compensatory arrangements generate the least revenue per passenger, but their
operating expenses are also very low. This results in a high operating margin. Nevertheless, it is
facilities with hybrid arrangements that realize the highest operating surplus per passenger on an
absolute basis. This is the result of flexible arrangements that allow the airport operator to divert
risk while leaving plenty of room to increase (and the option to retain) non-aeronautical revenues
when the opportunity arises.
Figure 4.19 Operating Income By Type of Cost Recovery Methodology,
Fiscal Year 2000
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revenues excludes Government-Sponsored programs such as AIP or PFCs.
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4.6 Main Drivers of Operating Revenues
According to Table 4.1 large commercial airports receive almost half of their operating revenues
from airlines in the form of landing fees and of rental fees for the space leased in the terminal
buildings. But the distribution and size of the revenue sources can vary, according to a number of
factors, that include airport size and configuration, traffic volumes, traffic mix, the state of the
local economy, etc. For example, the largest commercial airports typically have a more
diversified base of revenues than do smaller ones, and terminal concessions can be expected to
generate a greater percentage of the airport's total operating revenues as boarding numbers
increase (GAO 1998, 2).
What influences greatly the aeronautical operating revenues is the existing use and lease
agreements that airports establish with the airlines. The relationship between the airport and
the airlines is therefore important in shaping most of the aeronautical operating revenue structure.
The relationship between the airport and the airlines is influenced by factors such as existing
long-term contractual obligations, ownership and management structure of the facility, O&D
demand, competitive airline environment within the facility and in the region (i.e., in regions with
more than one large airport, airlines have to compete with airlines within the same airport and
also with airlines serving nearby airports), as well as the financial stability of main air carriers
using the airport.
Non-aeronautical operating activities are not vital to the transportation of passengers. However,
they play a key supporting role by providing convenience to the traveler. In recent years airports
have started to implement aggressive business plans to expand their cash inflows from non-
aeronautical operating revenues. The remodeling of existing facilities and the construction of
new airport terminals utilize new concepts and designs aimed at maximizing business revenues.
This can be achieved by incorporating the latest retail techniques and adapting them to fit airport
activities. Therefore, the main driver of non-aeronautical operating revenues is the business
practices of the airport management. The business environment is influenced by a number of
25 As explained in Section 2.3 some airports might choose not to have a contractual agreement with the
airlines and set their fees by ordinance.
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factors that include management philosophy, traffic volumes, O&D demand, state of the national
and local economy, as well as trends in the retail industry.
Government-sponsored revenues contributed a significant $1.4 billion in 2000. The main
components of this segment are grants received from the federal, state and local governments and
passenger facility charges (PFCs), which are fees collected from the passengers for the use of
airport facilities. The funds from the AIP and PFC programs are dedicated to specific capital
programs. Therefore these cannot be considered operating revenues. This revenue stream is
controlled externally by the FAA, which grants permission and holds the right to discontinue the
programs at any time if airports do not comply with established federal regulations. Grant money
and PFC revenues are directly related to government policies towards the funding of air
transportation. Therefore, this revenue stream is mostly shaped by Policy considerations.
Figure 4.20 highlights the main drivers of airport revenues. The 20 line items on the left column
generate the revenue streams that flow into the airports' coffers. The revenues are divided into
three main categories: aeronautical operating revenues, non-aeronautical operating revenues, and
government-sponsored revenues. Each category is influenced by one main driver (center
column). For instance, the existing relationship between the airports and the airlines is the main
driver that shapes the aeronautical operating revenue structure. Airport-airline relationships are
influenced by various internal and external factors (right column) such as existing long-term
contractual agreements,2 6 O&D demand, competitive airline environment and financial strength
of the airlines. The business environment is the main driver that shapes the non-aeronautical
revenue structure. At the same time, the business environment is influenced by factors such as
management philosophy of the airport operator, traffic volumes, O&D demand, state of the
economy, and trends in the retail industry. Finally, federal policy is the main factor that shapes
the government-sponsored revenues.
26 As explained in Section 2.3 some airports might choose not to have a contractual agreement with the
airlines and set their fees arbitrarily by ordinance.
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Figure 4.20 Drivers and Main Factors that Affect the Operating Revenue Structure of Large Commercial Airports in the U.S.
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Chapter 5
Logan International Airport
This chapter presents Logan International Airport (BOS) as an example of an airport that uses a
compensatory approach to set its aeronautical fees. As indicated in Section 4.5, airports using a
compensatory methodology have higher reliance on non-aeronautical revenues and high operating
margins. This chapter will assess whether these patterns hold in the case of BOS. Another aspect
the chapter will focus on is debt service coverage, which should be higher for BOS due to a
higher dependence on non-aeronautical revenues. According to S&P, U.S. airports with
compensatory elements in their business profile tend to achieve average higher debt service
coverage (1.75-2.50 or higher) to compensate for the highly elastic association between passenger
traffic and concession revenues as compared to residual airports (Forsgren, Wilkins and Greer
1999, 21). It is important to point out that all financial information on this chapter pre-dates Sep.
11,2001.
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5.1 Background
Located in Boston, Massachusetts, Logan International Airport (BOS) serves a population of
approximately 3.5 million. In 2000 over 27 million passengers flew to and from BOS making it
the 18h most active airport in the United States. About 85% of BOS traffic is domestic. Only 4
million passengers or 15% of total traffic is international. Close to 86% of passengers originate
or end their trips at Logan, making it one of the strongest O&D markets in the country. According
to Standard & Poor's the fact that Logan is an O&D facility rather than a carrier hub lends
stability to enplanement growth, making forecasts dependent on local economic trends rather than
air carrier routing decisions.
Figure 5.1 Logan International Airport Layout
Source: FAA
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As of June 30, 2001, airline service at Logan, both scheduled and non-scheduled, was provided
by 60 air carriers, including 8 U.S. major carrier airlines, 16 no-U.S. flag carriers, and 8 regional
and commuter airlines. Logan has the lowest market concentration of all large commercial
airports in the U.S. (Figure 2.10). No airline has over 25% market share at Logan. In 2000 Delta
had approximately 22% market share, followed by US Airways' 17% and American's close to
14% (Figure 5.2). In Standard & Poor's opinion, Logan's diversity of air carriers is a
considerable strength and indicative of the strong demand by carriers to provide service to the
Boston area (Loop and Hecht 2000, 3).
BOS is one of the most coveted airport facilities. However, during the last few years traffic
growth has slowed down considerably. Average annual growth during the 70s was 4.5%,
followed by a 4.2% average annual growth in the 1980s. During the 90s growth declined
considerably to about 1.8% per annum. The noticeable decrease in growth can be explained (at
least in part) by recent increased activity at neighboring airports (i.e., Worcester Regional in
Central Massachusetts, T.F. Green/Providence Airport and Manchester Airport), which now serve
the periphery of the Boston Metropolitan area.
BOS has five passenger terminals (Figure 5.1) each with its own ticketing, baggage claim, and
ground transportation facilities. As of December 2000, the airport had 84 gate positions available
for both scheduled and non-scheduled service. The airfield is comprised of five runways,
fourteen miles of taxiway, and 237 acres of concrete and asphalt apron. During 2000 BOS had
over 478,000 aircraft operations (an average of 1,300 aircraft movements a day). Due to its high
traffic volume and limited capacity BOS was ranked fifth in the country in number of flights
significantly delayed (more than 15 minutes). The current airside capacity benchmark at BOS is
118-126 flights per hour in good weather, while declining to 78-88 flights (or fewer) per hour in
adverse weather conditions (that include poor visibility, unfavorable winds, or heavy
precipitation). A new runway planned for completion in 2005 will help mitigate delays normally
encountered during northwest wind conditions when the airport is reduced to a dual or a single
runway configuration. According to the FAA demand is expected to grow by 6% over the next
decade but delays are not expected to increase primarily due to the construction of the new
runway. In addition, terminal construction should reduce gate delays, and new taxiways and high
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speed turnoffs will improve runway utilization, thereby minimally improving airside capacity
(FAA 2001).
Figure 5.2 Airline Share of Total Passenger Traffic at BOS, Fiscal Year 2000
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5.2 Ownership, Governance and Management
Logan International Airport is owned and operated by the Massachusetts Port Authority
(Massport). This self-supporting, independent public authority was created by Chapter 465 of the
Massachusetts Act of 1956 to operate and manage the airport and Boston's port facilities. Today,
Massport operates three major airports, the region's largest seaport facilities and important
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surface arteries. Massport facilities include Boston-Logan International Airport, Laurence G.
Hanscom Field, the Worcester Regional Airport, Tobin Memorial Bridge, and various port
properties, located in Charlestown, South Boston, and East Boston.
Massport is governed by a seven member Board appointed by the Governor of the
Commonwealth. The chairman and members are appointed to staggered seven-year terms, with
the term of one of the members expiring on June 30 of each year. All members serve without
compensation. The management of Massport and its operations are carried out by a staff headed
by the Executive Director, who is appointed by and reports directly to the members of the Board.
Massport has the power to acquire property by purchase or through the exercise of the right of
eminent domain. The authority does not have taxing powers and no stockholders or equity
holders. Massport receives no state taxpayer funds for its operations or capital programs. It is a
revenue bond authority and all of its monies are generated by these bonds and through user fees
charged at the facilities it operates.
5.3 Operating Revenue Structure
Logan Airport is the principal source of revenue, net revenues, and net income, and is the
dominant factor in the determination of Massport's financial condition. In fiscal 2000, Logan
accounted for 77.4% of Massport's revenues and 83.3% of net revenues (as defined in Trust
Agreement) (Massport 2000, 2). Figure 5.3 highlights the importance of the airport properties28
to Massport's operating revenue (and expense) structure. In the past Logan airport subsidized the
other properties/facilties to a considerable degree, but the authority appears to be shifting to a
stance of fuller cost recovery from each property rather that in aggregate. These changes seem to
go in the direction of the compensatory arrangement used for fee-setting at Logan Airport (see
Appendix 2), where each cost center must generate revenues to cover its expenses. An example
of this new trend can be found in the decision to raise tolls on the Tobin Bridge (from 500 to $1
27 Under an operating agreement between Massport and the City of Worcester, Massport assumed the
operating responsibility of the Worcester airport on January 15, 2000.
28 These include Logan International Airport, Hanscom Field and Worcester Regional Airport.
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in 1997) and to tie rentals at some of the port properties to the quantity of cargo handled (Loop
and Hecht 1999, 1).
Figure 5.3 Massport's Operating Revenues and Expenses by Business Units,
Fiscal Year 2001
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Source: Massachusetts Port Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (Fiscal Year 2001)
During the last few years Massport Airport System 29 has strengthened its financial standing
considerably. Figure 5.4 shows that between 1991 and 200130 operating revenues increased 90%
from $144 million to $274 million. Expenses increased 89% from $83 million in 1991 to $157
million in 2001. Operating income grew almost every year except in 1999 and 2001. From 1991
to 2001 operating income almost doubled from $61 million to $117 million.
29 Massport Airport System includes Logan International Airport, L.G. Hanscom Field and Worcester
Regional Airport.
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Figure 5.4
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5.3.1 Operating Revenues
In 2000 the Massport Airport System generated $261 million in operating revenue. Figure 5.5
and Table 5.1 show the composition of the operating revenue. Parking fees generated $71 million
or 27% of total operating revenue. Landing fees contributed $53 million or 20% and concession
revenues $41 million which accounted for 15.9% of operating revenues. Terminal rentals and
30 The impact of Sept. 11, 2001, was not recorded because Massport's fiscal year 2001 ended June 30,
2001.
31 Massport Airport System includes Logan International Airport, L.G. Hanscom Field and Worcester
Regional Airport.
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fees per passenger contributed with another $39 million or 15.1% of operating revenues. The
remaining line items contributed 22% of operating revenues.
Figure 5.5 Massport Airports' Operating Revenue Structure, Fiscal Year 2000
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Source: Massachusetts Port Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (Fiscal Year 2000)
Table 5.1 further shows how the individual revenue line items contributed to the overall operating
revenue structure of Massport Airports between 1991 and 2000. Since 1991 parking revenue has
consistently been Massport Airport System's main source of operating revenue. Parking
revenues increased from $36 million in fiscal year 1991 to $71 million in fiscal year 2000,
achieving a 94% increase in a ten-year span!
Since Massport does not have long-term written agreements with the airline tenants, landing fees
are set on a compensatory basis to recover direct and allocated capital, administration,
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maintenance and operations costs, as well as amortization and interest. Landing fees at Logan
increased 55% from $34 million in 1991 to almost $53 million in 2000. Modest increases in
traffic volumes and small increases in landing fees (Figure 5.6) have kept this line item from
growing at the same pace as the consolidated operating revenues. In 2000, landing fees
accounted for approximately 20% of all operating revenues. Appendix 2 describes the
methodology used by Massport to set landing fees and terminal rentals.
Figure 5.6 Landing Fees at Logan Airport, Fiscal Years 1992-2001
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At 15.9% in 2000, concession revenues were the third most important operating revenue source.
Concession revenues include payments made by rental car companies and commissions from
businesses such as food and beverages, news and gifts, duty free shops, specialty shops, and other
concessions. These revenues increased from $19 million in 1991 to $41 million in 2000. The
growth of concession revenues by 115% between 1991 and 2000 indicates their tremendous
potential. It is important to mention that during the five year period from fiscal 1995 to fiscal
year 1999, approximately 48% of concession revenues were derived from payments made by
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rental car companies (Revenue Bond Series 199-C and 199-D 1999, 47). Aware of the retail
business potential Massport continues to plan in order to capitalize on this opportunity:
"In recent years, the Authority [Massport] has adopted a concession strategy
aimed at identifying new revenue opportunities in passenger terminal
concessions and increasing passenger satisfaction and passenger spending
through the utilization of branded concepts and a variety of new retail offerings.
The Authority [Massport] has instituted a competitive bidding process which
include flexible financial models (premises rentals, annual guarantees,
commissions, profit-sharing, facilities investment and non-exclusivity) and
expanded marketing efforts for retail opportunities to include not only
traditional airport retail concessionaires, but also local and regional retail
operators and joint ventures. Sales (excluding rental car concessions) per
enplaned passenger increased in fiscal year 1999 by 11.9% over the prior fiscal
year." (Revenue Bond Series 199-C and 199-D 1999, 47)
Since Massport does not have long-term written agreements with the airline tenants, rental rates
are set on a compensatory basis to recover direct and allocated capital, administration,
maintenance and operations costs. Charges for the use of the terminal buildings cover the costs
of operation and maintenance only (including amortization and interest). This line item does not
show the strength of other revenue sources and increased by only 47% from $26 million in 1991
to $39 million in 2000.
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Table 5.1 Massport Airports(') Operating Revenues, Fiscal Years 1991-2000
(in Thousands of Dollars)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 (200)
Landing fees 34,020 38,080 37,917 42,022 44,989 45,358 49,058 50,812 51,994 52,972 20.2
Terminal rentals and per PAX fees 26,788 28,782 31,016 33,132 33,038 33,648 33,912 38,037 36,735 39,346 15.1
Parking fees 36,513 39,608 42,388 44,989 50,746 55,892 54,325 58,214 63,931 71,108 27.2
Non-terminal building and grounds rents 10,290 12,860 15,132 19,081 20,238 20,826 21,332 21,095 22,444 26,264 10
Concessions 19,975 21,391 24,248 25,136 27,228 30,924 33,881 39,000 42,449 41,567 15.9
Other (2) 17,361 18,802 21,254 22,798 22,813 25,910 26,383 29,675 27,843 30,493 11.6
Totals 144,947 159,523 171,955 187,158 199,052 212,558 218,891 236,833 245,396 261,750 100
(1) Includes Boston-Logan International Airport and L.G. Hanscom Field
(2) Includes airport utility revenues and fees from operations at Hanscom Field.
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (year ended June 30, 2000)
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Table 5.2 Massport Airports(') Operating Income and Operating Margin, Fiscal Years 1991-2001
(in Thousands of Dollars)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Revenues 144,947 159,523 171,955 187,158 199,052 212,558 218,891 236,833 245,396 261,750 274,087
Expenses 83,585 89,359 97,070 105,429 111,869 123,684 124,757 127,688 139,533 143,290 157,050
Operating Income 61,362 70,164 74,885 81,729 87,183 88,874 94,134 109,145 105,863 118,550 117,037
Operating Margins (2) 42 44 44 44 44 42 43 46 43 45 43
(1) Includes Boston-Logan and L.G. Hanscom Field.
(2) Excluding depreciation.
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (year ended June 30, 2000)
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To compare the relative strength of individual revenue line items on the overall revenue structure
and against each other, Figure 5.7 was created assigning each line item its percent value of
operating revenue for each year between 1991 and 2000. In this scale, parking revenues have
been and continue to be the most important source of operating revenue. Furthermore, since 1998
parking revenue shows a clear upward trend widening the gap against all other revenue sources.
Figure 5.7 Massport Airports Operating Revenue Share, Fiscal Years 1991-2000
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4Landing f ees 23 26 22 22 23 21 22 21 21 20
-Terminal rentals and per PAX fees 18 20 18 18 17 16 15 16 i15 15
Parking f ees 25 27 25 124 25 26 25 25 26 27
a Non-terminal buildings/grounds rents 7 9 9 10 10 10 10 9 9 10
-- Concessions 14 15 14 13 14 15 15 16 17 16
--- Other (2) 12 13 12 12 11 12 12 13 11 12
(2) Includes airport utility revenues and fees from operations at Hascom Field.
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (Fiscal Year 2000)
Landing fees started as the second most important line item and maintained their position at the
end of the 10-year period (Figure 5.7). Notice that despite the fact that between 1992 and 1997
landing fee rates increased continuously (Figure 5.6), landing fee revenues did not become more
important as a fraction of total revenues. Conversely, after 1997 when landing fees declined from
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$2.24 to $2.14 in 1999 and 2000 (Figure 5.6) landing fee revenues declined as a percent of the
overall revenues (Figure 5.7).
In 1991 the rentals paid by the airlines for the use of the airport facilities and per passenger fees
were, at 18%, the third most important operating revenue source. In 1992 the terminal rental fees
contributed 20% of operating revenues. After that they declined to 15% of operating revenues in
2000. In 1997 concession revenues surpassed terminal rentals revenues. In 2000 concession
revenues lost some of the previous gains, but still maintained a slight edge over terminal rental
revenues (Figure 5.7). The remaining line items contribute about 20% of operating revenues, a
percentage that has not changed much between 1991 and 2000.
5.3.2 Operating Expenses
Massport's operating expenses for airports have increased steadily from $83 million in 1992 to
$157 million in 2001. Massport divides operating expenses into three main line items: operations
and maintenance, administrative and insurance expenses (Table 5.4). About $110 million or 71%
of operating expenses was allocated to operations and maintenance costs. Approximately $44
million or 28% was dedicated to administrative costs, while about $2 million or 1.3% was used to
cover insurance expenses.
5.4 Net Income
Table 5.4 highlights Massport airports net income for fiscal year 2001. Net income takes into
account other revenues (and expenses) such as investments, the sale of property and equipment,
as well as funds received from grants and special programs such as the Airport Improvement
Program (AIP) and Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs). Items subtracted from operating income
include interest expenses, and more importantly depreciation and amortization. The cost of
depreciation and amortization was $51 million in 2001. After all adjustments were made, the
operating income was reduced from $117 million to a net income of $74 million.
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Table 5.3 Massport's Airport Properties Net Income, Fiscal Year 2001
Amount
Revenues, net:
Total pledged revenues (5)
Operating Expenses:
Operations and Maintenance
Administration (6)
Insurance
Total
Excess (deficit) of revenues over operating
expenses as prescribed by the trust agreement
Add:
Other Revenue (3)
Self Insurance Cost (1)
Passenger Facility Charge (3)
Gain on the sale of equipment (2) (4)
Capital grant revenue (3)
Less:
PILOT (4)
Interest Expense (4)
Depreciation and Amortization (4)
Other Expenses (4)
Net Income (loss)
274,087
110,343
44,690
2,017
157,050
117,037
1,516
10
36,324
70.3
28.5
1.3
100.0
0.0
71.4
0.3
12,851 25.3
50,849 100.0
(10,759) 11.6
(29,120) 31.3
(51,930) 55.9
(1,096) 1.2
(92,905) 100.0
74,981
(1) Expense under Trust Agreement, not an expense under GAAP.(2) Equipment is depreciated under GAAP, but not under Trust Agreement.(3) Not revenue under Trust Agreement, revenue under GAAP.(4) Not operating income/(expense) under Trust Agreement, income/(expense under GAAP).
(5) For trust accounting purposes, the provision for uncollectible accounts is netted within the accounts
listed under the Pledged Revenues caption.
(6) Massport allocates total administrative expenses based upon the proportionate amount of revenues and
direct expenses by facility.
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (Fiscal Year 2001)
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5.5 Capital Program
In July 2000, Massport approved a capital program for the period 2000-2005 for $3.4 billion. Of
this amount, 87% will be dedicated to improve the Logan airport facilities. The Tobin bridge was
allocated about 2%, while the maritime port, and other projects will receive the rest (Loop and
Hecht 1999, 3).
5.5.1 Projects
Logan Modernization consists of two programs, the Logan Landside program, which involves
major physical improvements to the airport and the Logan Airside program, which involves
various alternatives for reducing current and projected levels of aircraft delay and enhancing
operational safety. An important feature of the capital program is that each project has been
designed as a separate module and has been or is being carried out and financed independently of
other projects. Logan Airport improvements include:
* Replacement of Terminal A;
* Upgrade and expansion of Terminals B, C, and E;
* Renovation and expansion of the Central Garage and Terminal B Garage;
* Tow-level terminal roadway construction;
* Moving walkways from garages to terminals;
* Construction of unidirectional Runway 14/32;
* Construction of midfield taxiway between Runways 4L/22R and 4R/22L;
* Reconfiguration of taxiways in the southwest area;
* Other smaller projects.
5.5.2 Funding Sources
To pay for the capital program, Massport uses a sophisticated combination of financing
mechanisms that rely mainly on borrowing. The preferred financing instrument used by Massport
is revenue bonds. The federal government provides additional funding in the form
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of grants (AIP) and approval of user-fee schemes (PFC) for key projects. In addition, there are
smaller projects financed with special facility revenue bonds.
Massport relies heavily on government-sponsored programs such the Airport Improvement
Program (AIP) (federal grants) and the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) program, which was
instituted at BOS in 1993. The federal government-sponsored funds provide funding for specific
projects to meet the following objectives: preserve or enhance safety, capacity, or security; reduce
airport noise; or serve as a catalyst to further competition among the airlines (DOT/FAA 1999,
48). As Figure 5.8 shows, since 1991 the revenue from government sponsored programs has
increased substantially reaching its peak in 1996. It leveled off after that, declining slightly in the
last six years. PFC funding has become the main source of federal government-sponsored
funding, while AIP funding has decreased in recent years. Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 explain how
the FAA intended to use the PFC program as a quasi-substitute for the Airport Improvement
Program (AIP). This is exactly what happened at Logan as AIP funding has decreased by almost
two thirds from a high $23.1 million in 1993 to a low $8.5 million in 2001 (Figure 5.7).
In August 1993 the FAA approved the request from Massport to collect a $3 PFC at Logan. The
FAA authorized Massport to collect net PFCs up to $598 million from November 1, 1993 though
a projected expiration date of October 1, 2011. In January 1997, the FAA authorized Massport to
increase its PFC collections to $631 million and extended the expiration date to September 1,
2012. In addition the FAA approved the use of $493 million of PFC collections for preliminary
design projects as well as the final design, construction and financing costs associated with
portions of residential soundproofing, the Terminal E Modernization project, circulating
roadways and an elevated pedestrian walkway. In February 1998 the FAA authorized Massport
to increase its PFC collections up to $927 million extending the expiration date to October 1,
2017. Massport received authorization to spend $434 million for the final design, construction
and financing costs associated with the International Gateway Project. The steady revenue stream
of PFC money made it possible to issue bonds backed by PFCs. On May 6, 1999, Massport
entered into the PFC Trust Agreement with the Bank of New York, simultaneously removing
PFC revenues from the pledge of the Trust Agreement. All PFCs collected by Massport after this
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date are pledged under the PFC Trust Agreement. On June 16, 1999, Massport issued $249.3
million PFC Revenue Bonds, Series 1999A and 1999B pursuant to the PFC Trust Agreement.
5.5.3 Debt Service
Revenue Bonds
As of June 30, 2001, Massport had outstanding obligations issued pursuant to the 1970 Trust
Agreement and the PFC Trust Agreement of approximately $1.2 billion. In fiscal year 2001, the
total deposited in the debt service funds to pay senior lien obligations issued pursuant the 1978
Trust Agreement was $74.2 million, while debt service to pay PFC bonds was $21.5 million.
Massport had 14 series of revenue bonds outstanding pursuant to the 1978 Trust Agreement in a
total principal amount of $936.2 million, and two series of PFC Bonds pursuant to the PFC Trust
Agreement, with $249.3 million outstanding.33
Special Facility Bonds
Massport also sponsors special projects through the issuance of special facility revenue bonds.
As of June 30, 2001, Massport had approximately $315.6 million of special facility revenue
bonds outstanding in six separate series of bonds that include special bonds to finance the
Harborside Hyatt Conference Center and Hotel Project. On August 16, 2001 Massport issued
approximately $497.6 million in aggregate principal amount of its Special Facility Revenue
Bonds for the Delta Air Lines, Inc. Project. After the issuance of the Delta Bonds, the aggregate
principal amount of Massport's special facility revenue bonds outstanding was approximately
$813.2 million. The principal and interest on the special facilities revenue bonds issued by
Massport are payable solely from the revenues generated by each facility deal. For example, the
Delta bonds will be paid with the revenues generated by the Delta facility to be built. It is
important to mention that the special facilities revenue bonds are "stand-alone" financing
mechanisms that will not be tied to Massport operating revenue or turn into a general obligation
32 This number excludes special facility revenue bonds issued on behalf of and payable by certain
borrowers.
3 In addition, Massport had smaller obligations regarding commercial paper and letters of credit.
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of Massport, the Commonwealth or any political subdivision of it (Massachusetts Port Authority
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 2001, 12).
Figure 5.8 Massport's Government-Sponsored Revenues, Fiscal Years 1992-2000
(in Thousands of Dollars)
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Source: Massachusetts Port Authority Annual Financial Reports (Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001)
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Table 5.4 Massport's PFC Project Activity (as of June 30, 2001)
Projects ChargeEffective
Date
Approval of
Use Date
Cumulative
Expenditures
To Date
Approval
of Use
Amount
Residential Sound Insulation 1-Nov-93 27-Jan-97 15,325 26,990
Logan Modernization Program (LMP) 1-Nov-93 24-Aug-93 9,510 10,346
Planning, Preliminary Design, and
Environmental Analysis
Terminal E Modernization 1-Nov-93 27-Jan-97 20,892 24,568
Roadway System (Circulation) 1-Nov-93 27-Jan-97 78,334 268,306
International Gateway 1-Nov-93 5-Feb-98 5,959 434,106
Elevated Walkways 1-Jan-01 27-Jan-97 90,210 163,037
Total 220,230 927,353
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, page 57
5.5.4 Recent Developments
The strong financial standing of Massport can be appreciated when comparing Massport's annual
debt service, which in 2001 reached $64 million, to its increasing net income, which in 2001
reached $143 million. This resulted in a bond debt service coverage of 2.21 (Table 5.5). The
strong debt service coverage contributes to the high rating of Massport's bonds. By yearend
2000, Massport's Revenue Bonds were rated Aa3 by Moody's Investors Services, AA- by
Standard & Poor's3 5 and AA by Fitch IBCA. However, as a result of the financial impacts to
Massport arising from the events of September 11, 2001, each of the major credit rating agencies
placed Massport's Revenue Bonds on credit watch with negative implications. Massport's PFC
Bonds are insured by Financial Security Assurance Inc. and were rated AAA, Aaa, and AAA, as
insured, by each of Fitch IBCA, Moody's and S&P, respectively. Also, as consequence of the
events of September 11, 2001, each credit rating agency placed the bonds on credit watch with
34 Proceeds of the passenger facility charges ("PFCs") have been excluded from Revenues because such
proceeds have been excluded from Revenues under the Trust Agreement. As used in the table, "Annual
Debt Service" is equal to the "Principal and Interest Requirements" on Bonds (other than) PFC Revenues
Bonds, Commercial Paper and Special Facility Revenue Bonds) outstanding for the applicable year.
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negative implications (Massachusetts Port Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
2001, 11-12).
Massport's prior planning and its comprehensive financial plans have contributed to responding
to the changes in the aviation industry that have arisen since September 11, 2001. Now projects
relating to safety and security have become Massport's priority. The change in priorities have
aided staff in selecting which projects to accelerate and which projects to postpone. BOS should
be able to withstand a decline in net income by adjusting its capital expenditures to current
conditions (e.g. defer non-essential projects). On the other hand It is important to point out that
airport operators can actually benefit during an economic slow down: Christopher Gordon, head
of capital programs at BOS emphasized, "...the best time to build at an airport site is during a
recession. Why? During a downturn in the economy, the construction industry suffers. This
allows airports to hire the best construction companies at more competitive prices."
5.6 Conclusion
Logan International Airport stands out as one of the most profitable airports in the nation. In
terms of traffic volume it ranks 1 8th among U.S. large hubs, yet it has operating revenues that
comparable airports with much higher passenger volumes (e.g. ATL, DFW). As seen in Section
4.3.1, a strong O&D base contributes to higher parking and concession revenues. BOS, an airport
with a very strong O&D base, has been able to capitalize with substantial parking and concession
revenue increases. Massport's dependence on airline-driven revenues (i.e., landing fees, terminal
rentals) has diminished during the last 11 years. This is consistent with the findings of Section 4.5
regarding facilities with compensatory rate-setting methodology: during the period 1996-2000
airports 36 with compensatory arrangements showed declines in aeronautical revenues (i.e.,
landing fees and terminal building rentals) and increases in non-aeronautical revenues (mainly
parking and concession revenues). Operating expenses have been stable and well under control
(Figure 5.4) and should not pose a threat to Massport's operating revenue structure. Evidence of
3s On March 2002, d & Poor's lowered Massport Revenue Bonds rating from AA- to A+.
36 This is applicable only to large airport hubs as defined by the FAA (Section 2.1).
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Massport's sound financial standing is the increase of debt service coverage that since 1997 has
fluctuated between 2.06 and 2.21 (2001) (Table 5.5).
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Table 5.5 Massport Revenue/Bond Debt Service Coverages
Fiscal Years 1991-2001 (in thousands)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total Revenues 193,081 203,798 216,419 233,906 248,417 259,315 261,456 290,887 310,782 333,675 348490
Total Operating Expenses 115,782 121,605 132,406 142,402 152,659 165,819 164,336 169,673 188,016 191,726 204,944
Net Revenues 77,299 82,193 84,013 91,504 95,758 93,496 97,120 121,214 122,766 141,949 143,546
Annual Debt Service 42,882 42,563 45,656 48,018 48,024 47,054 47,061 46,560 56,956 57,444 64,965
Annual Debt Service Coverage 1.8 1.93 1.84 1.91 1.99 1.99 2.06 2.6 2.16 2.47 2.21
Proceeds of the passenger facility charges ("PFCs") have been excluded from Revenues because such proceeds have been excluded from
Revenues under the Trust Agreement. As used in the table, "Annual Debt Service" is equal to the "Principal and Interest Requirements" on Bonds
(other than) PFC Revenues Bonds, Commercial Paper and Special Facility Revenue Bonds) outstanding for the applicable year.
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (year ended June 30, 2000 and 2001)
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Chapter 6
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport
This chapter presents Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) as an example of an airport that uses a residual
fee-setting methodology. As seen in Section 4.5, airports using a residual approach to rate-setting
are least dependent on landing fees. They also have a lower dependence on aeronautical fees and
higher dependence on concessions. In the end, according to the findings in Section 4.5, airports
with residual agreements achieve the lowest operating margins. In addition, according to S&P,
airports with residual agreements should achieve average lower debt service coverage (1.75 or
lower) that those with compensatory agreements (Forsgren, Wilkins and Greer 1999, 21). This
chapter will be set to evaluate whether these patterns hold for DFW. It is important to point out
that all financial information on this chapter pre-dates Sep. 11, 2001.
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6.1 BACKGROUND
The Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) was built in the early 1970s and opened for
commercial service in 1974. After 25 years of operation, DFW ranks among the top five airports
in the world in terms of aircraft operations and passenger traffic. The airport is located about 17
miles equidistant from the central business districts of Dallas and Fort Worth, serving an area
with a population of approximately 4.8 million. The property contains about 18,000 acres with
seven active runways, four terminals and 127 gates. By having 12 landing approaches, DFW
ranks highly in on-time performance which is essential in maintaining reliable hubbing activity
(Lehman, Mock and Fallon 2000, 5).
Figure 6.1 Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Layout
IP
Source: FAA
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At the end of FY 2000 DFW had the following characteristics: it served over 60 million
passengers, ranking fourth among the largest hubs in the U.S. The main tenants at DFW,
American Airlines and partner American Eagle, had almost 70% market share, followed by Delta
Airlines at 17% (Figure 6.2). Since DFW is one of the major hubs for American Airlines about
60% percent of the airport's passenger traffic is connecting. However, it is important to point out
that the 40% O&D traffic at DFW represents about 23 million passengers, a number higher than
total passenger numbers at one third of the largest commercial airports in the United States.
DFW serves primarily U.S. destinations, consequently only 8% of the passenger traffic is
international. In recent years DFW has maintained a 3.5% annual average passenger volume
increase. This is well above the U.S. average, which in 2000 was about 2.4%.
Figure 6.2 Airline Share at DFW, Fiscal Year 2000
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Source: 2002 Aviation and Aerospace Almanac
Page 154
6.2 Ownership, Governance and Management
DFW was created on April 15, 1968 through a contract and agreement between the cities of
Dallas and Fort Worth, Texas. The creation of this joint entity was for development and
operation of the airport as a joint venture of both cities. The Board of DFW consists of seven
members from the City of Dallas and four members from the City of Fort Worth, each appointed
by the respective City Councils of Dallas and Fort Worth. The Board, has the power to operate
the facilities and establish capital programs on behalf of the cities. "However, the Board cannot
dispose of any airport property or issue revenue bonds without consent from the Cities"
(Dallas/Fort Worth 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report, 17). Total operating expenses to be
incurred in any fiscal year are budgeted and submitted to the cities for approval. Although the
annual budget must be approved by each city, operations are totally financed by user charges and
the cities have no responsibility for debt service of the airport (Dallas/Fort Worth 2000
Comprehensive Annual Report, 10).
6.3 Operating Revenue Structure
Between 1991 and 2001, operating revenues and expenses at DFW have had a parallel growth.
As Figure 6.3 shows, the gap between revenues and expenses has remained relatively constant.
Consequently, the operating income of DFW has remained almost flat. In 2000 expenses
increased slightly more than in previous years while revenues did not show a major improvement.
This resulted in a noticeable decline in operating income.
6.3.1 Operating Revenue
DFW operating revenues reached $256 million in 2000 (Table 6.1). Over half of this amount was
derived from parking and landing fees (Figure 6.4). Parking fees contributed over $70 million or
27%. About $69 million or 27% was derived from landing fees. Almost $40 million or 15% was
collected from terminal rents, user fees and concessions. Another $34 million or 13% derived
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from ground rentals and outside concessions. The remaining 16% was received from a variety of
sources that include utility services, hotel facilities, fueling systems, transit system, etc.
From $40.4 million in 1991, parking revenue increased by 75% to $70.9 million, becoming the
single most important operating revenue line item at the end of fiscal year 2000. At the end of
this 10-year span parking had become the most important line item accounting for 29% of total
operating revenues (Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.3 Operating Revenues and Expenses at DFW, Fiscal Years 1996-2000
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Table 6.1 differentiates signatory airlines37  from non-signatory airlines. Landing fee
contributions from signatory airlines reached about $66 million (25% of operating revenues) in
2000, while non-signatory airlines accounted for just $3.3 million (slightly over 1.3% of
37 The Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Use Agreement defines as a "Signatory Airline" a Certified Air Carrier,
which has executed with the Board a Letter of Agreement or an agreement substantially similar to the DFW
Airport Use Agreement.
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operating revenues). As Table 6.1 highlights, between 1991 and 2000 the revenues from
signatory airlines have actually decreased (value in current dollars). Landing fees from signatory
airlines first increased from $69 million in 1991 to an all-time high of $83 million in 1993. Then,
they declined gradually to reach $54 million in 1999. In 2000, as other sources of revenue
declined, landing fees had a sudden trend reversal with a 22% increase over the previous year
reaching $66 million. This was achieved by increasing the landing fees 15% from $1.28 (per
1,000 pounds maximum approved landed weight) during fiscal year 1999 to $1.48 in 2000
(Figure 6.5).
Figure 6.4 DFW Operating Revenues, Fiscal Year 2000
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Source: Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report
According to the residual fee-setting methodology used by DFW, the airport costs are guaranteed
to be covered by signatory airlines to reach a break-even point. Therefore, according to the use
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and lease agreements 38, whenever there is a reduction of revenues in any of the cost centers, the
signatory airlines will step up to cover any deficit. The Airport Use Agreement 9 imposes on each
signatory airline the obligation to pay landing fees, rentals fees and charges for the use and
occupancy of the airport. These payments, together with rental fees, and charges paid by other
airport users, "will produce total annual gross revenues sufficient to pay for the operation and
maintenance of the airport, plus 1.25 times the payment of principal and interest on the joint
revenue bonds, plus the payment of any other obligations required to be paid from the revenues of
the airport" (Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 2002, 1). This is in fact the definition of a
residual type of agreement.
Concession revenue accounts for charges to the airlines, and concessionaires for the use of the
space at the passenger buildings. Concession activity within the terminals has expanded
measurably in the last five years with service from more than 75 retail establishments (Lehman,
Mock and Fallon 2000, 5). In terms of current dollars, this line item has ranged from an all-time
high of $37 million in 1992 to $32 million in 1999. In 2000, as in the case of the landing fees,
this line item had a 21% increase to $39 million. Again, the terminal rents and concession space
is ruled by a residual agreement that obligates the tenants subject to the Use and Lease Agreement
to cover existing deficits in other cost centers.
Ground Rentals/Outside Concessions revenues accounted for 13.2% of all operating revenues in
2000. What is remarkable about this line item is the fact that between 1991 and 2000 it has
increased by 140% from $14.1 million to $33.9 million. Consistent with the increasing emphasis
in expanding business opportunities at DFW a consolidated Rent-A-Car facility was completed in
March 2000. The new Rent-A-Car facility, which provides a common rental center for 12 rental
car agencies, generated $19 million during its first year of operations! (Dallas/Fort Worth 2000
Comprehensive Annual Report, iii).
38 "The airport leases substantially all of its fixed assets (i.e., terminals, runways, and related assets) to
signatory airlines and other tenants under long-term operating leases. A majority of the lease payments are
determined each year under the Restated and Amended Use Agreement based upon actual costs of the
airport" (Dallas/Fort Worth 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report, 24).
39 DFW current Use Agreement will end on December 31, 2009. As of February 2000, there were 18
signatory airlines and eight signatory all-freight carriers. The original use agreements were signed in 1968
and were last amended in 1985.
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Figure 6.5 Landing Fees at DFW (1992-2002)
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Table 6.1 DFW Operating Revenues, Fiscal Years 1991-2000
(in Thousand of Dollars)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 (2000)
Landing fees (a) 69,168 82,445 83,368 73,547 68,664 73,082 68,157 61,913 54,997 66,607 25.9
Landing fees (b) 2,128 2,352 2,527 3,209 4,301 3,344 2,918 3,431 4,215 3,315 1.3
Terminal rents, use fees and concessions 34,276 37,255 32,662 27,230 28,738 27,557 29,345 30,891 32,539 39,675 15.5
Parking 40,424 42,324 44,371 47,884 52,572 54,603 57,101 63,460 68,373 70,922 27.6
Ground transportation regulation 1,370 3,872 3,981 5,160 7,149 2.8
Ground rentals/outside concessions 14,111 15,884 17,804 20,440 21,568 23,642 25,203 28,621 28,473 33,969 13.2
Transit system 5,022 6,088 6,549 6,618 6,663 6,812 7,996 8,332 7,917 7,654 3
Utility services 10,694 11,777 11,383 11,042 11,392 11,165 10,824 12,053 12,614 13,286 5.2
Hotel and recreation 4,233 4,278 4,300 4,479 4,700 5,037 5,590 7,944 8,190 3,526 1.4
Fueling system rentals 3,060 3,120 3,060 3,144 3,125 2,014 1,879 1,913 3,880 3,967 1.5
Reimbursable services 834 249 191 58 0
East cargo area rentals 1,468 1,495 1,482 1,729 1,711 1,741 1,715 1,718 1,787 1,813 0.7
Anti-air piracy charges 2,337 2,450 2,326 2,286 2,148 2,197 2,349 2,770 2,956 3,172 1.2
Miscellaneous 724 842 1,064 2,139 851 1,652 1,550 1567 8,766 1,704 0.7
Total 188,479 210,559 211,087 203,805 206,433 214,216 218,499 228,594 239,867 256,759 100
Signatory airlines
Non-signatory airlines
Source: Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report
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Table 6.2 DFW Operating Expenses, Fiscal Years 1991-2000
(in Thousand of Dollars)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 (2000)
Landing area 37,553 40,341 43,002 1,451 1,885 1,622 1,853 2,327 3,039 6,921 4.5
General aviation complex 255 298 335 103 170 187 196 230 370 0.2
Terminal area 9,724 10,250 8,727 6,271 6,634 7,186 8,212 10,031 11,386 12,574 8.2
Parking 10,494 11,185 13,174 8,429 9,440 9,756 10,228 12,119 13,919 17,498 11.4
Ground transportation 1,206 1,668 2,486 2,696 3,312 2.2
Ground rentals/outside concessions 3,628 4,600 5,445 521 231 1,792 1.2
Transit system 8,827 9,233 7,514 7,355 7,758 7,967 7,861 7,418 7,813 8,210 5.4
Utility services 7,827 9,193 9,312 8,948 9,596 9,324 8,984 9,211 9,407 9,824 6.4
Hotel and recreation 3,046 3,265 3,355 1 2 2 2 0
Fueling system rentals 1,768 1,573 1,848 1,500 1,375 196 0.1
Reimbursable services 0
East cargo area 684 804 846 617 619 630 628 29 24 682 0.4
Anti-air piracy 2,337 2,450 1,639 2,286 2,148 2,197 2,349 2,770 2,996 3,216 2.1
Airport services*** 56,227 57,696 67,128 67,521 72978 77,649 88,214 57.6
Other operating expenses (revenues) -921 -470 86 1 501 764 2112 256 0.2
Total 85,222 92,722 95,283 93,188 97,321 107,204 110,003 120,886 131,274 153,065 100
Depreciation 29,085 31,215 32,949 35,827 38,355 42,105 44,848 146,801 56,783 62,956
Total after depreciation 114,307 123,937 128,232 129,015 135,676 149,309 154,851 267,687 188,057 216,021
*** Prior to 1994 Airport Services Cost was included in other areas
Source: Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report
Page 161
Figure 6.6 DFW Operating Revenue Structure (selected line items),
Fiscal Years 1991-2000
35
30
25
20
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
--- Landing fees 38 40 41 38 35 36 33 1 29 25 27
-- Terminalrents,usefeesand 18 18 15 13 14 13 13 14 14 15
concessions
- Parking 21 20 21 23 25 25 26 28 29 28
- s Ground rentals/outside concessions 7 8 10 ] 11 12 13
Source: Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report
To assess the relative strength of individual revenue line items in the overall revenue structure,
Figure 6.6 was created assigning each line item its percent value for each year. Over the 10-year
span major changes occurred to the operating revenue structure at DFW. These changes highlight
the effect of the existing residual agreement between DFW and the signatory airlines. Generally,
under a residual agreement all cost centers are supposed to collectively cover the cost of running
the facility. If one of the revenue generating cost centers (or revenue line items) diminishes its
contribution, the gap will have to be covered by the remaining cost centers (Section 2.3.1). It is
evident in Figure 6.5 that as parking and ground rentals/outside concessions increased their share,
the other sources of revenue (i.e., landing fees and terminal rents, use fees and concessions)
decreased their contribution. Between 1999 and 2000 parking revenue growth came to a halt and
actually lost some ground as compared to previous years. In response, all other centers increased
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their contribution. This is the classic example of a residual agreement, where all cost centers are
collectively obligated to contribute to ensure that the airport breaks even.
6.3.2 Operating Expenses
DFW operating expenses (excluding depreciation and amortization) reached $153 million in
2000. Salaries accounted for almost $90 million or 58% of operating expenses (Table 6.3).
Labor costs at DFW were higher than the U.S. large hub average, which in 2000 was 37% of
operating expenses (Table 4.2). General Information Survey conducted by Airports Council
International-North America (ACI-NA) indicates that DFW employs over 1,700 people (Table
4.3). DFW averages expenditures of $51,000 per employee, which is below the $66,000 average
for large hubs in the United States (Table 4.3). Contract services including the outsourcing of
work accounted for $31 million or 20%. Utilities accounted for 7%, and maintenance and
supplies for 6%. The other line items that include other administrative charges and insurance
accounted for 6.4% of operating expenses.
Table 6.3 DFW Operating Expenses, Fiscal Year 2000
(in Thousands of Dollars)
Operating Expenses Amount (%)
Salaries, wages, and benefits 89,831 58.7
Contract services 31,861 20.8
Maintenance and other supplies 10,474 6.8
Insurance 2,851 1.9
Utilities 11,193 7.3
General, administrative and other charges 6,855 4.5
Operating Expenses * 153,065 100
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* Excludes depreciation and amortization
Source: Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 2000 Annual Report
6.4 Net Income
To obtain the airport's net income, revenues and expenses related to financing, and investment, as
well as grants and funding from federal-sponsored programs such as AIP and PFC are added and
subtracted to the operating income. Notice that interest income is as large as DFW's operating
income. The interest cost regarding the revenue bonds was about $60 million. Also, as a result
of DFW's large traffic volumes, PFCs generated over $67 million. In 2000 DFW operating
income reached $40 million.40 After adding and deducting all other revenues and expenses the
net income turned out to be a healthy $93 million (Table 6.4).
6.5 Capital Program
In 2000 DFW launched the largest construction project to date. The program is aimed at
increasing air and landside capacity adding convenience to the passenger for the use of DFW.
The 5-year Capital Development Program will cost over $2.5 billion. During the peak
construction phase the airport expects to employ 350 contractors and subcontractors, 100
consultants and sub-consultants and more than 4,800 construction workers. The capital program
at DFW includes the following main features:
6.5.1 Projects
Terminal D
A new international terminal is slated for completion in 2005. It will be built at a cost of
approximately $1 billion. The construction project will include an 8,100 car parking facility. The
new 1.9 million square foot international terminal will add 23 gates for both, international and
domestic flights, a centralized federal inspection facility sized to serve 2,800 passengers an hour
and plenty of space for concessions and retailers.
40 This amount includes depreciation and amortization.
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Table 6.4 DFW Net Income, Fiscal
(in thousand dollars)
Operating revenues:
Landing fees (a)
Landing fees (b)
Terminal rents, use fees and concessions
Parking
Ground transportation regulation
Ground rentals/outside concessions
Transit system
Utility services
Hotel and recreation
Fueling system rentals
Reimbursable services
East cargo area rentals
Anti-air piracy charges
Miscellaneous
Total operating revenues
Operating expenses:
Salaries, wages, and benefits
Contract services
Maintenance and other supplies
Insurance
Utilities
General, administrative and other charges
Depreciation
Total operating expenses
Operating Income
Non-operating revenues (expenses):
Interest income
Interest expense on revenue bonds
Increase (decrease) in direct financing leases receivable. net
Interest and other income (expense) on direct financing leases. Net
Federal and State Grants
Passenger Facility Charges
Other. Net
Total non-operating revenues (expenses)
Net Income (Loss)
66,607
3,315
39,675
70,922
7,149
33,969
7,654
13,286
3,526
3,967
25.9
1.3
15.5
27.6
2.8
13.2
3
5.2
1.4
1.5
0
1,813 0.7
3,172 1.2
1,704 0.7
256,759 100
89,831 41.6
31,861 14.7
10,474 4.8
2,851 1.3
11,193 5.2
6,855 3.2
62,956 29.1
216,021 100
40,738
40,142
-60,737
-17,635
13,388
12
67,933
9,816
52,919
93,657
Comprehensive Annual Report
Year 2000
Amount %
(a) Signatory airlines
(b) Non-signatory airlines
Source: Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 2000
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Airfield Projects
The $184 million plan is aimed at reducing delays and increasing overall aircraft operations
capacity. The plan includes the extension of three runways at a cost of $87 million, and the
construction of a new runway. Among the advantages of this program, the extended runways will
contribute to reducing congestion on the taxiways by increasing taxi queuing capacity.
Automated People Mover and Other Projects
The construction of a $742 million bi-directional automated people mover commenced in 2000
and is expected to be completed during fiscal year 2005. The system is designed to move as
many as 8,500 passengers per hour in each direction. The capital program includes other
supporting infrastructure projects such as an $18 million signage replacement program, a new
customer center, an aircraft rescue fire station, as well as additional parking spaces.
Various airlines and tenants have obtained independent financing for the acquisition, construction
and improvement of certain airport facilities. These entities are governed by boards that are not
under the control of the DFW Board. Although the airport reviews and approves the projects for
which the monies are spent, the airport has no authority over these entities. Furthermore, certain
airlines and other tenants have funded construction and improvements from their own working
capital and/or other sources (Dallas/Fort Worth 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report, 24).
6.5.2 Funding Sources
It is impossible for airports to pay for major capital programs without a financing mechanism. To
raise large amounts of money airports like DFW leverage their yearly revenues issuing revenue
bonds. DFW's capital program will be heavily debt-financed. DFW was planning to issue $500
million of General Airport Revenue Bonds (GARBs) in the spring of 2002, then $400 million in
the early winter of 2002, and $300 million in the spring of 2003. Already in the fourth quarter of
2001 DFW issued $650 million of new money and refunding bonds.
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In addition to the revenue bond money, DFW benefits from federally sponsored funding
programs. These federal programs include the AIP grant program and the PFC program. DFW
has received federal grants over the years for specific projects that are subject to review and audit
by the grantor agency. The AIP grants awarded are project-specific and are not given to the
airport authorities to be used at their discretion (see Section 3.1). Between 1991 and 2000 DFW
received $337 million in grant money from the federal government. About 68% of the grant
money has been used for construction, 29% for land acquisition and only 1.7% for planning
(Table 6.5).
Table 6.5 DFW Grant Awards History (unaudited), Fiscal Years 1991-2000
(in Thousands of Dollars)
Purpose of Grant*
Fiscal Year Total
Land Planning Construction
1991 - 500 20,482 20,982
1992 - 299 30,727 31,026
1993 10,991 375 29,859 41,225
1994 19,609 - 37,420 57,029
1995 6,500 90 38,500 45,090
1996 35,617 - 9,822 45,439
1997 24,679 1,918 1,646 28,243
1998 2,500 73 19,724 22,297
1999 - 2,269 18,432 20,701
2000 - 450 25,064 25,514
Total 99,896 5,974 231,676 337,546
* Represents grant amounts awarded each year from Federal Aviation
Administration Grants or actual grant amounts as closed. For
financial reporting purposes, grants are recorded as earned, not
awarded.
Source: Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Finance Department
In recent years funding from the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) program has become a key
component in the funding of DFW's capital program. In 2000 PFC revenues generated more
money than landing fees from signatory airlines, the second most important operating revenue
source (Table 6.4). Up until the end of 2000 five applications for the PFC Program have been
submitted by DFW. The first application provided for funding of the sponsor's share of federal
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grant eligible costs for the construction of Runway 17L/35R (formerly Runway 16/34 East),
including land acquisition and mitigation and issuance costs and interest related to the bonds sold
in conjunction with the runway project. This application provided for the collection of a $3 per
passenger fee resulting in total revenue of $132 million. The collection period began on May 1,
1994 and ended May 31, 1996 (Dallas/Fort Worth 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report, 16).
A second application provided funding totaling $96.8 million for six projects, including two that
required further approval (such as environmental assessments) prior to implementation. The
collection period for this application began on February 1, 1997 and extended through April 30,
1998. Three amendments extended the collection period through September 1, 2001, and resulted
in a decrease of total collection to $90.1 million. On September 26, 2000, a third amendment
provided additional authority to collect money for the extension and associated development of
Runways 17C, 18L, and 18R (Dallas/Fort Worth 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report, 16).
The third PFC application approved on December 18, 1997 requested about $249 million for four
projects. Among these projects were the expansion of terminal B and the development and
construction of Runway 16/34, West. Four amendments to this application increased the
authorized collection to $261 million (Dallas/Fort Worth 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report,
17).
A fourth application was approved May 17, 1999 and requested authorization to use $24.8 million
previously imposed in Application 2 for extension and associated development of Runways 17C,
18R, and 18L. An additional use authority of $42.8 million for the previous runway projects was
approved on September 16, 2000. The four applications resulted in a total collection authority for
DFW's PFC Program of $483.2 million (Dallas/Fort Worth 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report,
17).
The fifth PFC application was presented in December 2000. This should provide funding for a bi-
directional people-mover system and eleven other projects. This application is for a collection of
$3 charge with authorized total collections anticipated to be over $2 billion. The collection period
started in June 2001 and goes through September 30, 2011 (Dallas/Fort Worth 2000
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Comprehensive Annual Report, 33). The application for authorization of $3.75 billion in PFC
over the next 35 years is seen by the credit rating agency Standard & Poor's as a major factor to
reducing pressure on airline rates.
6.5.3 Debt Service
The airport has three forms of indebtedness: Joint Revenue Bonds, Special Facility Revenue
Bonds, and Facility Improvement Corporation (FIC) Revenue Bonds (how do these bond forms
relate to DFW being a residual airport?). Joint Revenue Bonds are issued for the development of
airport property and are serviced and secured from the operations of the airport. Special Facility
Revenue Bonds and FIC Revenue Bonds are issued for construction of various special facilities
and are payable from rentals and other fees pursuant to various lease agreements between the
Airport's various lessees (Dallas/Fort Worth 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report, viii). The
gross principal amounts outstanding as of September 30, 2000 were as follows:
Table 6.6 DFW Gross Principal Amounts Outstanding
(as of September 30, 2000)
Amount(in millions)
Joint Revenue Bonds 1,229 48.7
Special Facility Revenue Bonds 67 2.7
FIC(1) Revenue Bonds 1,228 48.7
Total 2,525 100.0
(1) Facility Improvement Corporation
Source: Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 2000 Comprehensive Annual Report
Between 1991 and 2000 DFW has embarked on a diversification of its operating revenue and a
strengthening of its Joint Revenue Bond Coverage. Standard & Poor's values highly DFW trends
over the past decade which show a substantial growth in parking and ground rental/concession
revenues that have allowed landing fees to drop from $85 million in 1993 to $69 million in 2000.
This has contributed to a diversification of DFW operating revenues. According to S&P, airport
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operating revenues at DFW are already well diversified (Table 6.1 and Figure 6.4) with no line
item accounting for more than 28% of operating revenue (Lehman, Mock and Fallon 2000, 5).
The Use and Lease Agreement stipulates that debt service coverage should be set at or near 1.25
times the costs needed to run the facility plus the payment of principal and interest on the joint
revenue bonds. DFW management is going beyond those requirements and continues to
strengthen its financial standing as the Joint Revenue Bond Coverage has gone up from 1.32 in
1997 to 1.64 in 2000 (Table 6.7), which means that the airport is generating revenues at a higher
pace than creating new debt. For example, in DFW net income in 2000 totaled $150 million,
while the debt service for the Joint Revenues was only $91 million. This gave DFW a financial
cushion of approximately $59 million, about $20 million more than in the previous year! The
timing of an increase in the Joint Revenue Bond Coverage coincides with a time when DFW
starts its most ambitious capital program.
6.5.4 Recent Developments
The recent weakening of the economy and the major disruption in the airline industry following
the incidents of Sept. 11 affected DFW's revenue stream. To cope with this challenge the DFW
management team has been able to make the necessary adjustments. For instance, about $204
million in near-term projects of the capital program have been temporarily deferred. Also, three
long-term projects have been placed on hold. They include the eight runway project (which
accounts for roughly $300 million), the proposed terminal F project (about $840 million), and a
proposed light-rail system connecting DFW to Dallas DART and Fort Worth's T light-rail system
(Gilliland, Champeau, Soltz and Stettler 2002, 8).
6.6 Conclusion
The steady revenue growth and controlled expenditure increase experienced by DFW between
1991 and 2000 suggests a very stable business environment. Clearly, during that period DFW
benefited from a continued growth in parking revenues. The increase in parking revenues caused
Page 170
landing fees and terminal rentals lower their contribution to the operating revenue. A weakening
of the economy between 1999 and 2000 had an immediate impact on parking revenues slowing
down its growth considerably. In response, the residual nature of DFW agreement with the
airlines obligated the other cost centers to increase their contribution (Figure 6.5). This is the
classical example of a residual agreement, under which the airport is guaranteed a minimum
revenue to cover its operation expenditures (Section 2.3.1).
About 58% of DFW operating expenses were labor costs in 2000. This is consistent with the
findings of Section 4.5, which shows that airports with residual agreements are most likely to
have higher labor costs. Contract services accounted for about 20% of operating expenses. This
is, again, consistent with the findings of Section 4.5, which shows that in 2000 airports with
residual arrangements spent an average 22% of their operating expenses in contracted services.
Table 6.7 DFW Joint Revenue Bond Coverage* (in Thousands of Dollars)
Net Revenues Net Debt Service
Operating
Fiscal Operating Interest Expenses Net Principal Interest Net Debt Ratio*Year Revenues Income (excluding Expense Service
depreciation)
1991 188,479 18,609 -85,222 121,866 26,300 62,511 88,811 1.37
1992 210,559 13,506 -92,722 131,343 28,995 71,995 100,990 1.30
1993 211,087 12,245 -93,632 129,700 22,425 72,666 95,091 1.36
1994 203,805 14,361 -87,675 130,491 28,360 65,916 94,276 1.38
1995 206,478 21,964 -99,106 129,336 25,742 71,844 97,586 1.33
1996 214,216 22,502 -104,984 131,734 34,660 62,157 96,817 1.36
1997 218,499 20,718 -105,254 133,963 35,970 65,618 101,588 1.32
1998 228,594 26,968 -123,887 131,675 37,885 58,253 96,138 1.37
1999 239,867 25,271 -131,274 133,864 39,565 55,136 94,701 1.41
2000 256,759 46,543 -153,065 150,237 39,165 52,677 91,842 1.64
* Revenue bond coverage is computed based on the requirements of the Bond Ordinance and
includes debt service for joint revenue bonds. The coverage required by the Bond Ordinance is
computed on a rates, fees and charges basis. The above calculation computes coverage in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, in years applicable. Therefore, the
coverage will not equal 1.25 in all years. However, DFW is in compliance with the requirements
of the Bond Ordinances as computed on a rates, fees, and charges basis.
Source: Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Finance Department
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DFW management has been able to respond well to a weakening of non-aeronautical revenues.
The decrease of parking revenues was immediately met by an increase of landing fees and
terminal rents. As the economy continued to struggle, DFW was able to increase its landing fees
considerably. Landing fees have been increased from $1.28 (per 1,000 pounds of maximum
approved landed weight) in 1999 to $1.48 in 2000, to $2.03 in 2002 (Figure 6.5). As a result
DFW has been able to increase its Joint Revenue Bond coverage from 1.41 in 1999 to 1.64 in
2000 (Table 6.7). This shows bondholders that DFW not only has the means to honor its
obligations, it also shows investors the resourcefulness of the management team and the sound
financial and legal structure of DFW.
Page 172
Chapter 7
Baltimore/Washington International Airport
This chapter presents Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI) as an example of an
airport that uses a hybrid approach to set its aeronautical fees. As seen in Section 4.5, airports
using a hybrid approach to rate-setting are more reliant on aeronautical fees (over 60% of
operating revenues). Also, they are the least reliant on parking or concession revenues. In the
end, according to the findings in Section 4.5, airports with hybrid agreements such as BWI should
achieve operating margins in between of those with compensatory or residual approaches. This
chapter will be set to evaluate whether these patterns hold for BWI. It is important to point out
that all financial information on this chapter pre-dates Sep. 11, 2001.
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7.1 Background
The Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI) is located in Baltimore, Maryland, 30
miles north of Washington D.C. Serving over 19 million people in 2000 (an average of over
53,000 daily passengers), BWI ranked 27th among large U.S. hubs. BWI has become one of the
fastest growing airports in the nation reaching double-digit growth in terms of enplanements
between 1999 and 2001 (Figure 7.3).
The presence of Southwest Airlines at BWI is being credited as one of the main factors for this
impressive growth rate. BWI has a very strong O&D market, as about 82% of the traffic
originates and/or terminates at this facility. BWI traffic is mostly domestic with 97% of the
passengers travelling to or from U.S. destinations.
BWI's 1.4million sq. ft. passenger terminal has 5 piers (four domestic and one international). As
of 2000, BWI had 65 jet gates (18 gates were dedicated to commuter aircraft). The FAA air
capacity benchmark at Baltimore Washington is 111-120 flights per hour in good weather.
Current capacity falls to 72-75 flights (or fewer) per hour in adverse weather conditions (i.e., poor
visibility, unfavorable winds, or heavy precipitation). Because of its unique runway
configuration, the potential gain in future arrivals over the next ten years due to technology and
procedural improvements cannot be achieved without a decline in departures. According to the
FAA, the demand is projected to grow by 27% over the next ten years suggesting that delays may
grow significantly in the future (FAA 2001). A new 11,000 ft. Runway 10R128L is planned to be
constructed at the south end of the airport by 2008, 3,500 ft. south of Runway 10/28 (Figure 7.1).
After the new runway is completed, Runway 4/22 will be converted to a taxiway. The estimated
cost of these airside improvements is approximately $150 million.
A series of events in recent years contributed to improve the BWI business environment. For
example, in 1990 Interstate 1-195 opened connecting BWI directly to 1-95 and greatly improving
access to and from both the Washington and Baltimore areas. In 1991 a $29 million, 4-level
parking garage, located in front of the main terminal, was inaugurated. The garage featured 2,800
parking spaces. In September 1993, Southwest Airlines began serving the Baltimore area. The
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following year (1994) over 12.8 million passengers used BWI, representing a 36% increase over
the previous year. An expansion project was completed in 1997 doubling the parking garage size
to accommodate 5,600 vehicles (4,600 for public use and 1,000 for car rentals). In 1999 BWI
initiated a program to renovate Piers A and B at a cost of $85 million to provide more gates for
the expansion of Southwest Airlines.
Figure 7.1 Baltimore International Airport Layout
'N
5,000 ft.
Source: FAA
Page 175
During 2000, about 34% of the passengers that used BWI flew Southwest Airlines, while another
25% flew US Airways. Consequently, the two leading airlines served about 60% of the
passengers using BWI. The rest of the traffic was quite evenly distributed with no other carrier
holding more than 8% market share (Figure 7.2).
Figure 7.2 Airline Share of Total Passenger Traffic at BWI, Fiscal Year 2000
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Source: 2002 Aviation and Aerospace Almanac
7.2 Ownership, Governance And Management
Commissioned by the Baltimore Aviation Commission, the master plan for a new airport was
completed in 1946. Under the name of Friendship International Airport operations started in July
1950. In 1972 the State of Maryland, through the Department of Transportation, purchased the
airport for $36 million from the City of Baltimore. The airport was renamed to
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Baltimore/Washington International Airport in 1973 to reflect its role as a transportation center
for the Baltimore-Washington region. Under the Maryland Department of Transportation, the
State Aviation Administration took over the operations of the airport. Today the Maryland
Aviation Administration controls the operation of BWI. BWI and HNL are the only two large
hubs in the United States under the jurisdiction and control of a state government (Table 2.2).
Figure 7.3 Enplanements at BWI, Fiscal Years 1997-2002*
12,000
* Figures for 2002 includes preliminary estimates for June 2002 and is subject to be revised.
Source: Maryland Aviation Administration
7.3 Operating Revenue Structure
Just as traffic volumes have increased consistently during the last few years, so have the
revenues. Figure 7.4 shows a dramatic increase in operating income during the period 1992 -
2000. Operating revenues increased 140% from over $50 million in 1992 to $120 million in
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2000. Expenses, on the other hand, increased 113% from $30 million in 1992 to $64 million in
2000. Operating revenues showed a dramatic improvement between 1993 and 1994, the same
year that Southwest started operations at BWI (during that period traffic at BWI grew by 36%).
A weakening economy contributed to a decline in the growth of operating revenues in 2001 .41 By
contrast, the growth of operating expenses continued to increase, resulting in a decline of
operating income.
Figure 7.4 Operating Revenues and Expenses at BWI , Fiscal Years 1992-2001
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
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20,000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
-- Revenues 50,917 49,636 62,201 69,971 69,850 74,784 84,926 100,799 120,270 121,225
-a-Expenses 30,579 34,284 38,893 43,362 46,279 45,691 52,145 57,296 64,025 77,331
I -p--- Oeratina Income 20,338 15,352 23,308 26,609 23,571 29,093 32,781 43,503 56,245 43,894
Source: Maryland Aviation Administration
41 BWI ends its fiscal year at the end of June, therefore the fiscal year ended in June 2001 did not capture
the negative impact of Sept. 11 to the airline industry.
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Table 7.1 BWI Operating Revenues, Fiscal Years 1992-2001
(in Thousands of Dollars)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 (2001)
Landing Fees 11,364 10,586 14,044 15,635 14,657 15,889 16,054 18,163 19,027 23,585 19.5
Rents 17,691 16,491 19,184 19,502 18,919 18,755 20,174 21,592 21,850 21,822 18
Passenger concessions 19,719 20,508 26,820 32,678 33,836 37,421 45,321 56,997 67,126 69,285 57.2
Other concessions (a) 1,527 1,715 1,645 1,561 1,839 2,124 2,565 2,734 3,309 3,791 3.1
Other revenues (b) 616 336 508 595 599 595 812 1,313 867 2,742 2.3
Totals 50,917 49,636 62,201 69,971 69,850 74,784 84,926 100,799 112,179 121,225 100
(a) Taxi stand permits, general aviation complex, advertising poster and diorama, motor vehicle fuel commissions, hotel, service station, land rental property tax,
automotive service station.
(b) Airport traffic fines, sale of documents, sale of specifications, charge for lost Ids, auditorium and meeting rooms, automobile parking decals, airport development
program.
Source: Maryland Aviation Administration
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Table 7.2 BWI Operating Expenses, Fiscal Years 1992-2001
(in Thousand of Dollars)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 (2001)
Salaries 10,901 11,609 12,422 14,393 14,853 15,657 15,729 17,979 20,569 22,965 29.7
Technical & Spec. Fees 787 1,130 1,371 689 1,372 1,444 1,593 1,762 1,192 2,685 3.5
Communications 453 512 595 634 636 804 909 824 968 1,317 1.7
Travel 36 62 104 155 135 226 177 266 368 326 0.4
Fuel and utilities 3,609 3,514 3,985 3,629 3,947 4,177 4,279 4,720 4,897 5,834 7.5
Motor vehicle operations 436 987 565 1,280 1,951 555 702 657 735 874 1.1
Contractual services 12,166 13,309 14,889 17,021 18,078 18,118 23,436 25,258 27,663 32,595 42.1
Supplies and materials 993 1,166 1,858 1,385 1,771 1,475 1,456 2,060 2,098 2,325 3.0
Replacement of equipment 8 61 70 464 368 150 540 186 260 181 0.2
Additional equipment -29 111 152 603 422 370 229 45 298 385 0.5
Grants, subsidies and & 543 423 887 542 420 471 493 672 179 337 0.4
contr.
Fixed charges 206 461 385 559 797 885 874 772 1,334 3,980 5.1
Land/structure 470 939 1,610 2,008 1,529 1,359 1,728 2,095 3,464 3,527 4.6
Totals 30,579 34,284 38,893 43,362 46,279 45,691 52,145 57,296 64,025 77,331 100.0
Source: Maryland Aviation Administration
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7.3.1. Operating Revenues
Figure 7.5 highlights the level of growth of the various categories of operating revenues at BWI
between 1992 and 2001. Passenger concession revenues 42 have been the major driving force
behind the formidable growth of operating revenue. Between 1992 and 2001 passenger
concession revenues increased by 251%, an average annual growth of 25%! The impressive rate
of growth of concession revenues outpaced the revenue growth experienced by all other line
items making them lose ground in the overall revenue structure.
Figure 7.5 Operating Revenue Growth at BWI Between 1992 and 2001
69,285
21,822
-17;691-
3,791 2,742
1,527
Other concessions (a) Other revenues (b) Rents
11,364
Landing fees
23,585 19 719
Passenger
concessions
(a) Includes taxi stand permits, general aviation complex, advertising poster and diorama, motor vehicle fuel
commissions, hotel, service station, land rental property tax, automotive service station.
(b) Includes airport traffic fines, sale of documents, sale of specifications, charge for lost Ids, auditorium and meeting
rooms, automobile parking decals, airport development program.
Source: Maryland Aviation Administration
42 Passenger concession revenues include parking, car rental facilities, foods and beverages, retail
establishments and other revenues such as taxi, limousines and other transportation services; flight
insurance, telephone, automated teller machines (ATMs), baggage carts, etc.
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Contributions that are derived primarily from the airlines, namely landing fees, grew by 107%.
This growth was generated mainly by increased traffic volumes (Figure 7.3), which translated
into more aircraft operations. Notice that between 1998 and 2000 when traffic growth was high
(Figure 7.3) landing fees for individual aircraft actually declined (Figure 7.6). Figure 7.6 shows
that between 2000 and 2001 landing fees had a slight increase (six cents per 1,000 thousand
pounds of landing weight for signatory airlines and 8 cents for non-signatory airlines) while
traffic continued to grow (Figure 7.3). This minor fee increase resulted in a 23% landing fees
revenue increase from $19 million in 2000 to $23.5 million in 2001 (Table 7.1).
The revenues from rents increased from $17.6 million in 1992 to $21.8 million in 2001. This was
a modest 23% growth rate on the 10-year span, averaging an annual 2.3% increase.
Figure 7.6 Landing fees at BWI, Fiscal Years 1993-2002
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Figure 7.7 Composition of BWI's Operating Revenue, Fiscal Year 2001
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Figure 7.7 shows the composition of BWI operating revenues for 2001, including a detailed view
of concession and rent revenues. In 2001 BWI operating revenues were over $121 million (Table
7.1). Of all passenger concessions, parking revenue was the most important line item accounting
for $40 million or 34% of BWI operating revenues. The airlines contributed $23.5 million (20%)
in landing fees, and $18 million (15%) in terminal building rents. Revenues for the car rental
business were $17.9 million or 15%. The food and beverages business raised $3.9 million, while
retail establishments contributed $2.3 million. It is important to highlight the fact that
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automobile-related revenues (i.e., parking and car rentals) contributed about half (approximately
$58.3 million) of all operating revenues at BWI during 2001.
Parking revenues are the catalyst behind the impressive revenue growth at BWI. Figure 7.6
shows the dramatic increase of 380% in parking revenues from over $14 million in 1992 to over
$56 million in 2000. Two major developments contributed to this growth: the arrival of
Southwest and added parking capacity. Notice how parking revenue growth comes almost to a
complete stop at the end of 2001. Airport administrators will have to examine this carefully as
parking revenues seem to be extremely sensitive to negative economic conditions.
Figure 7.8 Parking Revenues at BWI, Fiscal Years 1992-2001
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Source: Maryland Aviation Administration
43 BWI ends its fiscal year at the end of June, therefore the fiscal year ended in June 2001 did not capture
the negative impact of Sept. 11 to the airline industry.
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Figure 7.9 shows the percent contribution of the revenue line items for each year between 1992
and 2001. In 1992 passenger concessions"* and rents generated 39% and 35% of operating
revenue respectively. After that year, passenger concessions started to become more important
while rents declined, creating a gap that widened every year. In 2001 the upward passenger
concession trend reversed, while rent revenue continued to decline. Landing fees, on the other
hand, have remained relatively flat at about 21% of operating revenues up until 1997.
Figure 7.9 BWI Operating Revenues Share, Fiscal Years 1992-2001
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Source: Maryland Aviation Administration
44 Passenger concession revenues include parking, car rental facilities, foods and beverages, retail
establishments and other revenues such as taxi, limousines and other transportation services; flight
insurance, telephone, automated teller machines (ATMs), baggage carts, etc.
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The following three years landing fees lost ground reaching a low of 16% in 2000. In 2001, as
passenger concession revenues experienced a dramatic decline, landing fees suddenly surged.
This demonstrates the presence of hybrid fee-setting arrangement at BWI. In a hybrid type of
arrangement, a decline in revenues from a landside cost center will cause the airside cost center
linked to it to increase its contribution to maintain a predetermined minimum financial outcome at
the end of the year. Conversely, an increase of revenues from the concession cost centers can
contribute to a decrease in landing fees (see Section 2.3.3). Consistent with a hybrid approach,
other revenue sources not linked to landing fees were not affected (see how the share of rent
revenue continues to decrease).
7.3.2 Operating Expenses
Between 1992 and 2001 operating expenses increased smoothly and continuously (Figure 7.4).
Unlike operating revenues, expenses show a high degree of stability. For example, during 2001
when revenues were hit by the initial effects of an economic recession operating expenses showed
almost no change on their upward trend (Figure 7.3). Between 1992 and 2001, expenses
increased from over $30 million to $77 million, an increase of 250% (Figure 7.4 and Table 7.2).
Figure 7.10 shows the distribution of BWI operating expenses during 2001: contractual services
costs accounted for over $32 million or 42% of the operating expenses, while salaries reached
$22 million or 29% of operating expenses. This differs with most large commercial airports,
where labor (salaries and employee benefits) is usually the largest expense item (Figure 4. 2).
Fuel and utilities accounted for approximately $5.8 million or 8%, while expenditures in land,
structure and physical upkeep cost was $3.5 million or 4.6% of operating expenses. The
remaining expenditures were equivalent to 15-16% and were distributed among various line items
that include supplies and materials, communications, motor vehicle operations, etc.
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Figure 7.10 Operating Expenses at BWI, Fiscal Year 2001
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7.4 Capital Program
To cope with increasing needs due to BWI's traffic growth of recent years, the Maryland
Aviation Administration is implementing a capital improvement program for the period 2001-
2007. The Maryland Aviation Administration, which runs BWI, says it is committed to $1.2
billion worth of construction projects out of the $1.6 billion planned over the next five years.
Table 7.3 displays the timetable and phasing of the $1.6 billion capital program at BWI.
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Figure 7.11 BWI Government Sponsored Funding, Fiscal Years 1992-2001 (in
Thousands of Dollars)
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7.4.1 Projects
People Mover
BWI is proposing the construction of a monorail transit system that will connect the expanding
facilities. This project is aimed at increasing BWI parking capacity as the people mover will link
the terminal to new parking facilities.
Concourse A expansion and new Concourse F
This phase of the project will increase the terminal building capacity. Concourse A will be a self-
contained facility with all services and amenities, including concession space and 16 new gates.
The construction of concourse F will add 4 gates and 120,000sq. ft. of additional space. This
Page 188
two-level structure with holdrooms, baggage claim area, and concession space, for both domestic
and international traffic, will be built next to the international terminal.
Improved Roadway and Access
The capital program will include improvements to existing roadways to facilitate access to the
terminal. In addition, skybridges will connect parking areas directly to the new mezzanine level
of the terminal.
Intermodal Center
This part of the project is aimed at integrating the various improvements proposed for BWL. As
BWI continues its efforts to attract Washington D.C. customers, a new intermodal facility will
link trains, buses and the people mover to provide seamless access to the main terminal.
Parking
To capitalize on its tremendous growth BWI will continue to expand its parking capacity. By
2005 BWI will have increased its parking capacity to 13,000 parking spaces. During the first
phase, the car-rental facility will be moved to a new consolidated car-rental facility west of the
terminal. This will free about 1,000 parking spaces next to the terminal. This will be followed by
the construction of a major parking structure (Elm Road Garage) that will add another 8,400
parking spaces. The first phase of this project will provide 3,000 parking spaces by November
2002. The remaining 5,400 parking spaces will be made available by January 2004.
7.4.2 Funding Sources
Most large commercial airports rely heavily on borrowed money (in the form of revenue bonds or
special facility bonds) to finance their capital programs, however BWI does not rely on bond
money as much. As Table 7.4 shows, this is due to a strong financial support from the state and
the federal government. Indeed, the largest contribution to BWI's capital program will derive
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from the State of Maryland Transportation Trust Funds that over the 7-year span will provide
$638 million or almost 38% of the total cost of the program. In addition, BWI continues to
receive federal funding from AIP grants and is authorized to levy PFCs that provide an annual
revenue of over $20 million (Figure 7.9). BWI will use about $288 million (or 17%) of PFC
money for its capital program. In addition, the federal government will contribute $176 million
for environmental projects.
BWI is starting to capitalize on its strong operating revenue structure. A series of deals have been
secured or are underway to make BWI's capital program a reality. In February 2002 BWI issued
via the Maryland Transportation Authority $267 million of project construction bonds (secured
by garage revenues), and later the same year expects to issue $120 million of special facility
bonds (secured by consolidated rental car facility charges), as well as $137 million of PFC-
backed bonds in 2003. Additionally, the Maryland Economic Development Corp. (MEDCO)
anticipates issuing $180 million in bonds secured by airline lease payments and by concession
revenue (Gilliland, Champeau, Soltz and Stettler 2002, 14).
7.4.3 Debt Service
Setting aside the PFC-backed debt, BWI bond obligations will be approximately $580 million
(according to Table 7.4). That includes a $252 million revenue bond, a $179 million bond issued
by the Maryland Economic Development Corp. (MEDCO), $117 special facility bond secured by
the rental car facility, and $33 million of the Certificate of Participation.45 The operating income,
which in 2001 was over $43 million, should be sufficient to cover BWI's financial obligations.
7.4.4 Recent Developments
The impact of 9/11 was immediately felt by the airlines, and consequently the airports. As seen
previously, BWI was already experiencing a revenue slow down due to the existing economic
conditions. BWI's Acting Executive Director, Beverly K. Swaim-Staley's, reaction after 9/11
was that the state had to be monitoring the industry "every day, even every hour" to make sure
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the expansion of Maryland's major airport still makes sense. ". . . at this point we're not aware of
any changes with the airlines that would cause us to alter our plan." Swaim-Staley added,
"Fortunately for us, we're in a much better financial position than most other airports, who carry
a lot of debt." (Little 2001, 2)
State Transportation Secretary John D. Porcari said the expansion is continuing because many of
those projects are necessary even if business declines. "We're moving full speed ahead," he
added. "If you think about the elements of the BWI expansion plan, which would mean greater
customer convenience, more parking - all of that will still be needed," Mr. Porcari concluded
(Little 2001, 2).
7. 5 Conclusion
The big story at BWI is the pace at which traffic is been growing. The presence of low-fare
carrier Southwest Airlines is credited for this impressive growth rate. Still, the dependence of
BWI on the large presence of US Airways was felt between 2001 and 2002 when the airline
decreased its service, resulting in decreased traffic and revenue for the airport (Figure 7.3).
Section 4.5 shows that airports with hybrid rate-setting methodologies are least dependent on
non-aeronautical revenues (e.g., parking and concession revenues). BWI, which has a hybrid cost
recovery methodology, does not follow this pattern. On the contrary, in recent years BWI has
increased considerably its reliance on concession revenues. The main force behind concession
revenue growth has been parking revenues. In 2001 parking revenues accounted for 34% of BWI
operating revenues (Figure 7.7). This is twice as much as the average parking revenues for
airports with hybrid arrangements, which in 2000 was slightly over 14% (Figure 4.14). The
continued parking revenue growth came to an abrupt end during the fiscal year ended in June
2001. Parking revenues almost did not grow compared to the previous year affecting the overall
revenue structure. However, the hybrid agreement of the airport with the airlines allowed BWI to
slightly increase landing fees (Figure 7.6), which resulted in a substantial increase in landing fee
4 Special bond issue for specific airport projects by the Maryland Dept. of Transportation.
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revenues (Table 7.1). It is important to mention that, consistent with a hybrid arrangement, an
increase in landing fees did not affect the continued decline in rent revenues (Figure 7.9). This
highlights the flexibility of a hybrid agreement under difficult circumstances.
In 2001 labor costs accounted for about 30% of BWI operating expenses. This is consistent with
the findings of Section 4.5, which indicates that about 30% of operating expenses for airports
with hybrid arrangements were labor costs. It is important to note that in 2001 BWI spent about
42% of its operating expenses on contractual services. This is in contrast to the 17% used in
services by hybrid airports in 2000 (Figure 4.16).
Unlike most large commercial airports in the United States, BWI receives significant financial
support from local government sources (Section 7.4.3). Consequently, BWI debt is small
compared to other airports its size. Strong government support, as well as a capital program
aimed at strengthening the airport's concession revenue growth, the commitment of a strong
airline (i.e., Southwest Airlines), and an economically strong region suggest that BWI is well
positioned to continue serving the aeronautical needs of the Baltimore/Washington region.
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Table 7.3 Phases of BWI's Capital Program, Fiscal Years 2001-2007
(in Thousands of Dollars)
Total
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Estimated %
Cost
Preliminary Planning 7,806 4,720 8,794 704 22,024 1.3
Preliminary Engineering (Design) 77,604 23,764 26,202 14,076 11,505 10,454 9,656 173,261 10.3
Right of Way (Property Acquisition) 76,779 4,835 6,086 6,295 6,420 7,075 5,075 112,565 6.7
Construction and Construction 334,442 162,443 334,736 311,595 93,417 90,725 49,724 1,377,082 81.7Management & Inspection
Total 496,631 195,762 375,818 332,670 111,342 108,254 64,455 1,684,932 100
Source: Maryland Aviation Administration
Table 7.4 Funding Sources For BWI's Capital Program, Fiscal Years 2001-2007
(in Thousands of Dollars)
Total
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Estimated %
Cost
Federal Funds (a) 67,261 17,360 25,307 23,294 21,042 10,779 11,086 176,129 10.5
MAA State Funds 269,642 78,883 108,157 57,292 42,137 39,020 43,045 638,176 37.9
Medco (b) 17,365 45,621 115,211 1,034 179,231 10.6
PFCs 128,883 4,055 26,374 13,716 47,129 58,455 10,324 288,936 17.1
Customer Facility Charge (c) 22,892 63,852 30,639 117,383 7
COP Certificate of Participation (d) 30,845 805 1,369 33,019 2
Revenue Bond 54,402 105,138 92,518 252,058 15
Total 496,631 195,762 375,818 332,670 111,342 108,254 64,455 1,684,932 100
(a) ILEAV-Inherently Low-Emission Airport Vehicle/Entitlement/Discretionary/Noise Discretionary
(b) Maryland Economic Development Corporation - Quasi-state government agency providing loan to third parties
(c ) Related to the Consolidated Rental Car Facility
(d) Special bond issue for specific airport projects by the Maryland Dept. of Transportation
Source: Maryland Aviation Administration
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This study has provided a framework for the analysis and evaluation of the operating revenue
structure of large hub airports in the United States. In the process, the consolidated financial data
of all large hub airports were first examined in order to create a profile of their revenue structure.
Next, the major operating revenue line items were analyzed. The same operation was performed
with regard to major operating expenses. The final objective was to identify the main drivers and
factors that shape the most relevant revenue line items.
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In addition, by synthesizing scattered operational and financial data this research has tried to
highlight the impact of airport operations and business practices on the revenue structure of large
commercial airports.
Part I, which consists of Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, examines large commercial airports at an
aggregate level. The high concentration of the air traffic in the United States suggests that a large
portion of investments into airport infrastructure will be destined to large hub airports. Hence,
these airports became the primary area of concern of this study. After a review of the airports'
main characteristics, the study focuses on trends affecting their revenues and expenses. Each of
the principal revenues line items is assessed individually. Then, the study identifies the main
drivers that affect airports' revenues and expenses. In addition, funding alternatives are examined
against the need for capital programs. Part II, which includes chapters 5, 6, and 7 presents the
case studies of three airports. Each case is evaluated within the basic framework used to analyze
the system at an aggregate level in Part I. However, the evaluation emphasizes the unique
characteristics of each case.
Chapter 2 shows that air traffic in the United States is highly concentrated. In fact, in 2000 the 31
large hub airports handled over 74% or passenger enplanements (FAA 2001,:77, 78). This
suggests that these airports will also need to make massive investments in the near future to
maintain or increase their capacity, while coping with the far more stringent safety and security
requirements of the post-September 11, 2001 era. The chapter points out that large hub airports
are public entities owned by local governments or specially created authorities, and are controlled
by local operators. Consequently the decisions regarding capital programs are often driven by
strong local considerations.
Special emphasis was placed on the cost recovery methodologies used by the airports to set their
fees. These establish the guidelines for two of the most important operating revenue line items:
landing fees and terminal building rental fees. Large hub airports use one of the following rate-
setting schemes: residual, compensatory or hybrid. Residual arrangements combine all operating
revenues and expenses into a single account. Deficits are covered by the airlines46 through
46 This relates to airlines that sign an Use and Lease Agreement with the airport operator.
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appropriate aeronautical fee increases. Conversely, surpluses usually lead to reductions in
aeronautical fees. Under compensatory arrangements every business or operational unit at the
airport is treated separately. Therefore, airlines pay only for the use of specific facilities. Deficits
or surpluses in facilities not used by the airlines are the responsibility of the airport operator.
Under a hybrid rate-setting arrangement, the operator links certain non-aeronautical cost centers
to some or all of the aeronautical cost centers. For example, landing fees can be linked to parking
revenues. If parking revenues generate surpluses the result might be a reduction in landing fees.
The use of a residual arrangement entails increased risk for the airlines as they agree to cover
deficits. This results in the inclusion of Majority-in-Interest (MII) clauses in the Use and Lease
Agreements. MII clauses allow the airlines to review and approve or reject capital projects. In
2000 about 90% of the large hubs with residual arrangements had MII clauses in place. In a
compensatory arrangement most of the risk rests with the airport operator. As a result only 33%
of airports with compensatory arrangements had MII clauses in place. About 72% airports with
hybrid arrangements included MII clauses in their agreements.
The study shows that, despite some resistance from the airlines, large airports seem to be turning
away from purely residual cost recovery methodologies and toward compensatory and hybrid
approaches. There is some evidence that compensatory arrangements may create an adversarial
environment (contentious in some cases) between airport operators and the airlines. Residual
agreements, on the other hand, tend to foster more cooperation among stakeholders. In sum, the
fundamental difference between the cost recovery methodologies lies in who assumes the risk for
financial operations and who has control over airport capital decisions (Whiteman, Hu and Cahill
2000, 10)
Section 2.6 examines the issue of airline competition within an airport facility. The use of the
hub-and-spoke network structure has contributed to increased traffic concentration. According to
the Hirfendahl-Hirschmann Index and the scale used by the Department of Justice to measure
market competition about 61% of the large hub airports in the U.S. can be considered highly
concentrated offering a less competitive environment. Among the least competitive airports in
the nation are IAH, CLT, PIT, and STL. About 39% of the large airports can be considered
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moderately concentrated. The airports that offer the most competitive environments are BOS,
TPA, MCO and FLL.
Chapter 3 emphasizes that today's airport operators are not only managers, but highly skilled
developers constantly dealing with the planning and implementation of complex capital
programs. To finance these programs airport operators rely mostly on capital markets,
specifically the bond markets. Most of the money raised for capital programs is in the form of
revenue bonds. For many years this financing mechanism has proven to be a very safe
investment vehicle for bondholders. The remarkable performance achieved by airport revenue
bonds has its foundation in the revenue structure of large hub airports.
The study also found that increased access to capital markets by large commercial airports has not
resulted in a reduction of the role of the federal government in the funding of capital programs.
While the direct support that the federal government provides through grants has declined, the
FAA has been instrumental in increasing the revenue potential of large hub airports by allowing
them to charge special passenger fees (known as Passenger Facility Charges-PFCs 47). As a result,
the federal government maintains the role of a regulator of the airport system and can act as a
catalyst for increasing large hub airport revenue and airline competition. This scheme has also
allowed the federal government to direct unused AIP grant money to smaller airports.
Chapter 4 presents a 5-year analysis of the consolidated operating revenues and operating
expenses of large commercial airports. The analysis found a clear upward trend in both revenues
and operating income. In 2000 the consolidated operating revenues were $7.23 billion, while
operating expenses reached $4.22 billion. This resulted in a consolidated operating income of $3
billion. The consolidated data helped create the following profile of large hub airports for 2000:
aeronautical revenues accounted for 54% of operating revenues and non-aeronautical revenues
for 46%. Five line items accounted for 82% of operating revenues. They were: landing fees
(20%), terminal building rental fees (24%), parking (24%), concessions (13%), and car rentals
(8%). An analysis of individual revenue line items found a fairly good correlation between traffic
47 Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) are fees charged to passengers for using an airport facility. The fees
are included in the passenger's air ticket and range in value from $1 to $4.50.
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volumes and non-aeronautical revenues, specifically parking and concessions. For instance, the
study found that as O&D traffic increases the revenue from parking generally increases as well
(Figure 4.5). A similar pattern was found for concession revenues.
An analysis of the data regarding federal government-sponsored revenues confirms the fact that
PFC funding has more than compensated for the loss of parts of AIP funding by large hub
airports. The consolidated data show that the federal government is limiting the amount of grant
(AIP) money allocated to large hub airports. Simultaneously, there is a noticeable increase in
PFC revenues. AIP funding has declined from $498 million in 1996 to $376 million in 2000.
Conversely, PFC revenues have increased from $713 million in 1996 to $1.12 billion in 2000.
One of the main objectives of this project was to determine the factors that influence the airports'
operating revenues. Since cost recovery methodologies are used to set the charges for landing
fees and terminal rentals, which represent 20% and 24% of operating revenues respectively, an
evaluation of the impact of the rate-setting methodologies was performed. Contrary to what was
expected, the analysis in Section 4.5 found that airports using compensatory arrangements seem
to be the least reliant on aeronautical revenues. These airports are the least dependent on
terminal rental revenues, while their landing fee revenues have declined dramatically to be almost
as low as those of facilities with residual arrangements (which are the least dependent on landing
fee revenues). Airports with residual arrangements have a higher dependence on aeronautical
revenues than those with compensatory arrangements. Airports with hybrid rate-setting
methodologies are the most reliant on aeronautical revenues.
The study also found that airports with compensatory arrangements outsource substantially more
services than other airports. In fact, in 1996 airports with compensatory arrangements spent twice
as much, percentage-wise, on outsourcing services than their counterparts with hybrid and
residual arrangements. However, in recent years, airports with residual and hybrid arrangements
have also steadily increased their reliance on outsourced services. Labor accounts for 42% of
operating expenses in airports with residual agreements. Despite having large service
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expenditures, airports with compensatory arrangements also have high labor expenditures.
Airports with hybrid arrangements have relatively low labor expenditures.
As expected, the study also found that airports with compensatory arrangements achieved the
highest operating margins, with hybrid facilities the second highest and those with residual
arrangements the lowest. This is consistent with the very nature of residual agreements, which
limit risk to airports by shifting it to the airlines, but at the same time limit the potential of the
airport for increased revenues. Airports with compensatory arrangements generate the least
revenue per passenger, but their operating expenses are also very low. This results in a high
operating margin. Nevertheless, it is facilities with hybrid arrangements that realize the highest
operating surplus per passenger on an absolute basis.
Section 4.5 identifies the drivers and main factors that affect the operating revenue structure of
large hub airports. The relationship between the airport operator and the airlines is the main
driver that shapes aeronautical revenues. This relationship is influenced by factors that include
existing contractual agreements, airport ownership structure and management philosophy, O&D
market, competitive environment among airlines and the financial strength of the dominant
airlines. The business environment is the main driver that shapes the non-aeronautical revenues.
At the same time, the business environment is influenced by factors such as management
philosophy of the airport operator, traffic volumes, O&D demand, state of the economy, and
trends in the retail industry. Agendas set by federal and state government influence the policy
driver that determine government-sponsored revenues.
Chapter 5 examines the case of Logan International Airport (BOS). This airport stands out for
having the lowest market concentration of all large hub airports in the U.S. In fact, no airline has
more than 25% of market share at Logan. In terms of traffic volume it ranks 18th among U.S.
large hubs, yet it has operating revenues comparable to those of airports with much higher
passenger volumes (e.g. ATL, DFW). BOS stands out as one of the most profitable airports in
the nation. For instance, its operating revenues have grown from $144 million in 1991 to $274
million in 2001. Similarly the airport's operating income has grown from $61 million in 1991 to
$117 million in 2001. As seen in Chapter 4.3.1 a strong O&D base can strengthen parking and
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concession revenues. BOS, an airport with a very strong O&D base, has been able to capitalize
with substantial parking and concession revenue increases. It is important to point out that the
reliance of BOS on airline-driven revenues (i.e., landing fees, terminal rentals) has diminished
considerably in recent years. This is consistent with the findings of Section 4.5 regarding facilities
using the compensatory rate-setting methodology. Section 4.5 shows that during the period 1996-
2000 airports with compensatory arrangements showed a decline in aeronautical revenues (i.e.,
landing fees and terminal building rentals) and an increase in non-aeronautical revenues (mainly
parking and concession revenues).
Chapter 6 features Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. The steady revenue growth and
controlled expenditure increases experienced by DFW between 1991 and 2000 suggests a very
stable business environment. The study shows that during that period DFW benefited from a
continued growth in parking revenues. The increase in parking revenues caused the contribution
to operating revenue of landing fees and terminal rentals to diminish. A weakening of the
economy between 1999 and 2000 had a noticeable impact on parking revenues slowing down
growth considerably. Consistent with the residual fee-setting approach used at DFW, this led to a
corresponding increase in the contribution that all other cost centers had to make.. Thus, the use
of a residual approach still allowed DFW to achieve revenue growth during fiscal year 2000. The
case study also points out that, due to large traffic volumes, DFW relies heavily on PFC funding.
Chapter 7 focuses on Baltimore/Washington International, one of the nation's fastest growing
airports. The big story at BWI is the pace at which traffic is growing. The presence of low-fare
carrier Southwest Airlines is credited for this impressive growth rate. The dependence on the
large presence of US Airways was clearly felt when in 2001 the airline decreased its service with
a corresponding decrease in traffic and in revenue. In recent years, BWI has also relied more
heavily on parking revenues. This came to an abrupt end during fiscal year 2001. Parking
revenues did not grow compared to the previous year, affecting overall revenues. However, the
hybrid agreement of the airport with the airlines allowed BWI to increase slightly landing fees,
resulting in a substantial increase in landing fee revenues. Consistent with a hybrid arrangement
other cost centers were not affected. This highlights the flexibility of a hybrid agreement under
difficult circumstances. An issue worth mentioning is BWI's dependence on the support of local
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government for funding capital programs. This has resulted in lower debt when compared to
other airports of similar size.
The case studies have provided an insightful view into how operating revenues are structured in
different settings. They also helped illustrate the effect that a decline in a strong revenue source
has on other revenue sources. In addition, the case studies generally corroborated the findings of
the consolidated evaluation of large hub airports performed in Chapter 4 (i.e., strength of
individual revenue line items, trends based on cost recovery methodologies, etc.). This only
strengthens the view that consolidated financial data analysis can be a useful tool in helping to
assess industry trends.
Continued research on financial issues affecting airports can shed light on existing trends, and
patterns developing in the industry and should help decision-makers when responding to funding
initiatives. Increased knowledge and awareness is vital for the air transportation system in general
as responses to funding problems must address local issues while adequately responding to issues
of national concern. Airports will certainly continue to invest in capital improvements and must
in the short-run face the challenges of a depressed airline industry. This thesis should be viewed
just as a starting point for continued research aimed at contributing to the body of knowledge
which is vital to the efficient use of existing resources.
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Large Hub Airports Key Operational Indicators, Fiscal Year 2000
% of total Total PAX PAX Dominant Passengers Dominant
Rank Enplanements scheduled Traffic Connecting (%) O&D (%) International % Domestic % Airline Handled by Airline Share
enplaments Flights Main Airline (%)
1 ATL 39,375,330 5.92 80,162,407 50,742,804 63.3 29,419,603 36.7 5,851,856 7.3 74,310,551 92.7 Delta 58,526,573 73.01
2 ORD 34,153,190 5.13 72,144,244 38,236,449 53.0 33,907,795 47.0 10,460,915 14.5 61,683,329 85.5 United 31,274,530 43.35
American 22,573,934 31.29
3 LAX 32,332,452 4.86 66,424,767 16,473,342 24.8 49,951,425 75.2 18,067,537 27.2 48,357,230 72.8 United 16,088,079 24.22
4 DFW 28,066,194 4.22 60,687,122 37,322,580 61.5 23,364,542 38.5 5,037,031 8.3 55,650,091 91.7 American 37,668,497 62.07
5 SFO 18,498,749 2.78 41,040,995 11,450,438 27.9 29,590,557 72.1 7,879,871 19.2 33,161,124 80.8 United 19,317,996 47.07
47.2
60.6
79.4
46.3
78.0
45.1
65.6
40.3
85.7
35.3
84.2
71.7
86.1
90.8
59.7
25.8
24.6
83.0
34.7
82.2
64.9
45.3
87.2
86.1
95.1
75.3
1,046,296
1,045,174
958,513
3,589,043
8,854,813
2,866,627
17,651,168
5,499,214
20,962,268
519,544
2,435,057
2,386,318
4,084,526
1,370,243
2,541,664
738,365
1,089,639
5,869,218
634,128
588,078
3,914,367
39,802
529,432
316,407
1,252,940
0
2.7
2.9
2.6
10.1
25.9
7.8
52.5
15.6
63.8
1.7,
7.9
8.4
14.9
5.4
10.2
3.2
4.9
25.5
3.2
3.0
19.6
0.2
3.3
2.0
7.9
0
37,705,391
34,995,295
35,907,353
31,946,037
25,333,655
33,885,005
15,970,105
29,752,158
11,893,952
30,041,843
28,388,452
26,022,235
23,328,400
24,004,623
22,376,612
22,335,529
21,147,886
17,147,324
19,182,383
19,014,531
16,056,893
19,861,008
15,513,951
15,503,935
14,607,064
15,724,613
97.3 United
97.1 America West
97.4 Southwest
89.9 Northwest
74.1 Continental
92.2 Northwest
47.5 American
84.4 Continental
36.2 American
98.3 TWA
92.1 Delta
91.6 Alaska
85.1 Delta
94.6 Delta
89.8 USAirways
96.8 USAirways
95.1 Delta
74.5 Hawaiian
96.8 USAirways
97.0 Southwest
80.4 United
99.8 Delta
96.7 Delta
98.0 Southwest
92.1 Delta
#### USAirways
23,909,791
14,798,217
11,498,464
24,661,346
18,369,464
26,549,379
16,659,341
25,581,921
6,508,817
22,429,002
8,362,418
8,093,597
5,647,063
6,262,517
14,788,997
18,844,449
13,642,722
5,876,123
14,975,337
6,829,549
8,879,222
13,309,662
3,282,476
5,285,576
4,023,683
4,772,420
61.70
41.06
31.19
69.40
53.73
72.24
49.55
72.57
19.81
73.39
27.13
28.49
20.60
24.68
59.35
81.67
61.35
25.53
75.57
34.84
44.46
66.88
20.46
33.41
25.37
30.35
Sources: FAA, ACl-NA and Aviation Week
6 DEN
7 PHX
8 LAS
9 DTW
10 EWR
11 MSP
12 MIA
13 IAH
14 JFK
15 STL
16 MCO
17 SEA
18 BOS
19 LGA
20 PHL
21 CLT
22 CVG
23 HNL
24 PIT
25 BWI
26 IAD
27 SLC
28 TPA
29 SAN
30 FLL
31 DCA
18,883,765
18,652,345
17,530,409
17,873,801
17,144,940
17,203,373
16,716,291
16,564,385
16,080,974
14,552,733
15,136,268
14,225,451
13,816,195
12,567,451
13,022,732
11,936,722
9,185,962
10,511,446
10,520,627
10,617,714
8,501,994
9,297,702
8,200,264
7,953,273
8,541,532
7,959,838
2.84
2.80
2.63
2.69
2.58
2.59
2.51
2.49
2.42
2.19
2.27
2.14
2.08
1.89
1.96
1.79
1.38
1.58
1.58
1.60
1.28
1.40
1.23
1.20
1.28
1.20
38,751,687
36,040,469
36,865,866
35,535,080
34,188,468
36,751,632
33,621,273
35,251,372
32,856,220
30,561,387
30,823,509
28,408,553
27,412,926
25,374,866
24,918,276
23,073,894
22,237,525
23,016,542
19,816,511
19,602,609
19,971,260
19,900,810
16,043,383
15,820,342
15,860,004
15,724,613
20,460,891
14,199,945
7,594,368
19,082,338
7,521,463
20,176,646
11,565,718
21,045,069
4,698,439
19,773,217
4,870,114
8,039,620
3,810,397
2,334,488
10,042,065
17,120,829
16,767,094
3,912,812
12,940,182
3,489,264
7,009,912
10,885,743
2,053,553
2,199,028
777,140
3,883,979
52.8
39.4
20.6
53.7
22.0
54.9
34.4
59.7
14.3
64.7
15.8
28.3
13.9
9.2
40.3
74.2
75.4
17.0
65.3
17.8
35.1
54.7
12.8
13.9
4.9
24.7
18,290,796
21,840,524
29,271,498
16,452,742
26,667,005
16,574,986
22,055,555
14,206,303
28,157,781
10,788,170
25,953,395
20,368,933
23,602,529
23,040,378
14,876,211
5,953,065
5,470,431
19,103,730
6,876,329
16,113,345
12,961,348
9,015,067
13,989,830
13,621,314
15,082,864
11,840,634
APPENDIX 2
FEE-SETTING METHODOLOGY AT LOGAN (BOS)
Massport charges tenants for the use of the airport facilities according to a
compensatory fee approach. To set the fees it first must determine the cost of
running the facilities. For this purpose, Logan Airport facilities have been classified
into eight cost centers that include 1) landing fields, 2) terminal building, 3) general
aviation facilities, 4) airline support, 5) parking, 6) non-aeronautical, 7) roadways
and access, and 8)airport service facilities. Table 1 contains a sample part of the
expenditure allocation prepared by Massport at the end of August 2000 to help set
the fees for fiscal year 2001. To determine the annual direct expenditures, a matrix
is prepared with each cost center assigned a column and each row representing an
expenditure line item (e.g., pumping station, fire training area, [airline X] hangar,
parking garage management, etc.). The dollar amount of the rows will be placed on
the column corresponding to the cost center where the expense should be allocated
(Rows A, B and C). The sum of all amounts in the columns will provide the total
direct expenses of each cost center.
The next step is to allocate expenses of line items48 whose costs can be distributed
among several cost centers (e.g., electrical maintenance, field maintenance,
building maintenance, fire control, state police, etc.). These costs are assigned to
cost centers on a percent basis, in proportion to the estimated value of the services
to be received. For example, the 2001 budgeted expenses for the state police (Row
D) were assigned depending on the amount of services projected to be provided to
each cost center. The projections indicate, that the majority of the services to be
provided by the State Police, and thus the expenses, will be allocated to the terminal
buildings (41.2%) and the landing fields (15.5%).
48 Massport labels these line items as undistributed expenses.
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Table 1 Extract of BOS Allocation of Budgeted Expenses (Y/E 6-30-01)
FY 01
Budget General Non- Airport
Exclude Landing Terminal Aviation Airline aeronauti Roadways Service
Utilities fields Buildinges Facilities supp .ort Parking cal and Access Facilities
A Noise Mgmt. 1,149,431 1,149,431
B Parking Meters 92,229 92,229
C Terminal B 1,602,396 1,602,396
% 100.00% 15.50% 41.20% 1.00% 9.54% 9.54% 9.54% 9.55% 4.13%
D 2080 State Police Amount 1,938,676 300,495 798,735 19,387 184,950 184,950 184,950 185,144 80,067
E Airport Service 152,507 1,302,893 12,664 534,423 178,062 375,984 74,855 (2,631,389)Facilities_____________ 
____
F ARoadwaAllocation 3,738,477 1,580,354 42,866 735,921 3,200,072 1,019,075 (10,316,764)
Totals 75,058,156 22,819,954 20,234,935 131,484 3,105,334 26,701,425 2,065,024 0 0
Percent 100.00 % 30.40% 26.96% 0.18% 4.14% 35.57% 2.75% 0.00% 0.00%
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority
Some cost centers have expenses, that are allocated to other cost centers. For
example, Airport Service Facilities and Roadways and Access 49 (Rows E and F) have
expenses allocated to all other cost centers. The amount charged to all other cost
centers is then subtracted from the "charging" cost center. Finally, office expenses
and taxes are allocated to all cost centers in proportion to the services to be
rendered and/or tax liability. At BOS over 90% of the cost centers expenditures are
allocated among Landing Fields, the Terminal Buildings and Parking.
49 A detailed analysis of roads usage is prepared to allocate the corresponding expense proportion.
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Table 2 Landing Fee Computation for Logan Airport (in thousand dollars)
Totals FY 01 Totals FY 00
1 Amortization & Interest 20,016 19,051
2 Equipment--Amortization & Interest 802 803
3 Equipment--Expense 381 1,020
4 Maintenance & Operation Expense 21,955 19,649
Excluding Snow Removal Contract
Services
5 Administration Expenses Including 13,179 11,748
AVSEC Level IlIl Security
6 Contract Snow Removal Services 864 864
7 Allocated Portion of Estimated Tax 1,873 1,792
Liability
8 Credits Applied (4,521) (3,991)
9 Prior Years Adjustment to Actual (FY00) (1,751) (1,047)
10 Bad Debt Write-Offs (@ 10% Over Five 124 149
Years)
Annual Cost of Public Aircraft Facilities 52,922 50,038
Scheduled Air Carrier Projected Weights 24,000 23,350
In Thousand Pounds (1)
Landing Fee Per Thousand Pound 2.21 2.14
(1) 1% Increase over FY00 Actual Weights
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority
Landing fees
Setting the landing fees is a simple and straightforward procedure. Under the
compensatory scheme the airport has to recover the cost of operating the landing
field. In order to set the landing fees for the next year airport administrators have to
prepare a budget and air traffic projections. Table A.2 shows BOS landing fee
computation calculations for fiscal year 2001.50 The expenses list has 10 line items
50 This is a preliminary calculation and was subject to later revisions.
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including amortization and interest, maintenance and operations, and administration
expenses. Adjustments regarding prior year overpayments are included (Row 10).
The sum of all 10 line items in Table A.2 shows projected expenses of $52.9 million
for fiscal year 2001. Next, projected scheduled air carrier weights in thousand
pounds for the year are incorporated. The projected weight in thousand pounds for
BOS for fiscal year 2001 was 24 million. The landing fee per thousand pounds is
found by dividing the budgeted cost of operating the airfield by the projected weight
in thousand pounds. BOS landing fee for 2001 was set at $2.21 per thousand
pounds.
Figure 3 Historical trend of landing fees at BOS
2.30 -
2.20 N2 2.21
2.10
2.00
1.90
1.80
1.70
1.60
2.15 2.14 2.14
2.04
1.69
1.69
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Fiscal Year
1998 1999 2000 2001
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority
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1992
TERMINAL RENTAL COMPUTATION AT LOGAN AIRPORT
To calculate the space rental rates and passenger fees for a terminal building space,
Massport uses the procedure shown in Table 1 (the example is the actual calculation
for a terminal building at BOS FY2001). The process begins with a breakdown of the
square footage in the building and a determination of the total annual costs of
operating and maintaining the terminal. Rent differentials are applied, to account for
differences in the type of space being used. Then the differentials are multiplied by
the relevant square footage to produce a dollar amount that is subtracted from the
total annual cost of the terminal.
To find the average rental rate (ARR), the adjusted net annual costs are divided by
the gross square footage of the terminal. In this case the rate is $33.90. The next
step is to allocate the cost to the different areas of the terminal. Using the average
rental rate, a dollar value is given to every space in the terminal. Then, the $3.00
and $13.50 rental rate differentials are added to the average rate for Type 2 and
Type 3 spaces respectively.
The next step is the allocation of public space value (PSV). First, it is necessary to
distinguish between FIS and non-FIS public space. This is done on the basis of the
percentage of passengers using the FIS and non-FIS areas. In the case of this
terminal the projections show that about 52% of the users will be inbound
international passengers, while the remaining 48% will be outbound (domestic and
international) and inbound domestic passengers. Next an adjustment is made for
the results of the previous year. The adjustment amount represents the difference
between payments made by the tenants based on the prior year projections and the
true costs calculated on the basis of the actual passenger count.
Finally, the calculation of the terminal building rental rates is made. Type 1 rental
rate is charged for the use of non-FIS public space. The value is calculated by
dividing the annual value of the non-FIS public space by the total tenant space. In
this case the rate is $15.86. This amount is added to the base rate
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Table 1 Terminal Rental Calculation
1 Square Footage Summary
Type 1 bagagge sq. ft. 24,318
Type 1 Common Baggage sq. ft. 1,318
Type 2 Office sq. ft. 84,400
Type 2 Common Office sq. ft. 337
Type 3 Finished sq. ft. 31,755
Type 3 Common Finished sq. ft. 440
Common Holdrooms 19,133
Subtotal 161,701
FIS sq. ft. 75,890
Total Rentable sq. ft. 237,591
Public sq. ft. 112,558
Total sq. ft 350,149
2 Annual Costs in thousands (FY01)
Amortization & Interest 3,159,000
Maintenance & Operating Expenses 6,071,000
Administrative Expenses 3,520,000
Utilities 1,708,000
Roadway & Access Allocation
Allocated Portion of Tax Liability 560,000
Less Free Bagagge Cart Expense (388,000)
Prior Year Expense Adjustment to Actual 416,000
Maintenance Reserve Deposit Fee for PFC 316,000
Projects
Total Annual cost 15,362,000
3 Rental Rate Differentials
Type 2 Office Space $3.00
Type 3 Finished Premises $13.50
Sq. Ft. Rate Diff.
Type 2 Office sq. ft. 84,400 $3.00 (253,200)
Type 2 Common Office sq. ft. 337 $3.00 (1,011)
Type 3 Finished sq. ft. 31,755 $13.50 (428,693)
Type 3 Common Finished sq. ft. 440 $13.50 (5,940)
Common Holdrooms 19,133 $13.50 (258,296)
FIS sq. ft. $13.50 (1,024,515)
75,890
Public sq. ft. 112,558 $13.50 (1,519,533)
(3,491,187) (3,491,187)
Adjusted Net Annual Costs 11,870,813
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority
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Table 1-(Continued)
4 Setting of Average Rental Rate
Adjusted Net Annual Costs 11,870,813
Gross Square Footage of Terminal 350,149
Average Rental Rate (ARR) $ 33.90
5 Allocation of Terminal Costs
Tenant Space: Sq. Ft. ARR DIFF TOTAL
Type 1 Baggage 25,636 $33.90 N/A $33.90 869,116
Type 2 Office 84,737 $33.90 $3.00 $36.90 3,126,980
Type 3 Finished 32,195 $33.90 $13.50 $47.40 1,526,113
Common Holdrooms 19,133 $33.90 $13.50 $47.40 906,946
Total Value of Tenant Space 6,429,155
FIS Space Value 75,890 $33.90 $13.50 $47.40 3,597,351
Public Space Value (PSV) 112,558 $33.90 $13.50 $47.40 5,335,494
Total Terminal Value 15,362,000
6 Allocation of Public Space Value % Cost
Projected Inbound Intl. Passengers (FIS) 1,675,000 52 2,774,457
Projected Outbound Passengers (Non-FIS) 1,250,000 39
Projected Inbound Domestic Passengers (Non-FIS) 300,000 9
Sub-Total (Non-FIS) 1,550,000 48 2,561,037
Total 3,225,000 100 5,335,494
Projected Common Space Usage 500
7 FY00 Actual Passenger Adjustment to Actual
Inbound (428,728)
Outbound (259,032)
Total FY00 Paxs. Adj. To Actual (687,760)
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority
resulting in $49.75 sq. ft. The other two rental rates are calculated by adding their
corresponding differential to the average rental rate. Then the common space rate is
calculated by multiplying the rate assigned to each type by the square footage. This
provides the total cost of all spaces, which is $111,198. Since the objective of this
calculation is to recover the cost for the use of the facilities, the airport operator will
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have to estimate how much this common space will be used. Then, the total cost
(which in this case was $111,198) is divided by the projected usage (500), resulting
in the price the operator will charge ($222.31) for the use of the common space.
Table 1-(Continued)
8 Calculation of Terminal building rates
Type 1 (Base) Rate
Average Rental Rate $33.90
Annual Value of Non-FIS Public Space 2,561,037
Total Tenant Space 161,701
Non-FIS Allocated Public Space Rate $15.84
Type 1 Rental Rate $49.74
Type 2 Rental Rate
Type 2 Rental Rate Differential $3.00
Type 2 Rental Rate $52.74
Type 3 Rental Rate
Type 2 Rental Rate Differential $13.50
Type 2 Rental Rate $63.24
Common Space Rate Per Use
Common Space Sq. Fl. RATE COST
Type 1 Baggage 1,318 $49.74 $65,558
Type 2 Office 337 $52.74 $17,773
Type 3 Finished 440 $63.24 $27,826
$111,157
Projected Usage 500
Cost per Use $222.31
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority
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In addition to the rent for the use of space, airlines pay a fee per passenger served.
The fee depends on the services and space usage. Table 2 displays the fee
calculation procedure. The passenger fee rates are separated into three main
categories: inbound international, outbound, and inbound domestic. The base
charge per international inbound passenger includes charges for the use of the FIS
facilities. The cost per international inbound passenger was $3.84, which includes
charges for the use of FIS facilities, baggage handling fee and AvioBridge fee. The
fee per outbound passenger (domestic and international) was set at $0.78; while the
fee per inbound domestic passenger was set at $0.26.
Table 2 Calculation of Passenger Fee Rates
9 Calculation of Passenger Fee Rates
Inbound International
Base Inbound fee
Total annual value of FIS space
Total public space value allocated to FIS
Annual passenger adjustment to actual
Sub Total
Projected International Inbound PAX
3,597,351
2,774,457
(428,728)
5,943,080
1,675,000
Base Intl. Inbound Fee $ 3.55
Baggage handling fee
Inbound Passenger Service Fees (free bag carts) 387,882
Projected International Inbound PAX 1,675,000
Inbound Intl. Passenger Baggage Fee $ 0.23
Avio Bridge fee
Avio Bridge annual costs 180,706
Projected percentage inbound passenger/total 52%
Allocation of Avio Bridge cost to inbound PAX 93,967
Projected inbound Intl. Passengers (FIS) 1,675,000
Avio Bridge fee per inbound passenger $ 0.06
Total International Inbound Fee $ 3.84
Note: Adjustments were made to simplify the table. Total reflect Massport final figure
Source: Massachusetts Port Authority
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Large Hubs Aeronautical Operating Revenues, Fiscal Year 1996
Airport Landing Fees Terminal Apron Fuel_Flowage Utilities FBO Cargo Security Miscellaneous Other Aero Fees Total
1 ATL
2 ORD
3 LAX
4 DFW
5 SFO
6 DEN
7 MSP
8 DTW
9 MIA
10 LAS
11 EWR
12 PHX
13 IAH
14 JFK
15 STL
16 MCO
17 SEA
18 BOS
19 LGA
20 PHL
21 HNL
22 CVG
23 CLT
24 SLC
25 AD
26,006,832
92,736,229
97,010,000
73,082,000
28,782,982
86,562,044
22,097,000
56,479,837
40,651,000
22,426,000
91,317,000
18,504,645
40,233,000
142,777,000
30,738,685
39,572,000
28,629,218
45,349,301
91,028,000
26,738,976
31,909,488
16,874,754
9,634,000
10,816,699
21,641,740
144,422,074
34,471,000
12,881,000
34,340.328
238,145,480
11,147,000
18,971,492
95,257,000
39,525,000
98,314,000
34,716,661
42,154,000
146,330,000
21,786,993
49,744,000
0
32,917,645
26,936,000
47,285,929
39,378,379
12,590,502
20,856,000
17,364,719
4,041,601
0
2,293,000
0
47,915
0
4,242,000
0
3,450,000
5,215,000
0
115,912
486,000
0
263,998
3,247,000
0
2,618,193
0
2,608,233
179,489
3,941,101
0
0
168,494
5,585,429
670,000
0
1,257,831
0
132,000
0
0
963,000
29,449,000
1,942,906
1,022,000
9,092,000
347,257
2,000,000
77,682
0
1,004,000
922,106
231,400
0
29,900
224,437
0
638,823
1,734,000
11,165,000
11,859,167
0
1,264,000
4,219,646
0
0
7,179,000
0
0
43,199,000
1,175,347
55,000
3,109,937
11,502,609
9,121,000
2,874,844
103,746
2,672,232
0
466,713
187,307
1,178,493
0
2,014,000
342,900
55,023
451,000
0
0
2,949,000
0
781,751
0
0
1,470,655
2,003,000
0
1,954,971
0
628,645
0
165,776
742,342
119,488
12,050,010
4,923,670
8,023,000
1,741,000
15,074,826
3,535,292
13,690,000
0
0
0
19,201.000
1,543,112
4,651,000
79,766,000
1,911,448
2,786,000
423,438
12,534,675
3,758,000
2,629,327
280,259
872,800
6,896,582
1,455,501
6,437,228
0
0
0
1,934,240
989,337
455,000
0
0
0
0
0
1,288,000
0
0
2,281,000
52,535
906,241
0
1,207,696
0
0
0
423,400
0
735,958
1,171,000
3,344,000
69,804
1,788,405
154,000
0
0
969,000
0
74,739
0
0
118,873
6,000
1,120,715
0
0
381,513
4,323,837
327,560
0
1,567,144
4,555,946
0
0
3,225,000
494,455
13,552,077
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-23,433,000
0
0
0
586,540
13,023,486
628,850
0
4,719,048
75,089,158
250,220,676
145,372,000
107,452,000
94,204,448
344,627,658
53,632,000
79,670,975
139,358,000
72,047,000
245,460,000
57,679,726
89,834,000
421,164,000
57,813,256
78,261,000
33,413,525
107,783,635
131,847,000
85,863,809
89,430,084
38,073,575
38,158,824
37,157,149
26 PIT 22,568,952 44,404,959 2,272,875 43,170 3,378,655 77,792 9,929,036 0 0 14,575,187 97,250,626
27 BW1 14,178,717 13,358,262 478,435 75,087 110,752 837,229 1,682,243 570,338 0 0 31,291,063
28 SAN 11,143,461 13,839.228 0 120,740 75,937 0 0 0 0 838,581 26,017,947
29 TPA 11,253,079 22,611,910 488,221 284,610 271,817 760,466 1,033,919 0 608,423 748,546 38,060,991
30 DCA 23,032,700 27,412,800 0 0 3,533,400 770,081 0 0 0 2,146,229 56,895,210
Totals 1,252,133,599 1,362,804,101 35,988,973 55,643,049 119,710,625 17,489,919 210,392,138 16,545,015 16,760,971 35,660,945 3,123,129,335
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
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Large Hubs Operating Expenses, Fiscal Year 1996
Airport
1 ATL
2 ORD
3 LAX
4 DFW
5 SFO
6 DEN
7 MSP
8 DTW
9 MIA
10 LAS
11 EWR
12 PHX
13 IAH
14 JFK
15 STL
16 MCO
17 SEA
18 BOS
19 LGA
20 PHL
21 HNL
22 CVG
23 CLT
24 SLC
25 IAD
Personnel
Compensation
25,081,729
122,699,415
70,136,000
67,183,000
70,700,898
54,105,270
26,341,000
36,466,908
135,067,000
29,541,000
56,572,000
26,883,258
39,659,000
85,011,000
24,466,710
33,691,000
37,711,610
50,532,103
39,731,000
27,329,987
22,128,705
13,513,917
7,357,464
16,712,670
Communications
2,726,570
20,253,497
15,416,000
10,314,000
17,746,868
32,809,648
6,106,000
8,523,995
30,614,000
6,530,000
6,257,000
7,296,793
8,689,000
52,338,000
5,065,208
18,394,000
6,952,452
15,532,831
7,643,000
8,147,922
11,003,919
6,489,643
2,788,240
3,367,995
Other Operating
26 PIT 23,580,883 15,248,886 12,880,960 2,049,107 847,518 0 1,905,137 44,500,088 101,012,579
27 BWI 14,680,551 4,582,741 3,684,507 20,930,869 341,216 0 974,555 760,103 45,954,542
28 SAN 1,293,398 1,958,694 4,147,137 5,190,267 326,692 0 232,965 32,569,742 45,718,895
29 TPA 13,822,234 5,346,619 8,478,356 9,335,488 835,518 0 287,571 4,556,350 42,662,136
30 DCA 28,317,000 3,964,000 16,333,000 0 1,880,000 0 0 26,508,000 77,002,000
Totals 1,200,316,710 342,107,521 522,212,710 554,863,363 52,817,830 30,712,692 85,916,146 486,153,647 3,275,100,619
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
Supplies
18,891,744
57,174,747
14,040,000
0
32,580,416
21,392,883
9,035,000
9,043,051
49,896,000
8,800,000
65,638,000
8,454,687
3,506,000
72,788,000
4,393,796
12,845,000
15,225,725
6,326,810
24,246,000
15,728,454
12,098,090
6,374,739
5,097,022
3,112,586
Services
6,379,279
29,558,570
76,546,000
17,222,000
26,584,068
28,861,221
1,021,000
31,249,436
57,657,000
11,503.000
23,464,000
20,261,104
39,337,000
27,839,000
14,205,153
2,800,000
6,805,981
20,526,584
21,067,000
22,834,016
14,340.283
1,930,392
5,871,633
9,493,912
insurance
1,116,562
6,561,437
5,334,000
0
932,907
1,540,753
1,114,000
2,131,718
6,124,000
1,505,000
3,412,000
402,475
645,000
7,208,000
599,723
680,000
1,458,149
1,464,311
2,747,000
664,145
1,171,617
669,759
521,167
583,163
Government
139,128
0
0
0
532,595
0
0
0
0
0
1,680,000
1,833
0
1,003,000
0
5,827,000
22,257
8,103,704
181,000
18,931
13,203,244
0
0
0
Miscellaneous
81,544
15,452,910
3,429,000
10,265,000
962,204
726,233
2,042,000
1,311,340
16,847,000
942,000
7,485,000
622,281
0
6,201,000
50,000
-210,000
1,954,909
6,200,070
3,705,000
2,593,554
613,091
923,176
11,738
306,868
Expenses
3,890,436
90,361,522
11,417,000
45,800,000
0
0
7,870,000
0
15,515,000
0
35,264,000
0
0
66,953,000
0
15,514,000
13,467,614
19,772,746
49,514,000
1,920,046
0
0
0
0
Total
58,306,992
342,062,098
196,318,000
150,784,000
150,039,956
139,436,008
53,529,000
88,726,448
311,720,000
58,821,000
199,772,000
63,922,431
91,836,000
319,341,000
48,780,590
89,541,000
83,598,697
128,459,159
148,834,000
79,237,055
74,558,949
29,901,626
21,647,264
33,577,194
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Large Hubs Aeronautical Operating Revenues, Fiscal Year 1998
Other Aero
Airport Landing Fees Terminal Apron FuelFlowage Utilities FBO Cargo Security Miscellaneous Fees Total
1 ATL 26,382,789 30,151,801 5,068,864 2,052,090 0 189,895 0 6,365,574 0 5,341,999 75,553,01
2 ORD 124,001,569 155,405,795 0 5,487,308 882,993 1,103,047 4,701,812 0 0 0 291,582,52
3 LAX 79,634,000 43,298,000 1,658,000 390,000 1,087,000 0 8,649,000 0 726,000 0 135,442,00(
4 DFW 65,344,000 3,344,000 127,000 1,913,000 12,053,000 0 1,718,000 0 0 12,372,465 96,871,46
5 SFO 44,988,249 51,693,836 225,523 1,341,652 13,322,362 1,460,741 16,826,315 1,873,104 80,865 3,427,637 135,240,28
6 DEN 76,386,656 255,532,624 0 0 0 55,023 4,317,234 1,048,695 2,603,428 12,510,913 352,454,573
7 MSP 27,638,000 15,427,000 5,232,000 162,000 1,637,000 494,000 2,878,000 0 912,000 0 54,380,000
8 DTW 52,473,183 18,841,497 0 0 3,351,582 0 0 0 0 0 74,666,262
9 MIA 49,378,943 108,067,847 6,231,244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 163,678,034
10 LAS 23,260,000 39,862,000 5,191,000 1,137,000 0 3,321,000 0 0 771,000 0 73,542,000
11 EWR 87,089,000 131,784,000 0 31,584,000 6,718,000 0 19,919,000 0 0 0 277,094,000
12 PHX 18,214,793 40,392,501 107,861 269,805 0 831,492 1,682,924 0 27,690 0 61,527,066
13 IAH 42,275,000 42,876,000 353,000 1,111,000 0 0 3,147,000 1,270,000 0 0 91,032,000
14 JFK 139,402,000 113,814,000 0 8,577,000 60,815,000 0 87,444,000 0 0 0 410,052,000
15 STL 35,143,097 16,068,682 167,358 212,244 1,931,985 4,208 2,326,784 0 817,484 0 56,671,842
16 MCO 40,352,000 35,224,000 3,320,000 1,074,000 49,000 1,228,000 2,921,000 2,455,000 2,406,000 -14,986,000 74,043,000
17 SEA 35,720,259 28,786,360 0 74,774 3,282,344 0 1,093,089 43,073 0 0 68,999,899
18 BOS 50,809,442 36,997,479 2,630,159 0 12,494,590 2,051,530 12,867,952 847,340 0 0 118,698,492
19 LGA 88,333,000 32,840,000 0 1,010,000 8,302,000 0 3,908,000 0 0 0 134,393,000
20 PHL 23,660,294 44,845,077 2,996,475 1,050,315 2,753,447 635,208 2,554,241 1,376,206 404,244 485,621 80,761,128
21 HNL 2,192,795 40,484,366 79,171 352,366 1,151,946 0 330,750 0 0 10,428,804 55,020,198
22 CVG 14,650,738 12,566,299 4,108,939 0 2,858,063 160,000 877,102 0 96,206 6,764,991 42,082,338
23 CILT 8,053,000 19,899,823 0 70,977 0 703,200 5,426,137 0 0 0 34,153,137
24 SLC 15,439,216 19,306,988 0 312,213 314,679 94,925 1,675,697 490,439 2,244,130 5,168,278 45,046,565
25 IAD 22,764,400 0 0 0 4,335,700 0 0 0 40,262 59,129,500 86,269,862
26 PIT 19,399,697 47,889,385 2,888,948 265,611 2,879,729 77,792 10,167,265 0 0 13,930,173 97,498,600
27 aWI 15,570,160 13,548,769 484,257 263,545 122,859 882,664 1,959,458 689,370 5,940 0 33,527,022
28 SAN 16,031,530 19,850,335 0 147,609 4,533 0 0 0 0 2,067,434 38,101,441
29 TPA 10,023,362 18,910,729 576,540 365,266 222,824 851,247 799,510 0 488,848 574,854 32,813,180
30 DCA 24,417,400 0 0 0 3,296,600 0 0 0 542,891 59,595,000 87,851,891
Totals 1,279,028,572 1,437,709,193 41,446,339 59,223,775 143,867,236 14,143,972 198,190,270 16,458,801 12,166,988 176,811,669 3,379,046,815
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
2
4
Large Hubs Non-Aeronautical Operating Revenues, Fiscal Year 1998
cessions Parking Rental Cars
38,587,606 59,111,899 27,057,171
42,148,106 74,456,322 20,074,385
80,176,000 53,799,000 36,089,000
25,803,000 63,461,000 27,073,000
46,963,783 62,967,736 30,345,876
16,875,306 66,288,624 27,308,210
10,709,000 35,052,000 10,567,000
14,594,012 24,898,443 11,837,463
137,494,713 30,317,427 18,494,819
20,589,000 11,445,000 16,676,000
13,582,000 57,545,000 21,915,000
6,747,118 34,475,839 25,396,196
16,455,000 39,214,000 15,828,000
35,678,000 29,412,000 8,112,000
8,907,186 9,690,839 8,639,885
35,139,000 25,597,000 39,985,000
13,038,762 40,397,989 15,209,603
20,532,444 58,213,870 18,467,402
8,162,000 29,363,000 10,356,000
8,206,005 19,565,769 12,492,086
130,082,984 10,661,700 5,355,856
2,669,258 10,779,237 4,327,171
8,810,017 16,099,000 6,540,983
6,133,451 16,631,498 10,368,804
4,764,900 23,285,017 10,621,200
8,746,223 17,021,496 8,027,701
7,492,812 28,038,928 12,042,413
15,445,868 9,255,270 0
5,642,977 26,397,667 16,254,928
6,033,000 17,112,096 14,672,200
796,209,531 1,000,554,666 490,135,352
Catering Interest
0
50,869
125,000
0
0
1,029,978
481,000
1,224,003
0
1,871,000
6,203,000
0
1,272,000
27,596,000
860,452
1,862,000
2,940,181
0
6,525,000
2,808,351
2,113,956
2,159,679
1,415,570
1,697,689
4,144,200
0
633,358
0
843,614
1,578,000
69,434,900
Miscellaneous
1,484,221
1,687,243
2,332,000
5,651,000
0
6,556,271
2,496,000
0
0
745,000
5,831,000
2,932,903
997,000
5,045,000
2,847,688
1,587,000
3,501,809
5,530,826
2,499,000
759,853
3,895,321
550,241
0
669,555
1,434,700
384,810
814,142
30,970
2,391,938
541,100
63.196,591
Other Non Aero
Fees Total Nonaeronautical Total Operating
2,597,213
0
5,044,000
4,267,743
0
0
1,313,000
0
0
24,755,000
33,493,000
1,378,524
3,334,000
72,658,000
7,828,588
26,807,000
3,304,177
5,843,990
25,507,000
1,202,819
1,524,750
0
0
0
12,364,739
271,327
763,287
978,984
2,345,975
5,661,595
243,244,711
158,398,142
155,287,612
254,221,000
134,199,743
141,181,632
120,435,081
62,565,000
52,553,921
287,067,048
87,194,000
138,818,000
86,884,652
83,013,000
183,388,000
39,550,593
134,316,000
85,334,795
115,284,376
85,062,000
45,940,240
157,860,700
21,513,341
32,903,863
41,505,171
61,008,356
35,498,278
51,405,748
29,695,577
59,738,266
52,414,491
2,994,238,626
233,951,154
446,870,136
389,663,000
231,071,208
276,421,916
472,889,654
116,945,000
127,220,183
450,745,082
160,736,000
415,912,000
148,411,718
174,045,000
593,440,000
96,222.435
208,359,000
154,334,694
233,982,868
219,455,000
126,701,368
212,880,898
63,595,679
67,057,000
86,551,736
147,278,218
132,996,878
84,932,770
67,797,018
92,551,446
140,266,382
6,373,285,441
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
ConAirport
ATL
ORD
LAX
DFW
SFO
DEN
MSP
DTW
MIA
LAS
EWR
PHX
IAH
JFK
STL
MCO
SEA
BOS
LGA
PHL
HNL
CVG
CLT
SLC
lAD
PIT
BWI
SAN
TPA
DCA
Totals
Rent
29,191,181
16,870,687
76,656,000
7,944,000
904,237
1,604,989
1,947,000
0
100,760,089
11,113,000
249,000
15,954,072
5,913,000
4,887,000
775,955
3,339,000
6,942,274
6,695,844
2,650,000
905,357
4,226,133
1,027,755
38,293
6,004,174
4,393,600
1,046,721
1,620,808
3,984,485
5,861,167
6,816,500
330,322,321
Royalties
368,851
0
0
0
0
771,703
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,140,554
Large Hubs Operating Expenses, Fiscal Year 1998
Personnel Other Operating
Airport Compensation Communications Supplies Services Insurance Government Miscellaneous Expenses Total
1 ATL 28,511,115 2,913,827 17,909,885 7,369,437 675,084 237,666 65,553 3,346,116 61,028,683
2 ORD 132,200,465 22,657,944 65,794,067 25,775,238 5,776,350 0 9,506,322 2,415,396 264,125,782
3 LAX 83,719,000 17,580,000 17,655,000 82,427,000 5,569,000 0 8,941,000 1,554,000 217,445,000
4 DFW 78,464,000 9,618,000 8,555,000 19,095,000 2,496,000 0 0 1,623,377 119,851,377
5 SFO 84,176,283 17,309,227 37,425,908 41,347,310 1,572,644 536,918 2,265,866 0 184,634,156
61,389,859
32,433,000
35,700,862
138,665,138
37,982,000
57,551,000
29,665,522
42,234,000
72,154,000
27,478,585
32,869,000
45,392,812
53,410,131
40,757,000
27,868,308
24,936,609
16,386,167
8,108,497
20,609,122
35,395,743
25,732,579
15,703,008
2,585,092
15,325,173
30,302,100
1,337,706,170
34,246,921
6,466,000
9,366,128
39,586,149
7,044,000
7,572,000
8,347,960
9,201,000
56,668,000
4,448,945
8,871,000
7,824,022
14,988,574
7,273,000
8,754,532
10,742,681
5,384,187
3,196,094
3,240,249
0
15,820,693
5,188,879
2,902,190
4,980,335
0
352,192,537
24,110,236
10,415,000
8,240,351
73,778,945
10,334,000
76,607,000
10,428,314
5,023,000
73,564,000
5,799,247
17,240,000
6,281,291
6,300,116
31,049,000
14,413,129
16,726,162
10,049,255
6,182,407
3,759,589
19,712,039
10,839,825
2,157,665
710,883
8,829,652
23,498,000
623,388,966
39,387,012
1,543,000
26,165,205
32,253,525
14,085,000
23,614,000
23,718,045
43,438,000
9,531,000
19,689,645
25,486,000
17,100,142
22,825,327
4,636,000
30,755,049
17,903,256
894,737
6,892,736
14,674,191
0
2,978,069
26,782,363
5,939,168
8,112,843
0
594,418,298
1,601,753
1,013,000
1,346,804
6,273,196
1,203,000
3,963,000
431,835
136,000
5,672,000
519,067
706,000
763,714
1,387,831
3,024,000
673,503
1,287,956
556,441
445,266
677,841
207,602
590,978
359,415
316,815
870,509
1,961,300
52,077,904
0
0
0
0
0
0
6,770
0
0
0
537,000
0
10,153,723
0
7,120
5,366,272
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16,845,469
3,082,255
2,606,000
1,262,329
9,324,347
880,000
7,849,000
564,578
0
10,611,000
0
1,400,000
4,000,950
5,930,942
5,229,000
-89,750
350,942
772,071
0
0
0
1,612,237
1,184,640
0
98,029
0
77,447,311
5,786,473
9,376,000
0
24,247,282
0
44,039,000
0
0
129,281,000
0
18,186,000
18,164,201
19,614,738
55,744,000
2,070,932
13,696
0
0
0
52,053,296
44,265,182
769,775
25,509,514
5,202,944
49,900,350
513,163,272
169,604,509
63,852,000
82,081,679
324,128,582
71,528,000
221,195,000
73,163,024
100,032,000
357,481,000
57,935,489
105,295,000
99,527,132
134,611,382
147,712,000
84,452,823
77,327,574
34,042,858
24,825,000
42,960,992
107,368,680
101,839,563
52,145,745
37,963,662
43,419,485
105,661,750
3,567,239,927
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
DEN
MSP
DTW
MIA
LAS
EWR
PHX
IAH
JFK
STIL
MCO
SEA
BOS
LGA
PHL
HNL
CVG
CLT
SLC
[AD
PIT
BWI
SAN
TPA
DCA
Totals
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Large Hubs Operating Expenses, Fiscal Year 1999
Personnel Other Operating
Airport Compensation Communications Supplies Services Insurance Government Miscellaneous Expenses Total
1 ATL 30,137,759 2,903,167 20,623,085 6,917,475 1,206,488 143,488 408,280 2,896,238 65,235,980
2 ORD 141,473,054 21,623,376 82,930,633 34,883,869 5,301,109 0 12,301,366 3,052,270 301,565,677
3 LAX 95,162,639 19,058,866 22,877,600 84,346,911 4,809,196 0 10,808,158 1,601,685 238,665,055
4 DFW 76,320,988 11,381,502 8,738,415 32,641,672 1,705,981 0 -813,895 1,353,116 131,327,779
5 SFO 97,329,271 11,284,091 21,274,440 74,195,019 1,191,802 1,094,560 3,657,299 210,026,482
6 DEN 68,023,383 34,634,905 32,661,532 53,600,707 1,654,193 0 756,760 3,074,652 194,406,132
7 PHX 31,144,901 7,073,206 11,128,749 33,479,398 976,771 0 105,710 83,908,735
8 LAS 43,828,000 9,668,000 13,626,000 15,763,000 1,387,000 0 1,312,000 85,584,000
9 DTW 45,708,362 7,620,610 10,513,743 38,280,837 1,146,417 0 1,726,618 104,996,587
10 EWR 59,968,000 9,277,000 89,775,000 66,821,000 4,830,000 0 10,979,000 43,161,000 284,811,000
11 MSP 34,497,000 7,318,000 12,053,000 1,606,000 1,172,000 0 2,595,000 11,676,000 70,917,000
12 MIA 136,063,000 38,723,000 98,912,000 25,763,000 5,461,000 0 79,000 305,001,000
13 IAH 50,463,000 10,893,000 16,132,000 38,230,000 364,000 0 0 116,082,000
14 JFK 74,815,000 55,375,000 78,352,000 18,299,000 6,196,000 0 10,694,000 132,737,000 376,468,000
15 STL 30,538,872 5,120,729 5,580,160 20,768,080 610,702 0 0 62,618,543
16 MCO 34,828,000 9,358,000 20,114,000 29,402,000 659,000 0 3,428,000 17,760,000 115,549,000
17 SEA 53,924,872 7,417,811 4,917,558 16,519,637 966,423 0 2,395,772 22,251,913 108,393,986
18 BOS 57,270,535 16,076,113 6,967,401 25,890,071 1,277,275 10,400,395 6,507,168 22,291,581 146,680,539
19 LGA 43,325,000 7,784,000 40,231,000 13,277,000 2,965,000 2,000 4,087,000 56,517,000 168,188,000
20 PHL 29,531,979 9,410,949 16,196,460 35,009,091 3,641,540 6,859 -150,782 7,712,866 101,358,962
21 CLT 8,678,750 3,201,487 6,270,276 8,610,153 602,334 0 0 27,363,000
22 CVG 17,983,949 6,042,435 11,507,270 1,174,952 544,368 0 872,979 38,125,953
23 HNL 25,453,954 10,342,619 18,987,720 16,926,639 1,344,547 6,681,210 380,138 80,116,827
24 PIT 23,537,119 16,300,123 12,666,626 4,073,113 693,362 0 2,203,751 42,483,289 101,957,383
25 BWI 17,978,555 5,545,477 2,717,158 29,531,803 305,839 0 1,402,835 230,549 57,712,216
26 IAD 41,444,700 0 36,366,700 0 1,860,300 0 0 66,160,650 145,832,350
27 SLC 23,161,403 3,075,590 3,833,099 16,263,784 665,065 0 0 46,998,941
28 TPA 16,732,950 5,014,886 9,632,308 8,462,308 534,112 0 80,873 36,096,992 76,554,429
29 SAN 2,911,571 2,756,020 2,180,234 6,557,078 471,518 0 0 31,061,775 45,938,196
30 FLL 14,150,000 2,826,000 1,033,000 23,526,000 963,000 0 571,000 43,069,000
31 DCA 32,105,900 0 27,551,200 0 1,860,300 0 0 52,548,950 114,066,350
Totals 1,458,492,466 357,105,962 746,350,367 780,819,597 57,366,642 18,328,512 76,388,030 554,667,526 4,049,519,102
Source: FAA's Form 5100-127
Large Hubs Aeronautical Operating Revenues, Fiscal Year 2000
Airport Landing Fees Terminal Apron FuelFlowage Utilities FBO Cargo Security Miscellaneous Other Aero Fees Total
1 ATL 24,407,703 53,290,659 7,063,212 2,290,661 0 198,826 0 8,402,699 0 5,545,984 101,199,744
2 ORD 125,845,477 135,472,814 0 5,813,664 957,809 1,780,905 5,146,157 0 0 275,016,826
3 LAX 101,117,305 42,664,124 2,423,672 448,691 1,073,885 0 7,761,758 0 103,824,529 (a) 155,489,435
4 DFW 69,922,221 30,570,213 318,182 3,966,901 13,285,936 0 1,812,454 0 0 11,773,788 131,649,695
5 SFO 70,077,532 89,002,435 855,997 979,336 5,620,303 2,922,600 20,790,546 2,194,859 3,611,160 196,054,768
6 DEN 81,282,885 191,041,132 0 0 0 55,023 5,266,904 1,065,029 2,936,829 14,387,933 296,035,735
7 PHX 20,968,393 43,677,586 67,180 506,336 0 429,954 1,959,316 0 0 67,608,765
8 LAS 29,130,000 51,916,000 6,036,000 2,372,000 0 971,000 0 0 735,000 91,160,000
9 DTW 51,759,001 28,355,276 0 0 7,941,503 0 0 0 0 88,055,780
10 EWR 109,126,000 189,682,000 0 31,763,000 5,993,000 0 23,163,000 0 0 359,727,000
31
MSP
MIA
IAH
JFK
STL
MCO
SEA
BOS
LGA
PHL
CLT
CVG
HNL
PIT
BWI
[AD
SLC
TPA
SAN
FLL
DCA
Totals
39,610,000
52,379,000
25,221,000
177,705,000
40,692,020
20,916,000
59,216,661
52,929,656
93,174,000
33,535,970
11,334,000
15,827,008
25,700,426
16,447,706
18,486,001
28,528,572
16,183,382
8,261,654
16,539,041
9,905,000
28,392,115
1,474,620,729
22,993,000
124,934,000
55,107,000
115,167,000
21,663,209
41,603,000
35,412,568
39,346,134
41,052,000
49,982,340
22,780,187
12,588,725
36,753,310
43,823,134
15,881,931
70,457,055
20,849,801
26,121,251
20,416,910
16,125,000
68,134,988
1,756,864,782
7,413,000
5,966,000
499,000
0
167,358
3,480,000
0
3,552,266
0
3,425,157
0
4,295,116
99,916
2,751,994
836,302
1,836,802
0
218,417
0
551,000
0
51,856,571
496,000
0
291,000
15,198,000
342,213
1,067,000
105,759
0
995,000
1,479,470
93,233
0
350,715
226,849
0
315,780
348,522
446,066
210,925
239,000
50,499
70,396,620
1,417,000
0
0
69,885,000
1,822,653
316,000
5,056,262
12,487,811
10,384,000
2,447,913
0
3,054,271
1,228,343
3,265,973
243,384
7,121,214
347,185
341,573
0
574,000
5,991,814
160,856,832
726,000
0
0
0
17,740
596,000
0
2,622,920
0
864,538
861,515
471,334
0
77,792
245,140
2,414,520
83,894
957,907
0
310,000
2,433,333
19,040,941
3,950,000
0
2,016,000
100,709,000
2,657,335
2,809,000
6,775,991
13,659,387
4,648,000
2,588,351
1,845,000
712,949
369,156
8,730,614
2,261,957
0
2,053,111
1,073,188
0
626,000
0
223,385,174
0
0
0
0
0
2,366,000
131,353
948,275
0
1,697,854
0
0
0
0
849,121
837,211
558,096
-4,596,748
0
1,126,000
2,184,264
17,764,013
279,000
0
0
0
925,130
2,331,000
828,958
0
0
469,919
0
99,813
570,204
0
42,048
0
2,540,390
880,127
0
0
0
16,249,578
109,963
7,744,000
7,309,867
11,045,322
13,728,231
5,927,072
1,076,493
2,903,998
81,552,651
76,884,000
183,279,000
83,134,000
478,664,000
68,287,658
75,484,000
107,527,552
125,546,449
150,253,000
96,601,475
44,657,935
44,359,083
76,117,392
89,052,293
38,845,884
111,511,154
48,891,453
34,779,928
40,070,874
29,456,000
107,187,013
3,872,587,891
(a) The negative $103 milan amount was eliminated from the database.
Sorce: FAAs Form 5100-127
Large Hubs Non-Aeronautical Operating Revenues, Fiscal Year 2000
Other Non Aero
Airport Rent Concessions Parking RentalCars Catering Interest Royalties Miscellaneous Fees Total Nonaeronautical Total Operating
1 ATL 10,612,748 41,499,768 65,083,464 31,097,866 0 174,109 3,005,012 23,181 151,496,148 252,695,892
2 ORD 16,489,887 50,821,902 91,252,210 19,846,217 113,473 0 1,810,734 180,334,423 455,351,249
3 LAX 38,943,283 83,290,644 59,356,211 37,777,347 147,709 0 2,149,842 8,108,073 229,773,109 385,262,544
4 DFW 3,526,364 0 70,921,857 31,825,273 0 0 5,911,827 7,388,406 119,573,727 251,223,422
5 SFO 2,168,810 52,708,746 65,811,068 42,111,077 0 0 4,296,782 167,096,483 363,151,251
6 DEN 1,875,396 23,030,293 77,269,240 31,219,471 1,418,094 1,275,732 6,216,482 142,304,708 438,340,443
7 PHX 22,238,581 10,628,774 40,349,482 31,168,648 0 0 3,258,266 2,668,163 110,311,914 177,920,679
8 LAS 13,351,000 58,499,000 15,450,000 19,749,000 2,512,000 0 400,000 109,961,000 201,121,000
9 DTW 0 17,827,705 35,515,982 19,344,658 1,582,980 0 0 74,271,325 162,327,105
10 EWR 412,000 14,465,000 62,948,000 21,325,000 7,527,000 0 8,344,000 38,224,000 153,245,000 512,972,000
11 MSP 3,644,000 14,796,000 42,951,000 18,556,000 485,000 0 4,395,000 1,704,000 86,531,000 163,415,000
12 MIA 92,070,000 138,211,000 33,576,000 19,392,000 0 0 10,824,000 294,073,000 477,352,000
13 IAH 5,433,000 22,383,000 33,758,000 12,843,000 0 0 2,292,000 1,950,000 78,659,000 161,793,000
14 JFK 3,858,000 36,341,000 33,912,000 9,157,000 28,416,000 0 6,487,000 72,483,000 190,654,000 669,318,000
15 STL 1,196,138 12,372,744 12,394,040 9,816,508 986,563 0 2,860,512 7,828,588 47,455,093 115,742,751
16 MCO 3,481,000 39,696,000 32,806,000 55,491,000 2,158,000 0 1,049,000 27,772,000 162,453,000 237,937,000
17 SEA 7,207,451 17,520,288 47,108,400 18,711,351 3,546,895 0 562,230 4,731,992 99,388,607 206,916,159
18 BOS 11,231,720 21,286,453 71,107,801 20,280,504 0 0 2,686,215 6,031,396 132,624,089 258,170,538
19 LGA 105,000 9,864,000 35,545,000 11,573,000 6,907,000 0 4,560,000 25,555,000 94,109,000 244,362,000
20 PHL 182,431 12,755,329 21,894,091 15,663,025 2,733,066 0 354,519 1,505,494 55,087,955 151,689,430
21 CLT 1,116,742 11,140,575 17,689,000 7,401,748 0 0 0 37,348,065 82,006,000
22 CVG 366,813 7,097,458 16,620,465 3,806,612 1,164,127 0 1,017,679 30,073,154 74,432,237
23 HNL 3,808,883 130,713,231 10,795,600 7,021,961 2,080,660 0 1,515,121 1,939,628 157,875,084 233,992,476
24 PIT 1,481,699 9,071,036 19,456,044 9,142,047 0 0 436,562 297,518 39,884,906 128,937,199
25 BWI 2,133,607 11,875,194 50,103,640 14,844,535 652,689 0 703,785 1,110,869 81,424,319 120,270,203
26 IAD 2,596,649 13,778,678 31,012,228 13,177,485 5,499,300 0 6,334,124 72,398,464 183,909,618
27 SLC 5,874,986 6,803,695 17,984,703 10,633,158 1,915,376 0 1,017,462 44,229,380 93,120,833
28 TPA 5,990,529 8,115,606 33,647,588 20,491,108 922,382 0 145,621 2,409,776 71,722,610 106,502,538
29 SAN 4,713,457 15,597,585 13,976,747 0 0 0 8,397 624,063 34,920,249 74,991,123
30 FLL 5,323,000 14,341,000 25,538,000 10,283,000 448,000 0 655,000 56,588,000 86,044,000
31 DCA 398,025 7,190,839 23,402,684 13,232,623 1,907,000 0 3,666,498 49,797,669 156,984,682
Totals 271,831,199 913,722,543 1,209,236,545 586,982,222 73,123,314 11,449,841 86,963,670 212,355,147 3,355,664,481 7,228,252,372
Soume: FAA's Form 5100-127
Large Hubs Operating Expenses, Fiscal Year 2000
Personnel Other Operating
Airport Compensation Communications Supplies Services Insurance Government Miscellaneous Expenses Total
1 ATL 33,950,000 2,902,358 22,760,007 2,838,787 1,801,716 0 296,717 2,419,275 66,968,860
2 ORD 156,247,993 24,440,497 82,592,342 36,324,458 6,557,949 0 6,948,550 5,247,913 318,359,702
3 LAX 106,131,571 21,056,411 25,331,412 105,102,242 5,223,048 0 19,765,276 -1,703,119 280,906,841
4 DFW 89,556,704 12,274,414 10,145,756 35,341,964 2,850,744 0 12,104 1,074 150,182,760
5 SFO 111,910,110 11,744,123 12,705,309 81,079,774 1,278,859 598,107 2,781,126 222,097,408
6 DEN 72,378,486 37,100,361 34,423,161 45,700,645 1,588,930 0 263,201 30,869,323 222,324,107
7 PHX 34,552,399 8,807,129 10,531,579 37,408,265 983,923 0 8,997 9 92,292,301
8 LAS 48,709,000 9,253,000 6,071,000 24,717,000 1,429,000 0 883,000 91,062,000
9 DTW 49,214,547 11,570,370 11,479,104 38,006,879 1,180,165 0 1,852,090 113,303,155
10 EWR 63,439,000 9,575,000 112,993,000 53,266,000 4,035,000 0 5,564,000 47,102,000 295,974,000
11 MSP 39,814,000 8,678,000 13,924,000 1,412,000 1,102,000 0 2,254,000 13,838,000 81,022,000
12 MIA 143,627,000 37,239,000 92,017,000 50,957,000 5,873,000 0 8,598,000 338,311,000
13 IAH 30,789,000 9,121,000 13,378,000 29,397,000 89,000 0 0 82,774,000
14 JFK 77,955,000 61,166,000 92,183,000 30,594,000 5,411,000 0 19,159,000 131,111,000 417,579,000
15 STL 30,590,979 5,372,671 5,269,799 20,098,704 612,371 0 0 61,944,524
16 MCO 31,963,000 10,671,000 29,568,000 52,938,000 1,077,000 0 2,850,000 5,680,000 134,747,000
17 SEA 57,940,651 20,612,247 5,087,964 18,583,438 994,890 0 4,281,454 22,845,514 130,346,158
18 BOS 60,581,834 15,867,747 6,368,206 27,025,948 1,269,887 9,715,420 7,345,845 21,316,759 149,491,646
19 LGA 44,376,000 8,710,000 43,289,000 4,190,000 2,664,000 0 4,886,000 56,629,000 164,744,000
20 PHL 31,584,183 8,799,443 18,896,897 34,563,140 922,247 2,600 -260,417 4,847,633 99,355,726
21 CLT 9,471,008 3,461,618 7,351,575 8,534,479 553,320 0 0 29,372,000
22 CVG 19,503,111 7,430,178 13,458,922 1,313,321 551,267 0 1,118,226 43,375,025
23 HNL 25,622,180 12,038,706 18,201,481 16,828,255 1,446,053 9,840,479 490,830 84,467,984
24 PIT 19,039,642 17,718,025 12,981,297 12,388,065 655,368 0 2,102,669 43,669,974 108,555,040
25 BWI 20,569,358 5,865,266 2,832,847 32,108,697 276,156 0 1,504,574 497,538 63,654,436
26 IAD 45,516,045 13,515,309 16,154,519 28,018,719 1,766,923 2,029,180 618,197 107,618,892
27 SLC 23,783,305 2,996,548 4,477,058 16,340,439 820,293 0 0 48,417,643
28 TPA 18,667,687 6,473,998 12,156,479 8,459,247 744,135 0 133,006 2,342,970 48,977,522
29 SAN 3,272,211 3,207,388 839,138 6,586,554 481,797 0 0 34,731,635 49,118,723
30 FLL 15,186,000 3,369,000 1,024,000 26,531,000 814,000 0 939,000 47,863,000
31 DCA 33,454,493 8,035,751 6,342,350 21,473,653 1,562,939 2,029,180 1,432,729 74,331,095
Totals 1,549,396,497 419,072,558 744,834,202 908,127,673 56,616,980 24,214,966 95,828,174 421,446,498 4,219,537,548
Source: FAA's Forn 5100-127
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